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The Demography of Latin American Jewry

by U. O. SCHMELZ and SERGIO DELLAPERGOLA

LATIN AMERICAN JEWRY constitutes one of the regional clusters of world Jewry. It is distinct in terms of its geographical location and linguistic setting in countries of overwhelmingly Spanish or Portuguese speech.

Numbering now less than half a million, Latin American Jewry is spread over a vast subcontinent, in countries both large and small, which vary in climatic features, racial and cultural groupings, and economic and political conditions. The Jews of Latin America are clearly subject to diverse influences. Still, their demographic patterns are essentially similar throughout the whole of the region.

The overwhelming majority of Jews now living in Latin America are comparatively recent arrivals. They or their parents or, at most, grandparents settled in the area during this century. Most Latin American Jews are of European, and particularly East European, origin, although there is also a Middle East element. The major Jewish center is Argentina, whose general population is also of predominantly European stock. Jews who live in countries with general populations that are largely Indian or Black, are socially distant from the rural or slum-dwelling majorities, rather forming part of the urban middle and upper classes. All these factors make for a situation in which Latin American Jews exhibit the modern demographic patterns that are characteristic of the advanced regions of the world, encompassing the bulk of contemporary Diaspora Jewry as well. By the same token, Latin American Jews are subject to specific Jewish identity problems, with their demographic consequences, that are prevalent in many Jewish communities in the contemporary Diaspora.

The essential demographic similarity of Latin American Jewry to most other Diaspora populations—and, indeed, to the general populations of the developed regions—is of heuristic importance. It not only permits revealing comparisons, but also allows room for a judicious adducing of analogies from comparable populations where direct statistical information on the Jews of Latin America is deficient.

Half of all Latin American Jews live in a single country—Argentina—while about 70 per cent reside in two countries—Argentina and Brazil.

Note: The research reported in this article was carried out at the division of Jewish demography and statistics, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Fortunately, it is with regard to these two Jewries that the best statistical evidence is available.

The main statistical sources for the demography of Latin American Jewry since about 1960 are of the following types:

a) Official population censuses, notably those of Argentina in 1960 and Brazil in 1960 and 1980. Other relevant censuses are those of Mexico (1960, 1970, 1980), Chile (1960, 1970), and Peru (1961). Jews are identified in these censuses as one of a number of religious groups.[1] The official census publications merely indicate the geographical and sex distributions—and in the case of Brazil, the age structure as well—of the small Jewish minorities. However, a great additional potential for data retrieval exists in those censuses which distinguish Jews from the general population. Thus, it has been possible to obtain detailed tabulations on Argentina's Jewish population from the data file of the 1960 census.

b) Jewish-sponsored censuses or surveys of Jewish populations, including an incomplete census in Sao Paulo, Brazil (1968–1969) and a small sample survey in Greater Buenos Aires (1973–1974). There have also been enumerations in Tucuman (1962 and 1974), Quilmes (1968), and Bahia Blanca (1975), Argentina, as well as Panama (1960–1961), Guatemala (1963), El Salvador (1972), Colombia (1977), Guatemala (1983), and Santiago, Chile (1983–1984).

c) Surveys of Jewish sub-populations, e.g., Sephardic Jews in Buenos Aires (1969), members of Jewish organizations in Chile (1965) and Cordoba, Argentina (1970). This and the preceding type of source are usually linked to the existence of registers of Jewish communities or large Jewish organizations. Such registers, if fairly complete and updated, have an important potential for statistical use, but they have been little exploited thus far. An instance of population statistics compiled from a community register is a series of studies of Sao Paulo Jewry since 1978.[2]

d) Statistics on Jewish deaths (1953–1966) and Jewish marriages (1962–1963) in Greater Buenos Aires. These vital statistics relate to burials and weddings performed under Jewish religious auspices. In 1963 they embraced all the organized Jewish communities in Buenos Aires, while in other years they extended only to the principal Ashkenazi community (known by the initials AMIA). Regrettably, data collection on these subjects has been discontinued.

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[1] Questions about religious affiliation have not been included in the population censuses taken in Argentina since 1960; the same applies to Brazil's 1970 census. These censuses, therefore, fail to supply data on Jews.

[2] The Federaçao Israelita do Estado de Sao Paulo has established a departamento de estatistica e pesquisa social, which routinely collects and updates Jewish demographic, socio-economic, and educational data. Useful materials were supplied to the authors through the courtesy of Jose Knoplich, president of the Federaçao Israelita, and Claudia Milnitzky, coordinator of statistical and social research.

Aside from the above-mentioned empirical sources, which contain somewhat detailed information, periodic estimates of the number of Jews in the various Latin American countries have appeared in the AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK (AJYB) and other Jewish publications. In this article, only the figures published in the AJYB will be touched upon and they will be designated "current estimates." Starting with the 1982 AJYB, the old series of current estimates was discontinued and replaced by revised estimates prepared by the authors of the present article. Until recently, the population estimates for Latin American Jewry that have appeared elsewhere have approximated or even exceeded the high figures of the old AJYB series. The one exception is Ira Rosenswaike's study of Jewish population figures for Argentina, which was published in 1960.[3]

In this article an attempt will be made to synthesize the directly available as well as inferable information on some of the principal features of the demography of Latin American Jews. Attention will be paid to the size of the various Jewish populations, their dynamics (natural movement, affiliative changes, and external migrations), and selected aspects of their sociodemographic structure. The concluding section will consider prospects for the future in the light of demographic projections.[4]

SIZE OF JEWISH POPULATIONS

Recent Estimates and Their Rationale

OVERVIEW

Latin American Jewry amounted to some 465,000 people at the end of 1982. It was fifth in size among the regions of world Jewry, and fourth in the Diaspora (Table 1).

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[3] See Ira Rosenswaike, "The Jewish Population of Argentina, Census and Estimate, 1887–1947," *Jewish Social Studies*, October 1960, pp. 195–214.

[4] The most intensive analysis so far of the demography of Jews in Latin America is to be found in a monograph published in Hebrew: U. O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *The Demography of the Jews in Argentina and in Other Countries of Latin America* (Tel Aviv, 1974). A more recent article by Sergio DellaPergola, "Population Trends of Latin American Jewry," is scheduled for publication in the proceedings of the research conference on the Jewish experience in Latin America, held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 12–14, 1984, under the sponsorship of the Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, and the Latin America Jewish Studies Association. A useful compendium of information on the Jewish population in all the countries of Latin America is Jacobo Kovadloff (ed.), *Comunidades judías de latinoamerica, 1973–1975* (Buenos Aires, 1977). Judith Laikin Elkin's *Jews of the Latin American Republics* (Chapel Hill, 1976) includes chapters on demographic and socio-economic trends.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGIONS, 1982

Region	Absolute Numbers	Per Cent	
		World	Diaspora
World	12,988,600	100.0	—
Thereof: Diaspora	9,614,300	74.0	100.0
North America	6,013,000	46.3	62.5
Israel	3,374,300	26.0	—
Eastern Europe & Balkans[a]	1,771,800	13.6	18.4
Western Europe	1,070,900	8.3	11.1
Latin America	464,700	3.6	5.0
Southern Africa	120,250	0.9	1.2
Rest of Asia[b], Northern & Central Africa	94,650	0.7	1.0
Oceania	79,000	0.6	0.8

[a] Including the Asian territories of the U.S.S.R. and Turkey.
[b] Excluding Israel and the Asian territories of the U.S.S.R. and Turkey.

Argentina ranked seventh and Brazil ninth among the nine countries having Jewish populations of 100,000 or more; their respective ranking in the Diaspora was sixth and eighth.

Table 2 shows the geographical distribution of Jews and the general population within the Latin American region. While temperate South America accounts for only 11.5 per cent of the region's general population, 61 per cent of the Jews live there. Moreover, a major Jewish concentration of over 40,000 is found in adjacent Sao Paulo in southern Brazil. Jewish populations of over 10,000 exist in only six countries.[5]

Jews are a tiny minority everywhere in Latin America. In Uruguay they number about ten per thousand; in Argentina eight per thousand; and in all other countries, including Brazil, far less. Jews, however, constitute around two per cent of the population of Greater Buenos Aires.

The Jews of Latin America display features of both dispersion and concentration. On the one hand, they are scattered over the vast expanse of the subcontinent; there are more than twenty separate countries in which more than 100 Jews are estimated to reside permanently. On the other hand, a single country—Argentina—accounts for 50 per cent of all Latin American Jewry. Two countries—Argentina and Brazil—hold 72 per cent of the total,

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[5] Cuba also belonged to this category before the 1961 revolution.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION OF LATIN AMERICA, BY SUB-REGIONS AND MAJOR COUNTRIES (10,000+ JEWS), 1982

Sub-Region, Country	Jews		General Population		Jews Per 1,000 Of General Population
	Absolute Numbers	Per Cent	Absolute Numbers	Per Cent	
Latin America	464,700	100.0	376,327,000	100.0	1.2
Middle America:					
Total	41,750	9.0	97,137,000	25.8	0.4
Mexico	35,000	7.5	73,011,000	19.4	0.5
Other Countries	6,750	1.5	24,126,000	6.4	0.3
Caribbean:					
Total	5,050	1.1	29,375,000	7.8	0.2
Tropical South America:					
Total	134,900	29.0	206,223,000	54.9	0.6
Brazil	100,000	21.5	126,807,000	33.7	0.8
Venezuela	20,000	4.3	14,714,000	4.0	1.4
Other Countries	14,900	3.2	64,702,000	17.2	0.2
Temperate South America:					
Total	283,000	60.9	43,592,000	11.5	6.5
Argentina	233,000	50.1	29,158,000	7.7	8.0
Uruguay	30,000	6.5	2,947,000	0.8	10.2
Chile	20,000	4.3	11,487,000	3.0	2.0

while six countries, each with more than 10,000 Jews, account for 94 per cent of the whole. There is also a striking concentration of Jews within countries, with most of them being found in the capital city or the leading commercial center. In Brazil, the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro account for more than 80 per cent of the entire Jewish population.

ARGENTINA

The official population census of 1895 found no more than 6,085 Jews in Argentina. It is generally agreed that the large influx of Jewish immigrants occurred between that date and the outbreak of World War II.

In 1936 Simon Weill attempted to account for the annual growth of Argentine Jewry from 1888 to his time.[6] Weill's estimate for the end of 1935 was 260,000. The special value of his cumulative computation lay in the immigration figures that he reported, which, because of his access to sources, were authoritative. However, as Ira Rosenswaike has pointed out, Weill's figures were affected by two systematic errors: he conjectured an unvarying and rather high rate of natural increase for the Jewish population, whereas the demographic conditions of the late 1920's and especially the 1930's would have required a declining rate; and he disregarded emigration. Hence, Weill arrived at a population figure that was too high.

The upwardly biased figure of 260,000 Jews for the end of 1935 was adopted as the AJYB's current estimate, and repeated until the early 1940's. It was then replaced by the even higher figure of 350,000, which was communicated by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Demographic analysis shows that about half of the alleged rise of 90,000 can be accounted for on the basis of plausible natural increase and immigration,[7] while the other half appears unfounded.

An official population census specifying religion was taken in Argentina in 1947, and came up with a figure of 249,326 Jews. This figure requires some upward revision because of under-reporting of Jews,[8] especially at a time when considerable numbers of World War II refugees were remaining in the country "illegally." Still, the figure is considerably lower than the current estimates of the period, estimates which received wide currency.

In the 1950's and 1960's, the current estimates for Argentinian Jewry leaped forward several times, separated by considerable periods of invariance. The climb of the current estimates was as follows:

Year	*Current Estimate*
1943–1946	350,000
1947–1957	360,000
1958–1961	400,000
1962–1967	450,000
1968–1972	500,000
1973–1974	475,000

Another population census was taken in Argentina in 1960. Official publications gave the breakdown by religion only for persons aged five and over, and the figure for Jews was 275,913. The corresponding probable order of magnitude for Jews of all ages was again ignored in the unrestrained rise of the current estimates.

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[6] See Simon Weill, *Poblacion israelita en la Republica Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1936).

[7] Compare the reconstruction of Argentine Jewry's demographic evolution which appears below. Immigration was obviously at a low ebb during the war years.

[8] As already suggested by Rosenswaike, *op. cit.*

In 1971 U.O. Schmelz published an article[9] in which he argued that the alleged increases in Argentina's Jewish population were demographically untenable. A rise of 100,000 from about 1958 to 1968 would have implied an annual growth rate of more than two per cent. Since all observers agreed that Jewish immigration had become insignificant—indeed, the migratory balance of Argentine Jews tended to be negative—any growth must have been attributable mainly to natural increase.[10] A natural increase of over two per cent annually was far in excess of the level found at the time among the general populations of the developed countries, including Argentina (where it amounted to 1.3 per cent on average during 1958–1968). Moreover, the level of Jewish natural increase during those years consistently fell far short of that of the corresponding general populations; indeed, in some countries there was a natural decrease of Jews (i.e., fewer births than deaths).[11] Circumstantial evidence available for Argentine Jewry itself—e.g., death statistics—made it evident that any assumption of rapid growth, as implied in the strong rise of the current estimates, was untenable.

Then good luck came to the aid of Jewish demographic research. A data file containing the individual records of Jews[12] in Argentina's 1960 census was obtained,[13] and it was thoroughly tabulated and analyzed at the Hebrew University's Institute of Contemporary Jewry. The findings not only provided valuable insights into the structure and characteristics of Argentine Jewry, but also made it possible, in conjunction with other data sources, to evaluate its size and ascertain its dynamics. In fact, the outlines of the demographic evolution of Argentine Jewry could now be retraced from the beginning of the twentieth century.

The 1960 Jewish data file was found to include, after some slight adjustments, 291,877 people of all ages[14] who were reported as Jews. However, in a census asking about religion, some Jews may be included in one of two "unknown" categories: those stating to have no religion and those leaving the question on religion unanswered.[15] An evaluation of the 1960 Argentine census indicates that the directly available census count of about 292,000 was not very far from the probable actual total of Jews. The best estimate of the actual total was about 310,000 people, who either identified themselves as Jews or were of Jewish descent and had not completely severed their Jewish links.

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[9] First published in Hebrew. An abridged English version appeared in U.O. Schmelz, "An Overview of New Findings and Studies in the Demography of the Jews: 1969–1971," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S.J. Gould (eds.), *Studies in Jewish Demography; Survey for 1969–1971* (Jerusalem and London, 1975), pp. 7–52.

[10] As well as to the balance of affiliative changes, which, however, could be assumed to be negative for the Jews.

[11] See U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," AJYB, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 61–117.

[12] But completely safeguarding confidentiality, i.e., without the names and addresses of the persons concerned.

[13] Through the assistance of AMIA, Buenos Aires.

[14] Whereas the official census publications indicated religion only for those aged five and over. See above.

The reasons for these findings can be summarized as follows:

A) Approximate adequacy of the census count of Jews.

1) Comparisons with other contemporary data showed that an emended figure not very much above the directly ascertained 292,000 Jews was reasonable. Such data were: detailed death statistics of Jews in Greater Buenos Aires, where, according to the census, 80 per cent of all Argentine Jews were concentrated. In view of the empirically recorded absolute figures of deaths, a Jewish population size of 450,000–500,000 for the whole of Argentina would have implied a biologically impossible low level of mortality; statistics of the religiously celebrated Jewish marriages in Greater Buenos Aires, which showed that the number of brides and grooms was considerably below that of the Greater Buenos Aires Jews who, in the census, were reported to have been married in the directly preceding years. This discrepancy is mainly attributable to endogamous Jewish marriages without religious ceremony,[16] as well as mixed marriages, but its existence disproves strong inadequacy of the census count of Jews; a few local censuses of Jews that were taken on Jewish initiative.

2) The reconstruction of the demographic evolution of Argentine Jewry succeeded in reconciling, with moderate emendations, the 1960 census figure of 292,000 with the major data available from earlier times, viz. Weill's immigration figures and the results of the 1947 census.

B) Determination that the emended census total of Jews in 1960 was approximately 310,000.

1) This was the figure that emerged when the necessary correction in the reported number of Jews, because of the "unknown" categories of the religious distribution, was carried out according to the proportion of persons in the general population professing no religion or failing to answer the question. This proportion amounted to 5.8 per cent in Greater Buenos Aires. The assumption of about six per cent "unknown" among the Jews raised the recorded total of 292,000 to approximately 310,000.

2) On the assumption of 310,000 Jews for the whole of Argentina, and after making age-sex-specific adjustments for the "unknown" cases, a life-table could be computed for the Jews of Greater Buenos Aires which

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[15] They may even be misreported as non-Jews.

[16] Civil marriage is required by law in Argentina.

indicated reasonable life expectancies at birth: males—68.9; females—73.9 years.[17] A marked augmentation of the population in the life-table computations would have yielded unrealistically high life expectancies.

When the revised population figure of 310,000 for Argentina became known,[18] the AJYB current estimate dropped from 475,000 in 1974 to the round figure of 300,000, which purported to relate to 1975. It remained on this level, without change, until 1982, when the old series of current estimates came to an end.

It is not difficult to discern that an actual decrease in the Jewish population of Argentina must have taken place after 1960. By that year the balance of Argentine Jewry's internal—i.e., natural and affiliative—dynamics[19] was already approaching zero. Rather soon afterward it must have turned increasingly negative, because the continual growth in the number of elderly Jews, which was implicit in the 1960 age composition with its strong representation of persons in late middle age, must have raised the number of deaths. On the other hand, the birth rate of Argentina's Jews, which was already very low by 1960, cannot be assumed to have risen, given the strongly downward fertility trend known for the general populations of the developed countries[20] and documented for other Diaspora populations.[21] Nor is it likely that Argentine Jewry's affiliative balance improved; rather, the contrary. Moreover, between 1961 and 1982, 33,600 Argentine Jews were recorded as new immigrants in Israel,[22] and an unspecified but not unsubstantial number migrated elsewhere because of the difficult political and economic situation in the country.[23] Thus, a realistic estimate of Jewish population size in Argentina in 1982 would be 233,000.

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[17] The corresponding figures for the general population of Greater Buenos Aires in 1959–1961 were: males—67.9; females—74.2 years. A relatively small sex differential in life expectancy is also found in other Jewish populations. See: U.O. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984), appendix Ib.

[18] First published in Schmelz and DellaPergola, *op. cit.*

[19] The difference between "effectively Jewish" births and deaths, on the one hand, and between accessions and secessions, on the other. Effectively Jewish births (and, similarly, effectively Jewish fertility) does not include newborn of Jewish parentage—mostly from mixed marriages—who are not Jews themselves. A negative balance of accessions and secessions constitutes the net assimilatory losses.

[20] However, there was little decrease in the birth rate of Argentina's general population.

[21] Argentine Jewry's peculiar age composition in 1960 did not allow for a subsequent rapid increase in the proportion of the procreative age groups that might have raised the crude birth rate, irrespective of fertility changes. This was unlike the situation among some other Diaspora Jewries, where the large cohorts born during the "baby boom" around 1950 occupied procreative ages in the 1970's and 1980's.

[22] Some failed to stay on in Israel, but did not necessarily return to Argentina due to the unattractive conditions that prevailed in the latter country over a long period.

[23] There seems to have been very little immigration of Jews into Argentina, apart from a small, and partly temporary, Chilean stream.

Further information on the changes in the number of Argentine Jews, and on the determinants of these changes, will be found in subsequent sections of this article (see, particularly, Tables 3, 4, 5, and 8).

BRAZIL

The following figures on Jews in Brazil appeared in official population censuses: 1940—55,666; 1950—69,657; 1960—96,199; 1980—91,795.[24] Inspection of the somewhat detailed data available from the 1960 census shows, however, that among those classified as Jews were more than 10,000 people who lived in rural localities and had a very high proportion (45 per cent) of children below age 15—something which is demographically impossible for a modern Jewish population. The 1980 census similarly included close to 2,000 "Jews" who lived in rural localities and had disproportionately many (40 per cent) children below age 15. When these 10,000 and 2,000 individuals are eliminated from the census totals of Jews as spurious—apparently due to response or processing errors[25]—the numerical evolution between censuses assumes a gradual quality: 1940—56,000; 1950—70,000; 1960—86,000; 1980—90,000.

In the AJYB current estimates, a figure of 40,000 Jews, which first related to 1933, was repeated until the early 1940's. Then the estimate suddenly jumped to 111,000 on the basis of reports from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, as was the case with Argentine Jewry at the same time. The estimates continued rising in spurts, to 130,000 in 1963, 150,000 in 1969, 155,000 in 1973, and 165,000 in 1975, and then fell to 150,000 in 1975–1979, when the current estimates for Argentina had already been reduced.

The basic error of the current estimates lay in the big rise around 1940, a large part of which cannot be accounted for either by documented immigration or natural increase. It is true that Brazil, unlike Argentina, received relatively large additions of Jewish immigrants after World War II. This influx slackened, however, beginning in the 1960's, as can be ascertained *inter alia* from the distribution, by immigration period, of foreign-born Jews enumerated in Sao Paulo in 1968–1969. Moreover, close to 7,000 Jews left Brazil for Israel during 1961–1983, although some returned. The age distributions of Jews enumerated in the official 1960 and 1980 censuses[26] and in Sao Paulo's Jewish-sponsored census (1968–1969) show very low proportions of young children, e.g., 6.6 per cent aged 0–4 among urban Jews in 1980. This means that the birth rate has been very low in the last few decades; there can hardly have been any natural increase. Clearly then, the substantial further rises in Jewish population size alleged by the current estimates in the 1960's and 1970's are contradicted by the empirical evidence.

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[24] See footnote 1.

[25] Compare the even graver errors mentioned below in regard to the Mexican censuses.

[26] After correction for the spurious additions.

A further indication of the actual Jewish population size in Brazil was furnished by the regrettably incomplete 1968–1969 Jewish census in Sao Paulo. About 28,500 Jews were enumerated in the first instance. Taking into account the additions furnished by a complementary survey and some reasonable margin of error, an estimate of about 40,000 Jews appears justified. The official population censuses enumerated 37,000 urban Jews in the State of Sao Paulo in 1960 and 44,400 in 1980, while the current estimate claimed 65,000 Jews in Sao Paulo in 1969.

The official population censuses, if corrected somewhat as above, seem to reflect rather adequately the growth of the Jewish population in Brazil, in line with what is known about its internal and migratory dynamics. The proportions of persons declaring themselves to be without religion or leaving the question unanswered among the general populations in the two major Jewish centers in Brazil in 1960 were very low: about one per cent each in the states comprising the metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. By 1980 the proportions had risen somewhat to 2.3 per cent in Sao Paulo and 5.4 per cent in Rio de Janeiro. In view of the margins implied thereby for the Jewish group, and until more detailed fact-finding becomes feasible, a round figure of 100,000 for Brazilian Jewry in 1980–1982 seems appropriate.

MEXICO

The AJYB current estimates of Jews in Mexico were as follows: 1940—20,000; 1950—25,000; 1960—26,000; 1970—35,000; 1973-1975—40,000; 1976–1979—37,500. While these figures may be considered approximately accurate, this is certainly not true of the figures for Jews appearing in the various official, decennial Mexican censuses: 1940—14,167; 1950—17,574; 1960—100,750; 1970—49,277; 1980—61,790. Many of the alleged Jews were enumerated in provinces where few, if any, Jews were known to be living. Analysis of the computerized data file of all individuals in Greater Mexico City[27] classified as Jews in the 1970 census shows that even this metropolitan group comprised sub-sections with typically non-Jewish fertility levels and age compositions, including a few hundred individuals who went barefoot, spoke only Indian languages, etc. The conclusion is inescapable that the last few Mexican censuses have included numerous individuals who were misclassified as Jews. It is possible that some were adherents of various sects that were erroneously reported as Jewish; others may have been wrongly classified in the course of processing the census materials.

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[27] See Sergio DellaPergola and U.O. Schmelz, "The Jews of Greater Mexico City According to the 1970 Population Census: First Data and Critical Evaluation," Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1978 (mimeographed).

Mexico's Jewish population is described as well-off and dynamic. In the absence of any comprehensive statistical information, a cautious estimate of 35,000 for 1981–1982 would seem reasonable.

URUGUAY

Uruguayan population censuses have not inquired about religious identification. Nor has there been any comprehensive statistical study of Jews conducted under Jewish auspices. The AJYB current estimates stood at 40,000 in the early 1950's and at 50,000, with some fluctuations, during the long period 1955–1979. However, in informed Jewish circles there was an awareness that the currently circulating figures were quite exaggerated. Uruguay's Jews, nearly all of whom are concentrated in Montevideo, are generally regarded as being similar in socio-demographic characteristics to those in nearby Greater Buenos Aires.[28] This being so, it must be assumed that the internal demographic evolution of Jews in Uruguay has likewise been negative, resulting in decreases. Moreover, Uruguay's Jews have had a relatively heavy migration deficit—again like Argentine Jews and probably even exceeding the latter per 1,000 of respective Jewish population. Some 7,000 Uruguayan Jews migrated to Israel during 1961–1983.

In consequence of revisions and the inferred downward trend of demographic evolution, the Jews in Uruguay are estimated to have numbered 30,000 in 1982. Jewish population size in the country continues to decrease.

CHILE

Official Chilean population censuses indicated the following numbers for Jews: 1952—11,496; 1960—11,700; 1970—16,359. In sharp contrast, the AJYB current estimates were as follows: 25,000 in the late 1940's; 40,000 in 1950–1954; 30,000 in 1955–1965; and 35,000 in 1967–1971. By the end of the 1970's the current estimates had gradually declined to 27,000, this during a period in which Chile passed through the double upheaval of Salvadore Allende's accession to power and his overthrow.

A survey of affiliated Jews in Chile that was conducted in 1965 arrived at a figure of 8,450 people—by no means all of them household heads—who were connected with one or more of the major institutions or organizations.

On the whole, the AJYB current estimates may be considered to have been excessive. By 1952 the rate of natural increase was low for Chilean

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[28] The Jews of Buenos Aires constitute the great majority (about 80 per cent) of the Argentine Jewish whole, and virtually determine its demographic patterns.

Jewry, since the census of that year showed only 7.4 per cent children under the age of five among persons enumerated as Jewish. In later years, the balance of internal Jewish demographic dynamics is assumed to have gone down further and to have probably become negative—as in Argentina—because of a decline in fertility, increased assimilatory losses, and pronounced aging, the advent of which was implied by the age composition in the 1952 census. Since 1970 Chilean Jewry has been shaken by political and economic crises, which are known to have caused some emigration from the country (though, to some degree, perhaps temporary). Between 1961 and 1983, 4,200 Chilean Jews arrived in Israel.

A cautiously revised population estimate for Chilean Jewry in 1982 would be 20,000. However, fragments of evidence are accumulating which may lead to a further downward revision.

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA

The peak of the AJYB current estimates for Latin American Jewry was reached in 1972–1973, when a total figure of more than 800,000 was cited. The 1982 estimate put forward by the authors of the present article amounted to 465,000. The difference in the figures is due to substantial downward revision—especially for Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile—and a recognition of a decreasing trend in Jewish numbers in Argentina during the last two decades, and in the aggregate of other countries more recently (see below).

Reconstruction of Demographic Evolution of Argentine Jewry

The tabulations from Argentina's 1960 census supplied detailed data on the composition of the Jewish population. This rendered feasible an attempt to check the degree of agreement between the 1960 data and the principal previous sources. If the earlier and later data could be reasonably meshed, it would then be possible to reconstruct the outlines of Argentine Jewry's demographic evolution since the beginning of this century. The pre-1960 data in question were the 1947 census figures and Weill's immigration figures up to 1935. The 1947 census could be assumed, perhaps, to have been less efficient in its coverage of Jews than was the census of 1960 (see above). Still, while allowing for the intervening changes, the order of magnitude of the Jewish population enumerated at either date was hypothesized to conform mutually, this in contrast to the gaping disparities between the official figures for Jews in both censuses, on the one hand, and the contemporary AJYB current estimates, on the other. The project was conducted by B. Bloch, in conjunction with the authors of this article.

The basic approach was to apply a backward projection technique. The 1960 census gave the number of foreign-born Jews by year of immigration, age, and sex. Approximate allowance for mortality and re-emigration could, if successfully applied, yield estimates of the original numbers of Jewish immigrants to Argentina. Similarly, the 1960 census provided data on Argentine-born Jews by year of birth (age)[29] and sex. If mortality and emigration could be approximately accounted for, it would be possible to estimate the number of respective Jewish births that had occurred in Argentina. The constraints were a reasonable fit with Weill's immigration figures and the 1947 census, on the one hand, and demographic plausibility and consistency in the changing levels and trends of all the parameters that were involved, on the other.

The starting point was the 1960 census figure for Jews, as raised to 310,000, and emended for various "unknown" categories. This population was disaggregated by sex and age (or birth year), place of birth, and year of immigration in the case of the foreign-born.

Mortality was computationally accounted for through application of reciprocals of the age-sex-specific death rates.[30] The respective rates were obtained as follows: for most of the 1950's—from specially constructed life-tables, utilizing the death statistics available for the Jews of Greater Buenos Aires at the time; for earlier years—from the model life-tables of Coale-Demeny, changing the mortality level every five years in accordance with empirical data available from other countries on Jewish mortality at the time.

Cumulative emigration until 1960 was determined for the foreign-born who had immigrated up to 1935 on the basis of the difference (with adjustments) between Weill's immigration figures and those reconstructed from the survivors up to the 1960 census.[31] In the light of these findings, which covered nearly the entire period of massive Jewish immigration, as well as information on the successively changing conditions in Argentina and the world, plus data on Jewish migration from Argentina to other countries (especially aliyah to Israel), conjectures were made of the size of emigration up to 1960 for the other sectors of Argentine Jewry and the apportionment of the emigrants to five-year periods of departure.

The actual work on the reconstruction project was quite intricate, requiring a good many cross-checks and auxiliary computations. However, these technical matters will not be discussed here. The reconstruction, which merely sought to clarify the overall picture, while not claiming to be fully accurate on all specifics, could be accomplished due to the basic consistency that was found within the 1960 census material, as well as between that material and the major empirical sources of earlier date. The reconstruction also benefited from the availability of empirical death statistics around the census date. The computations were made for quinquennial intervals.

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[29] Both age at the time of the census and date of birth were inquired about in the questionnaire.

[30] This was one reason—technical in nature—why the age-sex distribution of the 1960 base population was needed for this project.

[31] Allowing for the fact that some of the persons comprised in the difference will have died in Argentina rather than actually emigrated.

The main results of the reconstruction from 1960 backwards, as well as of an updating to 1982 (using a forward projection technique), are shown in Tables 3–4.

Until World War II, Argentine Jewry experienced rapid population growth, except for the years of World War I, when immigration came to

TABLE 3. SIZE OF JEWISH POPULATION IN ARGENTINA ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SOURCES (CENSUS REPORTS AND ESTIMATES), 1895–1982

Year	Official Censuses	Authors' Reconstruction[a]	Current Estimates[b]
1895	6,085	..	..
1900		15,000	6,700
1905		25,000	22,500
1910		68,000	45,000
1915		116,000	100,000
1920		127,000	110,000
1925		162,000	200,000
1930		191,000	200,000
1935		218,000	260,000
1940		254,000	..
1945		273,000	350,000
1947	249,326	286,000	360,000
1950		294,000	360,000
1955		306,000	360,000
1960[a]		309,000	400,000
1960[a]	291,877	310,000	400,000
1965		297,000	450,000
1970		286,000	500,000
1975		265,000	300,000
1980		242,000	242,000
1982		233,000	233,000

[a] Figures for 1947 and 1960 (second line) relate to census date; the others, until 1960—to beginning of year; as from 1965—to end of year. The estimates until 1960 were made in conjunction with B. Bloch.

[b] As published in *American Jewish Year Book*, according to reference year; since 1982 supplied by the authors of this article.

a virtual standstill. The annual growth rates, and even the absolute increments, were greatest at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time, immigration was the main factor behind Jewish population growth in Argentina. It was then also that the rate of natural increase was at its peak; while considerable mortality prevailed, the birth rate was very high. This can be attributed to both substantial fertility and the youthful age composition of the recently arrived population. In the inter-war years, the rates of both migratory reinforcement and natural increase became more moderate. Though mortality dropped, the concurrent decline in the birth rate exerted an even stronger depressing influence on the balance of natural movement.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN SIZE OF JEWISH POPULATION IN ARGENTINA,[a] 1900–1982

Years	Population		Change			Annual Rate Of Change[c]
	Initial	Terminal	Total	Natural Increase/ Decrease[b]	Migratory Balance	
1900–1904	14,700	24,700	10,000	2,000	8,000	105
1905–1909	24,700	68,100	43,400	4,500	38,900	212
1910–1914	68,100	115,600	47,500	8,700	38,800	107
1915–1919	115,600	126,700	11,200	10,300	900	18
1920–1924	126,700	162,300	35,600	11,500	24,100	50
1925–1929	162,300	191,400	29,100	14,300	14,800	33
1930–1934	191,400	218,000	26,600	14,000	12,600	26
1935–1939	218,000	254,400	36,400	13,900	22,500	31
1940–1944	254,400	273,400	19,000	15,000	4,000	14
1945–1949	273,400	294,000	20,700	16,000	4,700	15
1950–1954	294,000	305,900	11,900	12,800	– 900	8
1955–1959	305,900	309,300	3,400	6,200	– 2,800	2
1960–1965	309,300	296,600	–12,700	200	–12,900	– 8
1966–1970	296,600	286,300	–10,300	– 3,500	–10,300	– 7
1971–1975	286,300	265,000	–21,300	– 5,000	–16,300	– 15
1976–1980	265,000	242,000	–23,000	– 8,600	–14,400	– 18
1981–1982	242,000	233,000	– 9,000	– 4,600	– 4,400	– 19

[a] For computational reasons the population figures are given here in greater detail than in Table 3. The intervals comprise entire calendar years. Cf. note [a] to Table 3: end of 1904 in Table 4 corresponds to beginning of 1905 in Table 3; beginning of 1966 in Table 4 corresponds to end of 1965 in Table 3.

[b] Accounting for assimilatory losses as well.

[c] Per 1,000 of Jewish population.

The post-World War II years, up to about 1960, were characterized by a trend toward vanishing population increase among Argentina's Jews. This was due to further declines in fertility and the birth rate, a tendency toward assimilatory losses, the aging of the Jewish population, and the disappearance, in the 1950's, of a migratory surplus.

Since about 1960 Argentine Jewry has undergone a marked numerical decrease, because both the balance of the natural *cum* affiliative changes and the external migration balance have been negative. An intensification of demographic aging raised the crude death rate. The migratory deficit was particularly marked in 1963–1965 and again in the 1970's.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN JEWRY

The socio-demographic development of Latin American Jewry can be analyzed by considering both the formative mechanisms of the various Jewish communities and the general societal contexts in which they have functioned. An important trait common to most of the communities is their relative newness, involving the immigrant status of the founding fathers. Of course, it is possible to refer back to the earlier stratum of Jewish or crypto-Jewish settlement, associated with the Spanish and Portuguese conquest of Latin America. However, due to the near-total assimilation of these people, their relevance for the socio-demographic trends and balance of contemporary Latin American Jewry is negligible.[32]

It is the Jewish experience of the last hundred years that is central to an understanding of the changing characteristics of Jewish population and society in contemporary Latin America. The common immigrant background encompasses a mosaic of Jewish origin groups, dominated by the Eastern European element. At the same time, Latin American Jewry is relatively more composite in terms of immigrant background than is North American Jewry. An important analytic issue is the extent to which differences between immigrants from communities with varying levels of modernization disappeared in the process of absorption into Latin American society. One may also wonder to what extent the differences between the various Latin American nations in terms of culture, economics, and politics were reflected in the parallel development of their respective Jewish communities.

In the following outline of the main transformations undergone by Latin American Jewry during the past few decades, the focus will be on five aspects of population and community: trends in international migration and nativity; changes in spatial distribution and urbanization; population dynamics and structure; socio-economic changes; and changing patterns of Jewish schooling.

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[32] The possibility cannot be entirely ruled out that certain contemporary population groups in Latin America, formally Christianized for hundreds of years, might be of Jewish or *converso* background.

Immigration and Countries of Origin

Probably no other single socio-demographic factor has been as important as immigration in shaping Latin American Jewry. Immigration laid the basis for the cultural and institutional patterns of the new Jewish communities, and determined the initial roles that Jews played in various spheres of Latin American life. The Latin American nations, being very much affected by immigration streams and sharp ethnic, racial, cultural, and class cleavages, usually exhibited the strongly unifying effects of nationalism, a shared Catholic religion, and a common Spanish or Portuguese tongue, all of which were foreign to Jews in their respective countries of origin. This, then, was the background against which the socio-demographic processes of Latin American Jewry played themselves out, determining current characteristics and trends.

The size and rhythm of Jewish immigration have been quite different in the various Latin American countries. The statistics compiled by a number of organizations[33] directly involved with Jewish immigration clearly show a strong movement to Argentina between the late 1880's and 1914. Out of 225,000 Jews who migrated to Argentina before 1940, roughly one half arrived prior to World War I. The corresponding figure for Jewish immigration to Brazil was around 15 per cent. This implies somewhat deeper roots for Argentine Jewry than for the other Jewish communities in Latin America, some of which—e.g., Venezuela—attained considerable size only after World War II.

The volume of Jewish immigration to Argentina, though quantitatively important until 1940, has followed a declining trend over time. The absolute peak of migration occurred between 1905 and 1914 (over 8,000 immigrants per year on average), followed by a second peak between 1920 and 1929 (over 6,500 immigrants each year), and a third between 1935 and 1939 (over 4,500 annually). The period of most intensive migration to Brazil was in the late 1920's (about 4,000 people per year between 1925 and 1929). In Uruguay, the maximum influx occurred even later (over 2,000 immigrants annually between 1935 and 1939).

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[33] E.g., the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. See AJYB, Vol. 46, 1945, p. 517 and Vol. 47, 1946, p. 656; Jacob Lestschinsky, "Jewish Migrations, 1840–1956," in Louis Finkelstein (ed.), *The Jews* (New York, 1960), pp. 1536–1596. For an overview, see U.O. Schmelz, "Migrations," *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 1971, Vol. 16, cols. 1518–1529.

One important feature of the early waves of Jewish immigration was the relatively large number of immigrants compared to the receiving Jewish population. This clearly shows up in a comparison of immigration rates per 1,000 of the Jewish and general populations in Argentina (Table 5). Immigration rates for Jews were higher before 1929 (with the exception of the World War I period), which points to both the smallness of the initial Jewish community and the intensity of the immigrant flow. During the 1930's Jewish immigration rates fell below the overall average for Argentina, reflecting the growing web of political limitations to Jewish migration during this period, both in Europe and in the potential countries of immigration.[34]

Another, perhaps even more characteristic, trait of Jewish migration was the very high degree of permanency of settlement among newcomers. Indeed, Jewish emigration rates from Argentina were substantially lower than

TABLE 5. IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION RATES PER 1,000 AMONG THE JEWISH AND GENERAL POPULATIONS OF ARGENTINA, 1900–1975

Years	Jewish Population[a]			General Population[b]		
	Immigration	Emigration	Balance	Immigration	Emigration	Balance
1900–04	88	4	84	31.1	21.4	9.7
1905–09	195	5	190	56.2	30.4	25.8
1910–14	93	5	88	54.2	34.6	19.6
1915–19	3	1	2	15.9	17.5	−1.6
1920–24	48	14	34	27.6	17.3	10.3
1925–29	37	20	17	33.4	24.8	8.6
1930–34	17	5	12	26.6	24.5	2.1
1935–39	20	1	19	29.2	26.8	2.4
1940–44	3	0	3	24.7	23.5	1.2
1945–49	4	1	3	29.4	25.0	4.4
1950–54	2	3	−1			4.2
1955–59	1	3	−2			1.6
1960–65			−9			0.3
1966–70			−5			0.3
1971–75			−12			

[a] Source: Reconstruction of Jewish population; see above.
[b] Z. Recchini de Lattes and A.E. Lattes (eds.), *La poblacion de Argentina*, Buenos Aires, C.I.C.R.E.D. Series, 1975, p.34.

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[34] See Haim Avni, *Argentina y la historia de la immigracion judía 1810–1950* (Buenos Aires, 1983).

those found among the general population. Political, rather than merely economic, determinants of Jewish migration explain this factor, which resulted over time in a far more significant international migration balance for Jews than for the general population.

A sharp down-turn in Jewish migration to Latin America occurred during World War II, although several thousand Jews did manage to reach the continent, often illegally, between 1940 and 1945. Even during the immediate post-war period, which was characterized by important movements of displaced persons, Jewish immigration there remained far below pre-war levels; in Argentina, it diminished rapidly; in Brazil, in the 1950's, there was a modest inflow (less than 1,000 persons per year on average), particularly from Eastern Europe and Egypt. During the 20 years since the mid 1960's, Jewish immigration to Latin America has been insignificant. The permanent net effect of transfers from one country to another within Latin America has apparently been rather limited, although it is more marked with regard to some local Jewish communities. Of much greater importance, since the 1960's, has been emigration from Latin America to the United States and other Western countries, and especially to Israel.

Emigration to Israel has gradually become the leading factor in the international migrations of Latin American Jewry. Over 68,000 immigrants from Latin America arrived in Israel between 1948 and the end of 1983; nearly 40,000 from Argentina, 8,400 from Brazil, 7,800 from Uruguay, 5,000 from Chile, 2,600 from Mexico, and 4,300 from other countries.[35] The overall intensity of aliyah from any particular country, and the rhythm of yearly variation in aliyah rates, have been strongly affected by rapidly changing socio-economic and political conditions in the various Latin American countries. Latin American immigrants to Israel have exhibited relatively low rates of re-emigration; 75–80 per cent of those who have arrived since 1969/70 have remained in the country after the crucial first three years there.[36]

International migration, which, in the past, was the prime force in the growth of Latin American Jewry, has more recently become a major factor in the reduction of the continent's Jewish population. In addition, the departure of an important segment of younger, better educated, and more Jewishly motivated individuals[37] represents a serious qualitative erosion in the socio-demographic and identificational balances of the Latin American Jewish communities.

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[35] Gross figures, unadjusted for re-emigration.

[36] Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Immigrants Absorption Survey.

[37] As deduced from comparing the characteristics of immigrants to Israel from Latin America with those of Jews in the countries of origin.

One crucial, structural consequence of the unequal spread of Jewish immigration over time shows up in the growing predominance of the local-born in the Jewish population (Table 6). In 1960 about 63 per cent of Argentine Jews were born in the country (as against 87 per cent of the general population); the proportions ranged from three per cent among the group aged 65 and over to more than 93 per cent among those below age 30. Since there has been virtually no immigration to Argentina since the 1960's, the local-born have by now become the overwhelming majority of the adult age groups involved in university study, family formation, economic activity, and communal leadership. Recent data show that Sao Paulo (Table 6) now has a proportion of local-born Jews substantially similar to that found in Argentina over 20 years ago, the time lag being a consequence of the generally later development and recent positive migration balance of Brazilian Jewry. A further difference emerges regarding the countries of origin of the foreign-born. The predominance of the East European origin group is far greater in Argentina, notwithstanding the fact that earlier

TABLE 6. JEWISH POPULATION, BY AGE AND REGION OF BIRTH (PERCENTAGES), ARGENTINA, 1960, AND SAO PAULO, 1983

Age	Region Of Birth				
	Total	Country Of Residence	Other America And Western Countries	Eastern Europe	Asia And Africa
			Argentina, 1960[a]		
Jewish Population					
Total	100.0	62.7	6.4	27.6	3.3
0–14	100.0	97.6	1.5	0.4	0.5
15–29	100.0	93.9	3.4	2.2	0.5
30–44	100.0	69.4	6.7	22.0	1.9
45–64	100.0	26.4	9.9	57.0	6.7
65+	100.0	2.9	13.0	74.3	9.8
General Population					
Total	100.0	87.1	11.4	1.2	0.3
			Sao Paulo, 1983[b]		
Jewish Population					
Total	100.0	63.2	9.2	18.5	9.1

[a] Source: 1960 Census of Argentina, authors' tabulations.

[b] Source: Federaçao Israelita do Estado de Sao Paulo, Departamento de Estatistica e Pesquisa Social.

Jewish migration to that country included substantial minorities from the Middle East and Western Europe.

The progressive replacement of the elderly immigrant group by a new generation born in the country, or even in the city of residence, marks a significant evolution in tastes, attitudes, opportunities, and behaviors, and points to new Jewish demographic, socio-economic, and identificational structures.

Spatial Distribution and Urbanization

Urbanization is a longstanding and widespread characteristic of Jewish populations in the Diaspora. However, in the case of Latin America, the predominantly urban character of contemporary Jewish population evolved out of an initial pattern of settlement featuring rural colonies in at least some of the major communities.[38] These colonies absorbed a significant share, if not the majority, of the early Jewish immigrants during the late nineteenth century. The largest group of colonies, founded in Argentina by the Jewish Colonization Association, included 6,800 settlers in 1896—68 per cent of all Argentine Jews at the time. The total Jewish population of these colonies increased to a peak of 33,100 in 1925, but gradually declined to some 8,000 persons in 1970 and even fewer in the 1980's. Most of the early Jewish settlers—many of whom had previously been impoverished craftsmen and merchants—became farmers, thus writing one of the significant chapters in the history of Jewish agriculture. Later, as the colonies lost momentum, other branches of economic activity came to the fore. In 1960 only 44 per cent of the greatly diminished Jewish population of the colonies consisted of farmers,[39] and this proportion has since declined further.

The urban Jewish communities tended to grow through migration from abroad and, to some extent, movement from the agricultural settlements. Buenos Aires' share among total Argentine Jewry was 12 per cent in 1895, 30 per cent in 1909, and more than 50 per cent in the early 1930's.[40] According to the 1960 census, about 80 per cent of the 310,000 Jews in Argentina lived in the metropolitan area of Greater Buenos Aires, a quite remarkable concentration, considering that the corresponding proportion among the general population was 33 per cent (this, too, being a comparatively high figure).

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[38] For an extended presentation, see Haim Avni, *Argentina, The Promised Land: Baron De Hirsch's Colonization Project in the Argentine Republic* (Jerusalem, 1973).

[39] See, in Hebrew, Haim Avni, *Argentine Jewry: Social Status and Institutional Profile* (Jerusalem, 1972).

[40] See Schmelz and DellaPergola, *The Demography of the Jews in Argentina and in Other Countries of Latin America, op. cit.*

Concentration of the bulk of the Jewish population in the capital city or chief economic center has been typical of several communities in Latin America. Nearly all of Uruguay's estimated 30,000 Jews live in Montevideo. In Mexico, the Federal District and its suburbs account for over 85 per cent of the total Jewish population. In Chile, Santiago Jewry grew from 12 per cent of that country's still very small Jewish population in 1907, to 51 per cent in 1920, 73 per cent in 1940, and 83 per cent in 1952; in 1970 the proportion had declined somewhat to 70 per cent. In every instance, the strengthening of the major metropolitan community has been accompanied by stagnation or decline in the size of smaller provincial communities.

A comparison of official data from the Brazilian censuses between 1940 and 1980 offers a further interesting perspective on the changes in Jewish population distribution within a major Latin American country (Table 7). In 1980, 98 per cent of the unrevised total of Jews[41] were defined as urban, as against 68 per cent of the general population. Jews, moreover, were concentrated in fewer metropolitan areas; the share of the urban population in two of Brazil's largest states (Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) was 82 per cent in the case of Jews and only 41 per cent among the general population. The earlier census data (presented in Table 7 without any adjustment) show approximately the same Jewish population size in the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Since the 1960's, however, Sao Paulo has gradually emerged as the main Jewish community. Consistent with the highly dynamic development of the general population of the area, the Sao Paulo community seems to have absorbed all of the country's Jewish population increase since 1960. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, discontinuation of the city's role as capital may have caused a slowdown in the growth of the Jewish population. At the same time, the number of Jews in the new Federal District of Brasilia is small; dominated as it is by public administration activities, Brasilia does not appear to have a powerful attraction for Jews. Rather, it is Sao Paulo, with its highly diversified economy, that is able to stimulate Jewish in-migration (internal and international), in keeping with the evolving occupational structure of Jews (see below). On the whole, Brazil's smaller Jewish communities have been remarkably stable over time, but their recently reduced size, which appears to be a symptom of great aging, points to future numerical decline.

Residential distribution within the major metropolitan areas is another important indicator of the ways in which Latin American Jews relate to the surrounding societies. Cities like Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Mexico City, and Santiago provide examples of a characteristically Jewish residential pattern. Despite some presence in all parts of the city, a very large proportion of the

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[41] See the critique of the data appearing above.

TABLE 7. JEWISH POPULATION OF BRAZIL, BY REGIONS AND SELECTED STATES, 1940–1980, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES[a]

Regions and States	1940		1950		1960[b]		1980[b]	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	55,666	100.0	69,957	100.0	86,038	100.0	89.969	100.0
North	1,562	2.8	1,791	2.6	1,390	1.6	1,248	1.4
Thereof:								
Para[c]	995	1.8	1,126	1.6	918	1.1	827	0.9
Nordeste	1,603	2.9	1,913	2.7	1,712	2.0	1,476	1.6
Thereof:								
Pernambuco[d]	1,115	2.0	1,531	2.2	1,292	1.5	1,237	1.4
East	24,274	43.6	30,117	43.1	34,060	39.6	31,549	35.1
Thereof:								
Bahia[e]	955	1.7	1,076	1.5	799	9.3	736	0.8
Minas Gerais[f]	1,431	2.6	1,528	2.2	1,948	2.3	1,525	1.7
Rio de Janeiro[g]	21,666	38.9	27,431	39.2	31,196	36.3	29,139	32.4
South	28,147	50.6	35,988	51.4	48,344	56.2	54,858	61.0
Thereof:								
Sao Paulo[h]	20,379	36.6	26,443	37.8	37,003	43.0	44,378	49.3
Parana[i]	1,038	1.9	1,340	1.9	2,162	2.5	1,993	2.2
Rio Grande do Sul[j]	6,619	11.9	8,048	11.5	8,720	10.1	8,210	9.1
Center-West	80	0.1	148	0.2	532	0.6	838	0.9
Thereof:								
Distrito Federal[k]	—	—	—	—	114	0.1	625	0.7

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[a] Source: Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, various censuses.

[b] Urban population only.

[c] Main city: Belem. [d] Main city: Recife. [e] Main city: Salvador.

[f] Main city: Belo Horizonte.

[g] Until 1960: Combined total of the states of Guanabara (main city: Rio de Janeiro) and Rio de Janeiro (main city: Niteroi). As of 1980, these two states are merged.

[h] Main city: Sao Paulo. [i] Main city: Curitiba. [j] Main city: Porto Alegre.

[k] Main city: Brasilia.

Jewish population tends to be located in one clearly delimited territorial sector, starting at the edge of the inner city's central business district and reaching out through a territorial continuum to select middle and upper-middle class neighborhoods and suburbs. Such extension toward the outer sections of the metropolitan area is often a correlate of upward social and occupational mobility, not unlike the situation in many North American cities. Still, as compared to the general urban population throughout Latin America, Jews are more likely to live in the central city, and are relatively less numerous in the vast, often extremely deprived, suburban areas. The similarity of these ecological patterns in different urban centers testifies to the "intermediate" position of Jews in Latin America: they stand between the dominant ethnic and economic élites and the struggling urban masses.

On the whole, residential concentration represents a powerful cohesive force in Jewish life, despite the prevailing trend of dispersal from the older, poorer, and more central urban *barrios* (where, in some instances, Jews may even have been a majority of the population in the past) to newer and better sections of the extended city.

Population Dynamics and Structure

BALANCE OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS

Latin American countries are often cited as extreme examples of the modern "population explosion." Particularly in Central and tropical Latin America, very high birth rates, combined with high but declining death rates, have produced some of the highest rates of natural increase currently on record. Only in a few countries in the subcontinent's temperate zone are current population processes somewhat closer to the situation prevailing in North America and other Western countries.

Although in the past Jews experienced periods of high natality and rapid population growth, the recent evolution of demographic processes among Latin American Jews could hardly be at greater variance with the predominant patterns on the subcontinent. Relatively small or even negative rates of natural increase, i.e., the balance between births and deaths, have prevailed among Jews since the 1950's. As a consequence, short-term changes in Jewish population size have again come to depend in the main on the volume of international migration, which was the major component of demographic change up to the late 1930's. Over the long term, however, changes in the demographic behavior of the local Jewish populations must have a decisive impact on the size and structure of Latin American Jewry.

Birth and death rates have been calculated for the Jews of Argentina between 1900 and 1975 in the framework of a general backward and forward reconstruction of the demographic development of the community, based on the detailed returns of the 1960 census[42] (Table 8). Jewish birth and death rates until World War I were rather consistent with the countrywide averages for the general population. These data basically reflect the demographic patterns of Jews in the major countries of emigration at the time, especially in Eastern Europe.[43] In Argentina, Jewish birth rates were actually higher than in Europe. This can be explained by the greater proportion of young adults among the migrants.

Between 1910–1914 and 1945 the pace of natural population increase was rather similar among Jews and non-Jews, although somewhat slower in the case of the former. Jewish birth rates declined by 50 per cent during the

TABLE 8. BIRTH AND DEATH RATES PER 1,000 AMONG THE JEWISH AND GENERAL POPULATIONS OF ARGENTINA, 1900–1975

Years	Jewish Population[a]			General Population[b]		
	Births[c]	Deaths[d]	Balance	Births	Deaths	Balance
1900–04	46	25	21	44.3	26.1	18.2
1905–09	47	25	22	42.1	22.7	19.4
1910–14	38	19	19	39.2	19.7	19.5
1915–19	33	16	17	36.5	17.7	18.8
1920–24	30	14	16	34.9	15.1	19.8
1925–29	27	11	16	32.5	14.1	18.4
1930–34	23	9	14	29.0	12.5	16.5
1935–39	20	8	12	25.7	12.5	13.2
1940–44	19	8	11	25.5	11.3	14.2
1945–49	18	7	11	26.3	10.5	15.8
1950–54	16	7	9	25.5	9.2	16.3
1955–59	12	7	4	24.5	8.7	15.8
1960–65	11	11	0	23.0	8.6	14.5
1966–70	11	13	−2	22.0	8.6	13.4
1971–75	10	14	−4	23.5	8.9	14.6

[a] Source: Reconstruction of Jewish population; see above.

[b] Sources: until 1970, Z. Recchini de Lattes and A.E. Lattes (eds.), *La poblacion de Argentina*, Buenos Aires, C.I.C.R.E.D. Series, 1975, p. 34; after 1970, United Nations, *Demographic Year Book*, New York, yearly publication.

[c] Effectively Jewish births, net losses of children of mixed marriages.

[d] Includes effects of adult affiliative losses.

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[42] See above.

[43] See Roberto Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 43–44; Sergio DellaPergola, *La transformazione demografica della diaspora ebraica* (Turin, 1983).

period, which was much more rapid than among the general population, but not unlike Jewish natality changes in Europe in the same period. Jewish death rates were also substantially lower than those among the general population. Since 1945, the demographic dynamics of Jews have diverged considerably from those of the general population of Argentina, this in a country with one of the lowest rates of growth in Latin America.

In the post-World War II period, Jewish vital statistics were more affected than previously by the net effects of affiliative changes. The birth rates in Table 8 do not include children born to mixed-married couples who are not identified with Jewry; the death rates incorporate the net affiliative losses of adults. The "effectively Jewish" birth rate was roughly half the general birth rate of Argentines. Jewish death rates, even without the compounding effects of assimilation, tended to increase because of the constant aging of the Jewish population. As a consequence, the balance of Jewish natural and affiliative changes rapidly dropped to zero between 1960 and 1965, and subsequently reached negative values.

While the above-discussed trends of Argentine Jewry may have been more negative than those of other Jewish communities in Latin America, they adequately illustrate the main general tendencies.

MARRIAGE PATTERNS

Although family patterns, i.e., the propensity to marry, age at marriage, and the choice of a marriage partner, do not bear directly on changes in population size, they fundamentally affect population composition and, through it, the rhythms of population growth. Near universality of marriage was one of the features of Jewish society prior to the beginning of modernization. It still shows up in the Argentine census data with regard to Jews born in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, who were aged 50 or more in 1960 (Table 9). Jews born in Western countries tended to marry somewhat less, and this tendency was intensified among the Argentine-born. The marked inter-generational decline in nuptiality among Jews can probably be interpreted as a correlate of the acculturation and social mobility processes which usually occur among immigrant groups. In the course of time, Jewish family patterns came to resemble, though not completely, the general pattern of the Argentine population, which included—as in other Latin American countries—widespread bachelorhood and spinsterhood. Jews tend to marry at older ages than do members of the general population, as shown by the higher age-specific proportions of never-married up to age 34 for males and age 29 for females. Eventually, however, a greater proportion of Jews form their own families than do members of the general population. This is true also for the Argentine-born. According to the evidence available

TABLE 9. PERCENTAGES NEVER-MARRIED AMONG THE JEWISH POPULATION, BY AGE, SEX, AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH, ARGENTINA, 1960[a]

Age	Jewish Population, By Country Of Birth					General Population
	Total	Argentina	Other America And Western Countries	Eastern Europe	Asia And Africa	
			Males			
Total 15+	28.9	48.2	15.8	6.8	9.3	37.4
15–19	99.8	99.8	99.4	98.1	94.6	98.9
20–24	91.9	92.2	86.8	82.6	95.4	84.0
25–29	55.1	55.9	45.8	45.6	69.8	46.3
30–34	27.8	28.8	22.3	23.8	32.8	26.0
35–39	15.5	17.3	16.7	11.5	12.6	17.7
40–44	11.2	12.9	11.4	6.7	12.6	15.2
45–49	8.9	10.2	8.9	7.2	8.3	14.1
50–64	5.6	8.2	8.1	4.7	5.6	14.3
65+	3.8	17.0	6.7	2.9	5.1	14.4
			Females			
Total 15+	22.6	37.1	10.2	3.3	5.2	30.0
15–19	97.7	97.8	92.9	94.3	89.1	90.2
20–24	65.2	66.4	48.7	41.7	43.8	55.6
25–29	28.4	29.3	18.7	22.8	20.6	28.3
30–34	15.6	17.3	9.0	9.4	9.2	18.2
35–39	10.4	13.2	5.2	5.1	9.1	14.8
40–44	8.4	10.6	5.3	3.1	10.6	13.9
45–49	6.1	8.8	3.6	2.4	7.0	13.4
50–64	3.3	8.8	4.7	1.9	1.7	13.6
65+	2.7	16.4	4.0	2.1	1.9	14.7

[a]Source: 1960 Census of Argentina, authors' tabulations.

from the 1960 census, consensual marriage—a rather widespread family arrangement in Latin America—is rarely reported by Jews.

Later and less frequent marriages may to some extent affect the patterns of child-bearing and family growth among the Jewish population. However, from the perspective of the Jewish group, the choice of whether the partner will come from within or outside the group is of greater significance for population trends over the long run. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to accurately investigate this crucial aspect of Jewish demography in Latin

America. The levels and demographic implications of mixed marriage can only be tentatively assessed with the help of very partial evidence and some conjecture.

The Argentine census of 1960, as noted above, provides information on the number of Jews who married during the preceding years, regardless of the type of ceremony performed. Assuming that the census did not significantly under-report the Jewish population, and comparing the figure for Greater Buenos Aires with the Jewish marriage records kept by the Jewish community there, the frequency of mixed marriage may be estimated. Indeed, the Greater Buenos Aires census figure of recently married Jews exceeds the figure found in the community records for the same years by over 30 per cent.[44] Considering other structural features of the Jewish population, in particular the connection between the overall proportion of non-Jewish members in Jewish households and the proportion of mixed marriages among current weddings, it can be estimated that about 20–25 per cent of all Jews marrying in Greater Buenos Aires around 1960 had a non-Jewish marriage partner. Another 5–10 per cent of Jewish spouses had perhaps married Jews, but in a civil ceremony (consequently not appearing in the Jewish community records).

Several studies of relatively small, and perhaps not quite representative, Jewish communities in Argentina during the 1960's[45] found proportions of mixed couples ranging between seven and eight per cent for all existing marriages. These figures closely correspond to that found among United States Jews in 1957, at a time when 9.2 per cent of newly formed households were mixed, not including those where the non-Jewish partner had been converted to Judaism.[46] In Tucuman (1962)[47] mixed couples constituted 7.1 per cent of all existing households, regardless of the year of marriage; 12 years later, in 1974, a survey of the same community[48] found a three-fold increase—to 22 per cent—in the proportion of mixed couples. This is a substantially higher figure than the corresponding estimate of 12.5 per cent for Jews in the United States in 1970–1971.[49] The current frequency of mixed marriage in the United States in 1970–1971, excluding cases of conversion, is assessed to have been about 35 per cent.[50] Thus, the current rate of mixed marriage appropriate to Tucuman's overall rate of 22 per cent would probably be above 40 per cent. In sum, during the late 1950's and early 1960's, the extent of marital assimilation in Argentina may not have differed much from the situation in the United States, but its subsequent increase has been much more rapid.

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[44] See Schmelz and DellaPergola, *The Demography of the Jews in Argentina and in the Other Countries of Latin America, op. cit.*

[45] Tucuman, a city and province in the North-West; Quilmes, a suburb south of Buenos Aires; the Sephardi community in Buenos Aires.

[46] See U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," AJYB, Vol. 84, 1984, pp. 161–163.

[47] See *Premier censo de la poblacion judía de la provincia de Tucuman* (Buenos Aires, 1963).

[48] See *La poblacion israelita de la provincia de Tucuman, Segundo Censo* (San Miguel de Tucuman, 1976).

[49] See Schmelz and DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," *op. cit.*, p. 162.

There is evidence suggesting that in Brazil—at least in Sao Paulo—out-marriage was less widespread for some time than in nearby Argentina. According to the internal records of the Jewish community in the State of Sao Paulo (which may overlook some of the identificationally weaker elements of the Jewish population), 12 per cent of all existing couples in 1983 included one partner who was not Jewish by birth.[51] In about half of these households, the non-Jewish partner had converted to Judaism, thus reducing the overall proportion of mixed marriages to a rather low 6.3 per cent. About two-thirds of these households included a Jewish husband, the remaining third a Jewish wife. When, however, the estimated current incidence of out-marriage in San Paulo is examined, the picture changes. Of all marriages performed in 1981, 44.7 per cent were mixed, another 11.9 per cent involved a non-Jewish partner who had converted to Judaism, and only 43.4 per cent were among two Jewish-born individuals.[52] In Sao Paulo, as in the Argentine Jewish communities, the recent increase in mixed marriage seems to have been very strong, at a level somewhat above that currently observed in the United States and Canada.

The major implications for Jewish demography in Latin America of these trends and differentials bear on the Jewish identification of the children of mixed marriages. Here again, only indirect evidence is available, the major source being the 1960 Argentine census. According to it, the number of children below age five who were reported as Jewish fell short by 25 per cent of the number of children born to Jewish women during the relevant periods.[53] If it is assumed that the 25 per cent represent the children of mixed couples, a significant erosive effect in the intergenerational dynamics of the Jewish population emerges.

FERTILITY

The rapid course of modernization of Jewish fertility in Argentina, already outlined above, can be followed in greater detail in Table 10, which

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[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Source: Federaçao Israelita do Estado de Sao Paulo, Departamento de Estatistica e Pesquisa Social.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] See Schmelz and DellaPergola, *The Demography of the Jews in Argentina and the Other Countries of Latin America, op. cit.*

'ABLE 10. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO EVER-MARRIED JEWISH WOMEN, BY AGE, LABOR FORCE STATUS, AND HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINED,[a] ARGENTINA, 1960[b]

ge	Jewish Population, By Labor Force Status In 1960									General Population
	Total	In Labor Force				Not In Labor Force				
		Total	Elementary Or None	Secondary	University	Total	Elementary Or None	Secondary	University	
'otal	2.3	1.8	2.1	1.6	1.6	2.4	2.5	1.9	1.7	2.7
0–24	1.0	0.6	1.0	0.6	0.4	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.8	1.2
5–29	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.8
0–34	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.3
5–39	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.6
0–44	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.8
5–64	2.4	2.0	2.2	1.7	1.8	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.0	3.2
5+	3.6	2.6	2.7	1.8	1.7	3.6	3.8	2.4	2.3	4.1

Completed or not.

Source: 1960 Census of Argentina, authors' tabulations.

also presents differentials in the number of children born, according to some basic socio-demographic characteristics of the mothers. The cumulative number of children born to ever-married Jewish women was already low during the 1930's and the World War II period. Quite strikingly, there is little or no sign of a "baby boom" in post-war Argentina; any short-term recovery that may have occurred was obscured by the long-term trend of decreasing fertility. In 1960 the cumulative fertility of ever-married Jewish women approaching the end of reproduction (aged 35 to 44) was about 2.2 children on average. However, after taking into account the never-married category (see Table 9), the fertility of Jewish women was below the intergenerational replacement level, which, at the very low mortality level prevailing among Argentina's Jews, was 2.1 children on average for all women (regardless of marital status). As noted above, a further reduction of "effectively Jewish" fertility must be assumed to have subsequently taken place due to increased mixed marriage.

Differentials in fertility by women's educational attainment and labor force participation may suggest the changes that could be expected after 1960. Educational attainment is negatively related to fertility, but the differential is small if there is control for labor force status. A residual of the higher fertility of the past can still be noted among women aged 65 and over —mostly foreign-born—who, at best, attended elementary school and did not work in 1960. Such a combination of characteristics was indeed predominant in this age group, while educational attainment and labor force participation rapidly increased among younger women. University educated younger women, though experiencing a slower initial pace of family growth, are likely to end up with as many or more children than women with secondary education only.

On the whole, more significant fertility differentials are related to labor force status. Thus, women participating in the labor force in 1960 had fewer children, whether they were in or past the childbearing age. The current and past labor force status of older women may be correlated, which would explain the low cumulative fertility of older working women. The association of reduced family size with women's work is clearly established after controlling for educational attainment.

The inter-generational transformation of Argentine Jewish women—their becoming increasingly local born, better educated, and more often employed in the labor force—implies a substantial increase of the element with small-sized families well before the 1960 census. The respective changes in the composition of Jewish women have continued since 1960, and have probably caused a further decline of fertility among Jewish women as a whole. The additional erosive effects of assimilation and mixed marriage can also be assumed to have occurred more intensively among the same element of the Jewish population. It follows that even if fertility had remained relatively stable, the "effectively Jewish" birth rate must have declined below the already low level revealed by the 1960 data. The inferred trends are confirmed by the age distributions of various Jewish populations in Latin America over the past 25 years, which show ever declining proportions of young children.

Equally detailed data on Jewish fertility in Brazil are not available. The 1980 census information on age structure, however, provides some insight into the changes that have occurred since the mid-1960's. A rough fertility ratio can be computed by dividing the number of Jewish children aged 0–4 in 1980 by the number of Jewish women aged 20–34 (the ages at which nearly all births occur according to contemporary Jewish fertility patterns). This computation can be extended by comparing the number of surviving children who were aged 0–4 in 1975 and in 1970 (aged 5–9 and 10–14, respectively, in 1980) with the survivors of the groups that reached age 20–34 at those same dates (aged 25–39 and 30–44, respectively, in 1980). The results for Brazil's total Jewry and for a few major geographical areas are shown in Table 11 (the rural population was excluded from these computations).

The general pattern of fertility decline is clear, although there is some variation between the different Jewish communities in Brazil. Interestingly, the decline in fertility seems to have been less marked in the State of Sao Paulo, where the country's largest and fastest-growing community is located. Apart from actual fertility differentials, one possible explanation

TABLE 11. RATIOS OF JEWISH CHILDREN TO JEWISH WOMEN AT CHILDBEARING AGES, BY YEAR OF BIRTH AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE, BRAZIL, 1980[a]

Age In 1980	Year Of Birth Of Children	State Of Residence			
		Total	Sao Paulo	Rio de Janeiro	Other
Children 10–14 Women 30–44	1966–70	.714	.724	.643	.810
Children 5–9 Women 25–39	1971–75	.616	.634	.548	.686
Children 0–4 Women 20–34	1976–80	.614	.669	.520	.624

[a]Source: Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, *IX Recenseamento Geral,* 1980. Urban population only.

for this finding might be that less erosion of "effectively Jewish" birth levels, due to mixed marriage, has taken place in Sao Paulo than in other communities, most of which are much smaller. (The available census data do not indicate how many children were born to Jewish parents, only how many were listed as Jews.) In comparison with similar estimates for Argentina in the 1960's, the Brazilian figures point to greater Jewish fertility. At the same time, the declining trend in recent years suggests convergence toward a general pattern of small Jewish family size in Latin America.

POPULATION STRUCTURE

The structure of a Jewish population by age, sex, and composition of households is the result of the major demographic processes at work. It is shaped by the prolonged effects of natality and mortality levels, nuptiality patterns, age-sex-differential migration movements, and affiliative changes. Hence, an examination of population structure can be particularly revealing.

While Jewish international migrations have typically included entire households—being less selective by age and sex than general migrations—in Latin America there is often some prevalence of males among the elderly, if not among the total Jewish population. This was the case in Brazil in 1980, as indicated by the figures in the census. The presence of a majority of males contrasts with the slight predominance of females that is typical among contemporary populations in the developed countries, as well as among Diaspora Jewry, both of which feature low mortality and greater female longevity.

Jewish sex ratios may be affected by different degrees of identificational erosion among persons of each sex. One of the intriguing features of the 1960 Argentine census was the unnaturally low proportion of Jewish males in the 15–44 age group.[54] An upward adjustment in the reported number of Jewish males had to be made as part of the assessment of Jewish population size and structure in Argentina, based on the census (see above). It may be assumed that fewer Jewish males than females reported their religion in the 1960 census, because of higher frequencies of mixed marriage and other types of identificational assimilation among the males (at least, before 1960).

The age structures of Jewish populations in Latin America, as in many other regions of the Diaspora, have been subject to a distinct process of aging (Table 12). The main cause is the early and prolonged decline of Jewish fertility, and the consequent lowering of the Jewish birth rate. The lower tiers of the Jewish age-pyramid have been further narrowed by assimilatory losses of young adults and children, especially children of mixed marriages. Consequently, the median age of the Jewish population has increased throughout the continent. Still, there are significant age differences between communities; the Jewish populations of Argentina, Chile, and probably Uruguay are more aged than those of Brazil and some smaller communities in tropical and Central America.

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[54] In view of the regular surplus of males among the new-born, and the relatively marginal excess of male mortality among children and young adults, males should constitute about one half of the population reaching this stage of the life cycle. According to the original census data, the number of Jewish males aged 15 to 44 amounted to 93 per cent of the corresponding female age group.

The aging of Latin American Jewry constitutes a powerful structural determinant of increasing death rates and, hence, Jewish population decrease.[55]

Delayed marriage, low fertility, and population aging have affected the size and structure of Jewish households. Household size has declined over time, and has become overwhelmingly dominated by simple structures encompassing household heads, spouses, and children. Other relatives and non-relatives have become infrequent household members. However, late marriage sometimes implies that children—often aged 25 or more—continue to live with their parents until, and even beyond, the end of their university studies. In 1960 the average size of Argentine Jewish households was 3.5, as against 3.8 among the general population. The proportion of one-person households was lower among Jews (5.6 per cent) than among Argentines in general (7 per cent). However, there can be little doubt that this proportion has increased substantially over the last two and a half decades.

Socio-economic Changes

The evidence that is available on the socio-economic structure and mobility of Latin American Jews is quite fragmentary and marked by divergencies of definition and classification with regard to the relevant variables. Still, despite the very imperfect comparability of data relating to different communities and different periods of time, it is possible to outline some of the main characteristics and patterns of change in educational attainment and occupational structure.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

By today's standards, the educational attainment of the earlier Jewish immigrants to Latin America was quite low. Thus, the 1960 Argentine

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[55] See Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry, op. cit.*

ABLE 12. AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF SELECTED JEWISH POPULATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1947–1980

ountry Or ocality	Year	Total	0–14	15–29	30–44	45–64	65+	Median Age	
								Jewish Population	General Population
rgentina									
otal	1947[a]	100.0	24.6	24.8	25.6	19.7	5.3	31.4	25.0
″	1960[a]	100.0	20.5	22.0	22.2	27.5	7.8	34.7	27.0
″	1975[a]	100.0	15.4	18.1	21.2	28.6	16.7	41.6	27.9
reater Buenos Aires	1960[b]	100.0	20.2	21.3	21.7	28.7	8.1	35.5	32.0
″	1973–74[c]	100.0	18.2	20.6	22.5	28.0	10.6	37.6	..
cuman	1960[b]	100.0	23.5	23.7	20.1	25.6	7.1	32.8	..
″	1974[c]	100.0	20.8	23.8	19.2	23.2	13.0	34.0	..
hia Blanca	1975[c]	100.0	21.9	19.3	18.7	29.8	10.3	36.9	..
olonies	1960[b, d]	100.0	21.6	17.7	19.2	30.3	11.1	36.9	..
azil									
otal	1950[b]	100.0	23.8	25.5	22.0	23.3	5.4	30.5	18.9
″ (Urban)	1980[b]	100.0	19.8	23.5	19.1	23.3	14.3	34.6	21.5
o Paulo (City)	1968–69[c]	100.0	21.6	24.8	17.1	24.9	9.3	33.2	27.2
o Paulo (State)	1980[b]	100.0	20.8	23.2	19.1	22.7	14.2	34.0	23.3
o de Janeiro (City)	1960[b]	100.0	23.1	21.1	21.3	27.5	6.9	33.3	20.8[e]
o de Janeiro (State)	1980[b]	100.0	17.1	22.6	19.3	24.9	16.1	37.9	24.3

hile									
otal	1952[b]	100.0	22.8	18.8	22.2	27.7	8.5	36.3	23.5[f]
anama									
otal	1960–61[c]	100.0	29.6	22.6	21.3	20.2	6.3	28.4	18.3
olombia									
ogota	1977[c]	100.0	25.3	24.4	17.6	21.3	11.4	30.5	18.3[g]

Reconstruction of Jewish population in Argentina, based on 1960 census data.

Population census.

Jewish survey.

Does not include all the relevant Jewish population.

State of Guanabara, urban population.

Province of Santiago.

Total country, urban population.

census revealed that only 15.8 per cent of Jews aged 65 and over had attended school beyond the primary level, while 23.4 per cent lacked any formal education (see Table 13). The rapid rise in educational achievement is apparent when a comparison is made with the younger age groups. The proportion of those with college and university education (whether completed or not) passed from 2.2 per cent among Jews aged 65 and over to 21.1 per cent in the 15–29 age group. In Sao Paulo in 1968, 36.6 per cent of Jewish men and 13 per cent of Jewish women aged 20–24 attended

TABLE 13. JEWISH POPULATION (AGED 15 AND OVER), BY SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND AGE, ARGENTINA, 1960[a]

Characteristics	Jewish Population, By Age					General
	Total	15–29	30–44	45–64	65+	Population
Educational Attainment	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	5.3	0.6	1.1	7.1	23.4	10.5
Primary	51.3	27.7	55.6	63.6	60.8	71.6
Secondary	32.1	50.6	30.9	23.8	13.6	15.2
University	11.3	21.1	12.4	5.5	2.2	2.7
Per Cent In Labor Force[b]						
Male	80.4	65.0	98.5	88.7	47.4	84.5
Female	19.7	32.6	20.3	12.6	4.7	23.3
Occupation[c]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional	11.1	14.0	14.2	7.5	3.7	6.5
Managerial	9.5	4.4	11.5	11.4	10.2	2.6
Clerical	13.2	26.6	11.7	5.9	3.6	11.9
Sales	37.2	28.7	35.4	43.3	49.7	10.3
Manufacturing	22.3	19.1	21.9	24.9	22.9	34.1
Services	4.5	5.9	3.7	4.1	4.7	14.7
Agriculture	2.2	1.2	1.6	2.9	5.2	19.8
Occupational Status[c]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0.
Employer	36.2	14.0	39.1	48.7	49.9	12.6
Self-employed	19.4	11.9	19.8	23.4	29.6	12.4
Employee	43.4	72.2	40.6	27.4	19.6	72.1
Family Help	1.0	1.9	0.5	0.5	0.9	2.9

[a] Source: 1960 Census of Argentina, authors' tabulations.

[b] Per 100 in each age-sex group.

[c] Per 100 in the labor force.

universities.[56] By now, the corresponding proportion for both sexes combined may have easily passed the 40 per cent mark. According to a 1983 estimate,[57] about 39 per cent of the Jewish population of Sao Paulo aged 25 and over had attained an academic degree or diploma.

The rapid academization of the younger generation of Latin American Jews is perhaps less complete than among comparable age groups in the United States Jewish population. Nevertheless, it contrasts sharply with the educational attainment of the general population in the various Latin American countries, where illiteracy is still widespread.

OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Changes in educational attainment provide a leading clue to the processes of occupational transformation that have occurred in the Latin American Jewish communities in recent decades. The 1960 Argentine census again provides the main benchmark for analysis (Table 13). If the occupational distributions of the different age groups are compared, the greatest decrease is found in the sales category, which accounted for about half the Jews working at ages 65 and over, but only around 30 per cent of those aged 15–29. (The decline of the Jewish agricultural labor force has been even greater—relative to its initial size, but it was already small before 1960.) The mostly blue-collar manufacturing and service sectors were also declining, although they still accounted for about 27 per cent of the Jews aged 30–44—a much higher proportion than among other contemporary Jewish communities in Western countries. Conversely, the same data point to a rapid intergenerational increase in professional, managerial, and clerical activities. Clerical work provided an important outlet for the considerably increased number of Jewish women in the labor force.

The partial synopsis of the occupational distributions of various Jewish communities over the past 30 years, presented in Table 14, offers further insight into the ongoing socio-economic changes, even allowing for some difficulties and imperfections in reconciling different sets of data. The very substantial professionalization of Latin American Jewry shows up when the same locality is observed at intervals of several years, e.g., Buenos Aires in 1960 and 1973–1974,[58] and Tucuman in 1960 and 1974. The substantial

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[56] See Henrique Rattner, "Census and Sociological Research of the Jewish Community in Sao Paulo—1968," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1969* (Jerusalem, 1973), pp. 289–303.

[57] See footnote 51.

[58] See Joaquim Fischerman *et al., Censo de la comunidad judía de Buenos Aires,* Buenos Aires, 1974 (mimeographed). This survey was carried out as a pre-test for a larger and more systematic study of the Buenos Aires Jewish community which, unfortunately, did not materialize. Included were 1,059 Jews selected from both the AMIA membership rolls and the unaffiliated sector of the community.

ABLE 14. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF SELECTED JEWISH POPULATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1951–1983

lace	Year	Occupation							
		Total	Profes-sional	Mana-gerial	Clerical	Sales	Manufac-turing	Services	Agriculture
rgentina									
otal	1960[a]	100.0	11.1	9.5	13.2	37.2	22.3	4.5	2.2
uenos Aires (Capital)	1960[a]	100.0	10.4	10.2	14.1	35.3	25.4	4.3	0.3
uenos Aires Suburbs	1960[a]	100.0	11.5	8.7	12.5	37.4	24.2	5.2	0.5
reater Buenos Aires	1973/74[b]	100.0	21.3	17.5	12.3	39.2	6.5	3.2	—
nterior, Total	1960[a]	100.0	13.4	7.6	10.6	43.2	11.1	4.7	9.3
olonies, Total	1960[a,c]	100.0	7.7	3.8	8.1	28.7	8.6	5.2	38.0
anus	1951[b]	100.0	5.9	4.3		74.3[d]	14.4[e]	1.1[f]	—
ordoba	1951[b]	100.0	15.6	5.8		56.5[d]	15.5[e]	6.6[f]	—
"	1960[a]	100.0	16.3	7.9	13.1	44.2	13.9	3.9	0.7
"	1970[b]	100.0	20.0	[g]	11.0	57.0[h]	3.0	8.0[f]	—
ucuman	1960[a]	100.0	14.9	10.1	9.5	51.9	8.5	4.5	0.6
"	1974[b]	100.0	31.8	5.1[i]	13.0	37.9	11.5[e,f]		0.6
ahia Blanca	1975[b]	100.0	23.0	1.6	11.2	46.4	10.8	1.9	5.1

Brazil									
Sao Paulo (City)	1968[b,j]	100.0[k]	18.6	19.3	16.1	34.4[l]	11.6[e]		—
Sao Paulo (State)	1983[b,j]	100.0	41.7	42.6[m]	4.5	9.6[n]	1.3	0.3	—
Mexico									
Federal District	1970[a]	100.0	14.8	39.3	12.2	21.0	7.4	4.8	0.5

Population census.
Jewish survey.
Does not include all the relevant population.
Including *cuentanik*.
Artisans, workers.
"Other."
Included in the "trade, sales" category.
Including the managerial category.
Industrials, workers on own account.
Occupational classifications for Sao Paulo in 1968 and 1983 are not complete. See also notes k-n.
The "other" category was excluded before computing the percentages.
The "employer" category was included here after checking the proportion of trade in additional data on occupational distribution by economic branches.
Including managers in the "trade, sales" branch.
Employees only.
These data include an unascertained minority of non-Jews.

minority of Jewish household heads in the rural colonies who were still engaged in agriculture in 1960 has since diminished, as previously noted. The once heavily Jewish clothing industry has lost most of its Jewish workers over the past 20 years. The sales area, including the *cuentaniks,*[59] which once claimed a majority of the Jewish labor force in some provincial localities, is now losing ground, although this probably applies more to the metropolitan centers than to the smaller communities of the provinces.

The widespread general economic trend toward specialization, complexity, and the development of large corporations has strongly affected the Jewish occupational structure, even where there has been no actual change in the types of occupation. (This is perhaps best exemplified in the data reported for Sao Paulo.) Many shopkeepers, craftsmen, and even small industrial proprietors have assumed the status of salaried managers by extending the scope of their enterprises. The data on occupational status in Table 13 suggest that the Jewish labor force in Argentina was rapidly shifting from a clear predominance of employers and the self-employed to a large proportion of employees.[60]

Jewish occupational structures in the various Latin American countries have many common traits despite local variation, but differ sharply from the characteristics of the majority populations. Jews comprise much larger proportions of persons engaged in sales occupations and the professions, and are more often self-employed. The shift from the traditional pattern of self-employment to the more modern employee status in corporations implies greater integration of Jewish economic activities in the general economic patterns of the Latin American countries. Thus, periods of economic recession, which repeatedly affect most of Latin America, and occasional changes in economic policy may find Jews—with their typical concentration in the middle classes—in a position of greater economic vulnerability. The growing role of Jews in academic life and the liberal professions seems to imply some trade-off of financial power for intellectual prestige. This, however, carries its own risks under regimes suspicious of intellectuals. The new trends and their implications for the changing position of Jews in relationship to the majority populations may constitute crucial factors in the future evolution of Jewish socio-economic stratification and communal patterns.

Quantitative Aspects of Jewish Education

In the preceding overview of socio-demographic changes among Latin American Jews, it has been repeatedly noted that the Jewish population equation is increasingly determined by identificational attitudes and preferences rather than the mere interplay of bio-demographic factors, such as fertility and mortality. Most certainly, it is Jewish education which is expected to play a decisive role in providing the younger generation with a knowledge of things Jewish, and a Jewish identity strong enough to prevent assimilation. Whether and to what extent the Jewish educational system—schools, teachers, curricula—is successful in fulfilling these basic objectives is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is possible to provide an indication of current enrollment and the types of Jewish education in the various countries of Latin America (Table 15).

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[59] Jewish traveling salesmen, selling on account.

[60] In interpreting this trend, age-differential status propensities, i.e., generally greater shares of employees among the young and of employers and the self-employed among the elderly, must be discounted.

According to the first international census of Jewish schools in the Diaspora, conducted by the project for Jewish educational statistics at the Hebrew University in 1981/82–1982/83,[61] there were 159 Jewish schools throughout Latin America, including kindergartens but excluding post-secondary education; 103 were in Argentina, 22 in Brazil, and 33 in other countries. Unlike the prevailing pattern in the United States, the overwhelming majority of Jewish schools provided a full-day curriculum, including both Judaic and general studies. Supplementary Jewish schools were relatively more developed in Argentina than elsewhere and typically consisted of daily afternoon programs.

More than 47,000 pupils were enrolled in Jewish schools—over 21,000 in Argentina, over 10,000 in Brazil, and over 15,000 in other countries. Enrollment tended to be concentrated in kindergartens and elementary schools. The drop-out rate of pupils from Jewish education was particularly marked in Argentina, where detailed cohort data show that maximum enrollment was often found at age 5, in kindergarten, followed by nearly regular reduction in the number of pupils in each successive grade.[62] Considerable dropping-out from Jewish schools in Brazil occurred between the elementary and secondary levels, although secondary school enrollment has expanded over the past 15 years.[63] Mexico and the smaller communities of Latin America featured some of the largest day schools in the Western hemisphere, with relatively little drop-out between the lower and higher grades.

The reach of Jewish education in Latin America can be determined by a comparison of overall enrollment rates, i.e., the percentage enrolled in Jewish schools per 100 Jewish children aged 3 to 17. Given the somewhat tentative character of the available estimates of Jewish age structures, these

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[61] First data were published in Allie Dubb, *First International Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora* (Jerusalem, 1984). A lengthier report is forthcoming.

[62] See Jacob Rubel, "Jewish Education in Argentina," in Harold Himmelfarb and Sergio DellaPergola (eds.), *World Jewish Education: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (forthcoming).

[63] See David Shers, "Jewish Education in Rio de Janeiro," *ibid.*; Source: Federaçao Israelita do Estado de Sao Paulo, Departamento de Estatistica e Pesquisa Social.

TABLE 15. SELECTED STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF JEWISH EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA, 1981/2–1982/3[a]

Indicator	Country			
	Total	Argentina	Brazil	Other
Schools, By Type				
Total	159	103[b]	22	33
Day Schools[c]	116	66	20	30
Supplementary Schools[d]	38	33	2	3
Jewish Pupils, By Grade				
Total	47,290	21,286	10,396	15,608[e]
Kindergarten	10,313	6,054	1,926	2,333
Grades 1–3	9,794	4,957	1,828	3,009
Grades 4–6	9,040	4,187	1,764	3,089
Grades 7–9	7,225	2,605	1,631	2,989
Grades 10–12	4,917	1,811	795	2,311
Grade Not Reported	6,001	1,672	2,452	1,877
Percentage of Jewish Children Aged 3–17 Enrolled In Jewish Schools	61–65	62–66	47–51	69–73

[a] Source: Project for Jewish Educational Statistics, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *First International Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora.*

[b] Including 4 schools for which type is unknown.

[c] Including unattached kindergartens.

[d] In some cities the local Talmud Torah system was counted as one school.

[e] Thereof: Mexico 5,648; Uruguay 2,984; Venezuela 2,513; Chile 1,502; Colombia 896; Peru 767; Panama 711; Costa Rica 288; Paraguay 134; Ecuador 86; Bolivia 79.

[f] Based on the authors' population estimates for ages 3 to 17.

rates are presented as ranges in Table 15. The aggregate of smaller Latin American communities featured the highest enrollment rate (69–73 per cent), which also appeared to be the highest for all major regions of the Diaspora. In some countries, e.g., Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador, enrollment rates may have reached even higher values, since nearly all of the relevant Jewish children attended Jewish schools. Argentina's enrollment rate was high (62–66 per cent), while Brazil's (47–51 per cent) was still somewhat above the world average, estimated at 41–45 per cent for the total Diaspora, not including Eastern Europe.

The available enrollment statistics point to relative stability in the absolute number of Jewish pupils, but this obviously needs to be interpreted in the light of demographic dynamics, such as changing levels of birth rate and migration. In countries like Argentina, where there has been a decline in the number of children of school age, stability in absolute numbers of enrollment actually means rising enrollment rates.

The Jewish educational system in Latin America has been strengthened by the emergence of the day school as the dominant mode of Jewish instruction, and by attempts at improving the Jewish content of the curriculum. Jewish education encompasses a growing share of the Jewish school-age population. It thus appears that erosion and decline do not cut across the entire Jewish community, but rather tend to be more salient at the periphery, among those who are least concerned with organized Jewish life and its institutions. This might imply that a smaller Jewish population—clearly suggested by demographic analysis and prognosis—is not necessarily synonymous with diminished intensity of Jewish commitment among the actively identified Jews of Latin America.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS

Demographic projections indicate the anticipated size and composition of a given population if it develops according to certain assumptions. Projections are not prophecies. However, if the information on the base population is sound, and the assumptions about the various factors of change are realistic, projections will approximate the actual course of evolution.

Projections for Jewish Diaspora populations are particularly difficult to make because of uncertainties about the future intensity of assimilatory losses and, especially, because of the notorious vicissitudes of Jewish international migration streams. However, projections can be useful for showing what a population will be like if all or some of its currently ascertainable trends should continue. This clarifies the contingent medium or long term effects of the respective trends. The projections presented here for Latin American Jewry are to be viewed in this light.

The base year for the projections was 1975, and results are presented up to the year 2000. This is a span of only 25 years, of which, by now, no more than 15 are left. Most Latin American Jews who will be alive in 2000 were already alive in 1975, and were thus subject to inclusion in the empirical data available from about that time.

Separate sets of alternative projections are presented for Jews in two regions of Latin America: Argentina and all the other countries together. "Other Latin America" is a composite aggregate, comprising some Jewish populations that have been expanding in numbers or have been rather stable

—e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela—and others that have been decreasing—e.g., Uruguay and Chile. As a whole, Jews in this aggregate may be assessed to have reached approximately zero population growth not long ago. The Latin American projections form part of a body of regional projections for all of world Jewry.[64]

Each regional set of projections comprises three comprehensive versions — medium, high, and low—that account for all factors of change—natural, affiliative, and migratory. In addition, the three partial versions show the separate impact of the various factors if, hypothetically, natural movement were to operate alone or in conjunction with assimilation—moderate or strong—but without external migrations.[65] A chart indicating the factors of change and their levels, as applied in the various versions, is contained in Table 16. Particulars can be found in the Appendix.

The initial fertility levels for the projections were deduced from the age-sex composition of the regional Jewish populations and, in the case of Argentina, from analysis of the fertility data in the 1960 census as well. The

TABLE 16. FACTORS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN VERSIONS OF PROJECTIONS[a]

Version	Fertility	Mortality	Assimilatory Losses	External Migrations
Comprehensive:				
A Medium	Low	Low	Moderate	Included
B High	Rising	Low	Moderate	Included
C Low	Low	Low	Strong	Included
Partial:				
D Natural Movement	Low	Low	—	—
E Natural Movement, Moderate Assimilation	Low	Low	Moderate	—
F Natural Movement, Strong Assimilation	Low	Low	Strong	—

[a] For calibration of factors, see Appendix.

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[64] See, especially, U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981), and Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry, op. cit.*

[65] The effect of migration can be assessed by comparison with an otherwise corresponding projection version that also accounts for the migration factor.

mortality schedule was derived from empirical data and demographic models; its determination was facilitated by the current similarity of life expectancy among the advanced populations of the world. Combined application of the fertility and mortality factors, thus assessed, resulted at the beginning of the projection period (Table 18) in a clearly evident natural decrease for Argentine Jews (cf. Table 4) and an approximately zero level of natural movement, but a slightly negative outcome of the whole internal evolution, due to some assimilatory losses, for "Other Latin America." From this initial situation, the internal demographic evolution of Latin American Jews was bound to deteriorate in the course of the projection period, due to the following factors: intensifying aging, which raises the crude death rate and lowers the crude birth rate (at given levels of life expectancies and fertility); continuation of assimilatory losses; and an assumed decrease in "effectively Jewish" fertility due to rising losses of the newborn from mixed marriages in the projection versions that apply the low level of fertility (Table 16). Consequently, the projections point to a marked deficit in the internal evolution of Jews in "Other Latin America" and an even greater one in Argentina by the end of this century (Table 18).

For emigration-prone Argentine Jewry, the projections assumed that this trend would continue, although on a relatively reduced scale. For Jews in "Other Latin America" a zero balance of external migrations was assumed during 1975–1984, and a mildly negative balance afterward.[66] A migratory deficit, in turn, adversely affects the internal evolution of a population, since migration rates are usually highest among young adults and early middle-aged persons. Diminution of these age groups reduces natural increase and intensifies natural decrease.

On these premises, all computed projection versions point to an expected Jewish population decrease in both regions of Latin America. The relative decrease will be much greater in Argentina than in the other countries together because, from the outset, Argentina's Jewish population was more aged (Table 19), had a worse balance of internal evolution, and was more emigration-prone. Since assimilatory losses tend to reduce Jewish population and any migratory balance was assumed to be negative, the projected figure of Jews by the year 2000 would be highest if natural movement alone were to operate. However, even this hypothetical contingency would yield a decrease of Jews—sizable in Argentina, more moderate in the aggregate of other countries—because of the anticipated excess of Jewish deaths over "effectively Jewish" births. When assimilatory losses and, in the comprehensive versions, assumed migratory deficits are introduced into the computations, the eventual figure of Jews by the end of this century drops. The

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[66] Because of a conjectured decline in immigration of East European Jews, but continued emigration to Israel and the United States.

TABLE 17. REGIONAL PROJECTIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN JEWRY, 1975–2000

	Argentina		Other Latin America		
Version	Number	Per Cent Change	Version	Number	Per Cent Change
		1975			
Base Estimate	265,000		Base Estimate	257,000	
		2000			
D Natural Movement	219,000	−17	D Natural Movement	235,000	−9
E Natural Movement, Moderate Assimilation	205,000	−23	E Natural Movement, Moderate Assimilation	219,000	−15
F Natural Movement, Strong Assimilation	192,000	−28	B Comprehensive-High	211,000	−18
B Comprehensive-High	152,000	−43	F Natural Movement, Strong Assimilation	204,000	−21
A Comprehensive-Medium	146,000	−45	A Comprehensive-Medium	202,000	−21
C Comprehensive-Low	137,000	−48	C Comprehensive-Low	189,000	−27

TABLE 18. ANNUAL RATES OF NATURAL MOVEMENT AND ASSIMILATORY LOSSES IN REGIONAL PROJECTIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN JEWRY (RATES PER 1,000 OF JEWISH POPULATION), COMPREHENSIVE MEDIUM PROJECTION, 1976–1980, 1996–2000

Years	Total Internal Dynamics	Natural Increase/Decrease			Assimilatory Losses[a]
		Total	Effectively Jewish Births	Deaths	
			Argentina		
1976–1980	−7	−5	9	−14	−2
1996–2000	−16	−14	6	−20	−2
			Other Latin America		
1976–1980	−2	0	11	−11	−2
1996–2000	−11	−9	7	−16	−2

[a] Excluding assimilatory losses of newborn, which are taken into account in the effectively Jewish birth rate.

rising fertility assumed in the high comprehensive version provides some compensation for the migratory erosion, but this effect is very limited in Argentina. The low comprehensive projection produces the lowest estimate of Jews for both regions, since it accounts for the compounded operation of natural deficit, rather strong assimilatory losses, and emigration drain. Even the medium projection involves prospects of a drastic decline in Jewish population size from 1975 to 2000, especially in Argentina. Of late, the Jewries of Argentina and "Other Latin America" have been rather

TABLE 19. REGIONAL PROJECTIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN JEWRY, BY AGE (PERCENTAGES), SELECTED VERSIONS, 1975, 2000

Year	Argentina				Other Latin America			
	Total	0–14	15–64	65+	Total	0–14	15–64	65+
				Comprehensive Medium Projection				
1975	100.0	15.4	67.6	16.7	100.0	16.8	69.0	14.2
2000	100.0	10.0	63.3	26.7	100.0	12.6	66.6	20.8
				Natural Movement, Moderate Assimilation				
1975	100.0	15.4	67.6	16.7	100.0	16.8	69.0	14.2
2000	100.0	11.3	65.3	23.4	100.0	13.0	66.8	20.2

similar in size. If the projection tendencies were to fully materialize, by the end of this century Argentine Jewry would be numerically much smaller than the aggregate of Jews in the other Latin American countries.

By 1975 Argentine Jewry was already the most aged of the large Jewish populations outside Europe. This was due mainly to continued low fertility (particularly the virtual absence of a "baby boom" around 1950, which had been characteristic of the general and Jewish populations in most of the developed countries) as well as to the age-differential impact of assimilatory losses and, especially, the heavy emigration drain that has affected Jewish population structure in Argentina. The projections point to a further great intensification of aging in Argentina (Table 19), especially if a migration deficit should continue to deplete the ranks of younger adults. In "Other Latin America" the aging of Jews was less intense in 1975 and is anticipated to increase less, although here, too, its rise will be significant.

Intensive aging has strong effects on virtually all areas of life—demographic, medical, economic, social, and communal. If the proportion of the elderly (aged 65 and over) rises to about a quarter of all Argentine Jewry, the impact will be acute.

The results of the comprehensive projections have been influenced by the migratory assumptions. In the case of Argentina this influence has been very strong. The migratory assumptions have been modeled on the ascertainable realities of the 1970's. Yet, experience—including that since the 1970's—has shown that the intensity of Jewish migrations is virtually unpredictable beyond a rather short time frame. This limitation ought not detract, however, from the significance of the projection results as viewed from the Jewish standpoint. The fundamental thrust of the projections, according to prevailing trends, is that the internal evolution of Jews in Latin America—especially in Argentina and typologically similar communities (e.g., Uruguay)—is set on a course of accelerating decreases. A negative balance of external migrations will intensify the demographic deficits, but even a hypothetical positive turn in the migratory balance would be no more than a palliative as long as the internal evolution adversely affects Jewish population size.

Appendix

TECHNICAL NOTES ON THE PROJECTIONS

GENERAL EXPLANATIONS

See publications indicated in footnote 64.

METHOD

Component method, applied age-sex-specifically.

BASE POPULATION IN 1975

(A) Size: Argentina—265,000; "Other Latin America"—257,000. (B) Age-sex composition: Argentina—updated from the adjusted data of the 1960 census; "Other Latin America"—a combination of the updated age-sex structures of the Jews in Argentina and in Sao Paulo, 1968–1969. (Owing to the paucity of other information, these were considered as approximately representative, respectively, of the numerically declining and the numerically increasing Jewish populations in Latin America.)

FERTILITY

(A) "Low": total fertility rate throughout the projection period—1.4 in Argentina, 1.5 in "Other Latin America." (B) "Rising": from that initial level, rising to 2.1 during 1996–2000.

MORTALITY

Life expectancy at birth in both regions and throughout the projection period—72.9 years for males, 76.1 years for females.

ASSIMILATORY LOSSES

(A) "Moderate": increasing reduction—from 2.5 per cent in 1976–1980 to 12.5 per cent in 1996–2000—of number of "effectively Jewish" newborn as compared to the number of newborn computed according to the fertility specifications; above infancy, average loss of about one per cent quinquennially, with increased impact in ages 20–34; (B) "Strong": losses of newborn rising from 5 to 25 per cent; above infancy, average loss of two per cent per quinquennium.

EXTERNAL MIGRATION BALANCE

Argentina—negative to the annual extent of 1.5 per cent of Jewish population during 1976–1985 and 1.0 per cent during 1986–2000; total migratory loss of about 72,000. "Other Latin America"—nil during 1976–1985, minus 0.5 per cent during 1986–2000; total loss of about 17,000.

QUALITY

The projection for Jews in "Other Latin America" is based on very fragmentary empirical evidence.

Communal

The Labor Market Status of American Jews: Patterns and Determinants

AMONG THE MOSAIC OF racial and ethnic groups making up the population of the United States, most are defined in terms of race or country of origin. Some, however, are defined on the basis of religious identity or ancestry. The latter category includes American Jews.

Jews are a small minority in the United States, comprising about 2.5 per cent of the total population. However, they have had a major impact on the economic, political, and cultural life of the nation. In part this is due to their high level of schooling, occupational attainment, and entrepreneurial achievement.

While successful, American Jews are also a troubled minority. As a religiously-based ethnic element, they are open to the negative impact of increased secularization. The high level of income and education which Jews enjoy has been both a cause and consequence of very low fertility rates. In addition, there has been an increase in intermarriage on the part of Jews, reflecting, to some degree, their growing level of education and greater number of generations since immigration to the United States.[1] These trends suggest that the Jewish population may decline in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the total population.[2] If so, Jews may fall victim to their own success.

Note: I am indebted to Gary S. Becker, Carmel U. Chiswick, Lawrence Fuchs, Victor Fuchs, Milton Himmelfarb, Soloman Polacheck, David Singer, Thomas Sowell, and Teresa Sullivan for numerous insightful comments, and to Rosemary Rees and Suchittra Chamnivickorn for their research assistance. I alone, however, am responsible for the contents of this article. A preliminary version was presented at the fourth annual Green Bay colloquium on ethnicity and public policy, Green Bay, Wisconsin, May 1982, sponsored by the American ethnic studies coordinating committee, University of Wisconsin system; it is being published in the conference proceedings, *Ethnicity and the Labor Market.*

[1] See Bernard Lazerwitz, "Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions," *Jewish Social Studies,* Winter 1981, pp. 31–46.

[2] See Calvin Goldscheider, "Demography and American Jewish Survival," in Milton Himmelfarb and Victor Baras (eds.), *Zero Population Growth—For Whom? Differential Fertility and Minority Group Survival* (Westport, 1978), pp. 119–148.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it will present a comparative analysis of Jews and non-Jews in the United States labor market. Basic quantitative information about the labor market status of many racial and ethnic groups is quite abundant, but this is less true for Jews. Second, the article considers alternative hypotheses as to why Jews have been so successful in the labor market. This analysis has considerable importance not merely for understanding the labor market adjustment of Jews, but also for explaining why other racial and ethnic groups have been less successful.

This article employs the methodology of social science research. Hypotheses are developed on the basis of analytical reasoning and are tested with data. Those hypotheses that are not consistent with the data are rejected, while those that are consistent are retained for further analysis. This methodological approach helps focus the discussion and analysis, and is essential for identifying substantive relationships between variables.

Data Availability

There has been relatively little systematic, quantitative research on the labor market experiences of American Jews. In contrast, during the past three decades there have been numerous quantitative studies of disadvantaged minorities, especially Blacks and Hispanics. In part, this disparity reflects the realities of the data resources that are available. The major source of data for studies of the labor market status of various American racial and ethnic groups has been the decennial censuses of population and the periodic and special household surveys conducted by the U.S. bureau of the census. With the exception of one survey, however, the bureau of the census has not inquired about religion.[3] Thus, information about Jews can only be gathered in part and with considerable difficulty from the census data, e.g., by isolating persons of Russian origin or with a Jewish "mother tongue."[4] Other household survey data, generally privately collected, will include a question about religion on occasion, but the sample size for Jews in these surveys tends to be very small.[5]

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[3] The exception is the supplement to the March 1957 Current Population Survey. Although some tables have been released, the bureau of the census has not made available a public use sample (microdata file). The bureau of the census has recently introduced a question on ethnic ancestry in its censuses and surveys, but the question does not permit the identification of religiously-based ethnic groups, such as Jews.

[4] See Barry R. Chiswick, "The Earnings and Human Capital of American Jews," *Journal of Human Resources*, Summer 1983, pp. 313–336; and Erich Rosenthal, "The Equivalence of United States Census Data for Persons of Russian Stock or Descent with American Jews: An Evaluation," *Demography*, May 1975, pp. 275–290.

[5] The data include the National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey, the Princeton Fertility Sample, the National Bureau of Economic Research-Thorndyke Sample, and the National Academy of Sciences Twin Sample. See Jere R. Behrman *et al., Socioeconomic Success* (Amsterdam, 1980); David Featherman, "The Socioeconomic Achievement of White

There have been surveys that have focused exclusively on Jews, such as the 1971 National Jewish Population Study and the 1981–1982 National Survey of American Jews.[6] These surveys are useful for comparisons among Jews and for testing the reliability of alternative methods for identifying Jews in the general data. But as is the case with other surveys limited to any one group, comparisons with other bodies of data are fraught with difficulty, because of differences in survey methodology, questionnaire design, and coding procedures.[7]

The analyses for contemporary American Jews presented in this article are based on two data sources. One is the March 1957 Current Population Survey, a probability sample of about 35,000 households, in which questions were asked regarding the schooling, income, religion, and other demographic characteristics of all persons aged 14 and over.[8] Of these households, 1,100 had a Jewish head. The 1957 Current Population Survey data suffer from several deficiencies. A Public Use Sample (microdata file) has not been released. The tables made available by the Bureau of the Census provide only limited cross-tabulations. Moreover, data on nativity and year of immigration for the foreign-born are absent. This is significant, since we know from various sources that, other things being equal, second-generation, white, male Americans earn five per cent more than white males with native-born parents; immigrants in the United States earn less than comparable native-born men during their first few years in the country, reaching earnings-parity at about 10 to 15 years of residence; and immigrants have higher earnings than the native-born if they have been in the U.S. for more than 15 years.[9] Since Jews are disproportionately first- and second-generation Americans, immigration generation may be responsible for some

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Religio-Ethnic Subgroups: Social and Psychological Explanations," *American Sociological Review,* April 1971, pp. 207–222; Galen L. Gockel, "Income and Religious Affiliation: A Regression Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology,* May 1969, pp. 632–646; and Andrew M. Greeley, *Ethnicity, Denomination, and Inequality* (Beverly Hills, 1976). These studies show higher levels of schooling, occupational attainment, and income for Jews, but the Jewish samples are small.

[6] See Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, pp. 264–308; Fred Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study: A New United States Estimate," AJYB, Vol. 75, 1974–1975, pp. 299–300; and Steven Martin Cohen, "The 1981–1982 National Survey of American Jews," AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 89–111.

[7] For an interesting comparative analysis based on data from several contemporary sources, see Erick Rosenthal, "The Jewish Population of the United States: A Demographic and Sociological Analysis," in Bernard Martin (ed.), *Movements and Issues in American Judaism* (Westport, 1978), pp. 25–62.

[8] The question on religion in the special supplement was "What was your religion—Baptist, Lutheran, etc.?" The data are described in U.S. bureau of the census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March 1957," *Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics,* P-20, No. 79, February 2, 1958.

[9] See Barry R. Chiswick, "Are the Sons of Immigrants at an Earnings Disadvantage?" *American Economic Review,* February 1977, pp. 376–380; and Barry R. Chiswick, "The Economic Progress of Immigrants: Some Apparently Universal Patterns," in William Fellner (ed.), *Contemporary Economic Problems 1979* (Washington, 1979), pp. 359–399.

of the income advantage they enjoy.[10] Finally, it is now more than 25 years since the March 1957 Current Population Survey, and much could have happened since then.

The other data source is the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire—the "long form" administered to 15 per cent of the population. It is the most recent data file that provides a large sample, a mechanism for identifying Jews and non-Jews, and a statistical control for immigrant generation. Among adult, native-born, white men with a foreign-born parent, i.e., second-generation Americans, those who reported their mother tongue as Yiddish, Hebrew, or Ladino are classified as Jews, while those with a different mother tongue are classified as non-Jews.[11] It is estimated that this procedure permits the identification of about 60 per cent of second-generation American Jews, and that less than five per cent of those identified as non-Jews are actually Jews with a non-Jewish mother tongue.[12] Tests suggest that the procedure does not generate biases in means or in the partial effects of

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[10] Immigrant generation of persons aged 25–64 (per cent):

Generation	Jews[a]	White Males[b]
First (Foreign-Born)	14	5
Second (Foreign-Born Parents)	63	18
Third and Higher (Native-Born Parents)	23	77
	100	100

[a] Jewish household heads.
[b] Includes Jews.

The data are from Massarik and Chenkin, *op. cit.*, Table 4, p. 276 and U.S. bureau of the census, *1970 Census of Population, Public Use Sample, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire* (data tape, one-in-a-hundred sample of the population), 1973.

[11] A person has a non-English mother tongue if there was a language other than, or in addition to, English spoken in the home when the person was a child. Ladino is the language of Sephardic Jews.

[12] The procedure is developed and implemented in Chiswick, "The Earnings and Human Capital of American Jews," *op. cit.* See also Ira Rosenswaike, "The Utilization of Census Mother Tongue Data in American Jewish Population Analyses," *Jewish Social Studies*, April–July, 1971, pp. 141–159; and Frances E. Kobin, "National Data on American Jewry, 1970–71: A Comparative Evaluation of the Census Yiddish Mother Tongue Subpopulation and the National Jewish Population Survey" in U.O. Schmelz *et al.* (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1981* (Jerusalem, 1983), pp. 129–143. The procedure cannot be applied to more recent data, such as the 1976 Survey of Income and Education and the 1980 Census of Population, because the Bureau of the Census has dropped the questions on nativity of parents and mother tongue. The procedure can be applied to the 1920 and 1940 censuses, as they included questions on nativity, nativity of parents, and mother tongue. Public use samples from these censuses are being produced.

explanatory variables (regression coefficients). The procedure was limited to second-generation Americans so as to avoid confounding the findings by other variables, e.g., the experience of immigrants in their countries of origin and the substantial loss of Jewish mother tongues among American Jews with both parents born in the United States.

Income and Its Determinants

The data from the 1957 Current Population Survey indicate that American Jews have a higher level of income than members of other major religious groups (Table 1). Among men aged 14 and over, with income, Jews received 36 per cent more than the overall median and 24 per cent more than Roman Catholics, the next highest group. Jewish women also had higher incomes—45 per cent more than the overall median and 13 per cent more than Roman Catholic women.

To some extent the higher income of Jews may be related to place of residence. Reported incomes are lower in rural areas, in part because of a lower cost of living (e.g., shelter), and in part because more income is received "in-kind" through own-production (particularly for farmers). American Jews are less likely than others to live in rural areas or to be employed in agriculture.[13]

Another measure of labor market outcome is occupational status. American Jews are more likely to be employed in higher-status occupations, such as professional and managerial jobs (Table 2). In 1957 one-fifth of employed male Jews were professionals, as compared with about one-tenth of other white males; over three-tenths of Jews were managers and proprietors, also more than double the proportion of other whites. Jews were also more than twice as likely to be in sales occupations. On the other hand, Jews were half as likely to be craftsmen, foremen, or operatives;

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[13] Proportion living in rural areas (aged 14 and over) and proportion of employed men in agriculture (aged 18 and over), by religion in March 1957 (per cent):

		Protestant			Roman	
	Jewish	Total	White	Black	Catholic	Total[a]
Rural	3.9	44.4	44.8	33.9	21.2	36.1
Agriculture[b]	0.2	11.9	11.7	13.4	5.5	9.8

[a] Includes persons with no religion, other religions, and religion not reported.
[b] Farmers, farm managers, farm laborers and foremen.

The data are from U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," mimeo, Tables 1 and 15 (no date).

TABLE 1. MEDIAN INCOME OF PERSONS AGED 14 AND OVER WITH INCOME, BY RELIGION, 1956 (DOLLARS)

	All Persons		Employed Persons in Urban Areas Standardized by Occupation[b]	
Religion	Male	Female	Male	Female
Jewish	4,900	1,660	4,773	2,352
Protestant	3,463	1,040	3,780	2,031
White	3,728	1,198	4,553	2,263
Non-White	2,005	776	3,038	1,831
Roman Catholic	3,954	1,470	4,509	2,282
Total	3,608[a]	1,146[a]	4,472[c]	2,255[c]

[a] Includes persons with other religion, no religion, and religion not reported.
[b] Within each sex, standardized by major occupation group for the urban employed in the three major religions.
[c] For the three major religious groups.
Source: U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," unpublished tables, no date, Table 18.

one-third as likely to be in service occupations; one-tenth as likely to be laborers (non-farm); and even less likely to be in agricultural jobs.

Although both income and occupation are measures of labor market status, it is useful to investigate whether the income differences among the three major religious groups reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 are due to differences in occupational attainment. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 consider only employed persons in urban areas, thereby controlling for group differences in the proportion living in urban and rural areas. In addition, the median income data control for group differences in occupational status by standardizing for this variable.[14] These two modifications substantially narrow group differences in median incomes. Among adult males the ranking changes, as white Protestants now have slightly higher incomes than Roman Catholics. The Jewish income advantage, however, is 6.7 per cent overall, 5.9 per cent compared to Catholics, and 4.8 per cent compared to white Protestants. Thus, on average, among urban men in the same major occupational category, Jews have higher incomes.

To what extent is the higher income of Jews due to level of schooling? The data from the 1957 Current Population Survey indicate that for all persons aged 25 and over, as well as among employed men, the median schooling of Jews is 1.5 years

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[14] The income data are standardized by the occupational distribution of the three major religious groups.

TABLE 2. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED MALES, AGED 18 AND OVER, BY RELIGION, 1957 (PER CENT)

Occupation	Religion						Ratio Jewish to Total[b]
	Jewish	Protestant Total	Protestant White	Protestant Black	Roman Catholic	Total[a]	
White-Collar	77.5	34.3	37.8	9.4	34.6	35.5	2.18
Professional, Technical and Kindred	20.3	9.9	10.9	2.6	8.9	9.9	2.05
Managers and Proprietors (Except Farm)	35.1	12.6	14.1	2.2	12.5	13.3	2.63
Clerical	8.0	6.5	6.8	4.1	8.4	6.9	1.16
Sales	14.1	5.3	6.0	0.5	4.8	5.4	2.61
Blue-Collar, Farm and Services	22.3	65.7	62.3	90.6	65.5	64.5	0.35
Craftsmen and Foremen	8.9	19.8	21.2	9.7	22.5	20.0	0.45
Operatives	10.1	20.5	19.7	27.0	22.4	20.9	0.48
Service	2.3	5.5	4.3	14.1	7.7	6.1	0.38
Agricultural[c]	0.2	11.9	11.7	13.4	5.5	9.8	0.02
Laborers (Except Farm)	0.8	8.0	5.4	26.4	7.4	7.7	0.10
TOTAL[d]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

[a] Includes persons not reporting the three major religious groups.
[b] Ratio of Jewish to total.
[c] Includes farmers, farm managers, foremen, and farm laborers.
[d] Details may not add to total due to rounding.
Source: U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," unpublished tables, no date, Table 15.

more than the overall median, and one year more than that of white Protestants (Table 3). Among men living in urban areas, there is little difference in earnings between Jews and non-Jews with less than 8 years of schooling (Table 4). Among those with 12 years of schooling, the median Jewish income exceeds the overall median by 7.7 per cent; among those with 16 or more years of schooling, the Jewish median is 30.1 per cent higher. Compared to white Protestants, the Jewish earnings advantage is 4.9 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively, for those with 12 and 16 or more years of schooling. Thus, at the median schooling level, Jews earn more than

TABLE 3. MEDIAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED, BY RELIGION, MARCH 1957

Religion	Persons Aged 25 and Over	Employed Persons Aged 18 and Over	
		Male	Female
Jewish	12.3	12.7	12.6
Protestant	10.7	11.2	12.1
White	11.3	11.7	12.3
Non-White	Under 8	8.0	8.8
Roman Catholic	10.4	11.3	12.1
Total[a]	10.6	11.2	12.1

[a] Includes persons with other religion, no religion, and religion not reported. For persons aged 25 and over the median for "Other Religion" is 8.9 years and for "No Religion" is 8.6 years. Source: U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," unpublished tables, no date, Tables 2 and 12.

TABLE 4. MEDIAN INCOME OF URBAN MEN, AGED 14 AND OVER, BY RELIGION AND EDUCATION, 1956 (DOLLARS)

Years of Schooling Completed	Jewish	Protestant			Roman Catholic	Total[a]	Ratio Jewish to Total
		Total	White	Black			
0–7	2,609	2,558	2,812	2,249	2,819	2,654	0.98
8	3,844	3,582	3,712	2,864	3,729	3,631	1.06
9–11	4,672	3,639	4,850	2,849	4,170	3,858	1.22
12	4,913	4,628	4,684	3,092	4,567	4,563	1.08
13–15	5,026	4,529	4,712	(b)	4,361	4,526	1.11
16+	8,041	6,049	6,375	(b)	5,727	6,179	1.30

[a] Includes persons with other religion, no religion, and religion not reported.
[b] Sample size too small for the reporting of medians.
Source: U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," unpublished tables, no date, Table 19.

other white men. The earnings advantage of Jews relative to comparable non-Jews rises with the level of schooling.

Similar patterns emerge from an analysis of the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire data. Using means rather than medians, among second-generation American men, Jews have 55 per cent higher earnings, 2.3 more years of schooling, and are more likely to be living in urban areas (Table 5).[15] The higher earnings of Jews are in part attributable to higher levels of schooling and urban residence. Using multiple regression analysis to control statistically for schooling and demographic variables (age, marital status, place of residence, etc.), it emerges that Jews have 16 per cent higher earnings than second-generation, white, non-Jewish men of British parentage (Table 6). The earnings of other non-Jewish men do not differ from those of British origin, except for men of Mexican and French-Canadian parentage, who have lower earnings.[16] Controlling for the major occupational categories reduces the earnings advantage of Jews from 16 per cent to 10 per cent. In other words, one-third of the higher earnings of Jews of the same schooling, age, marital status, and area of residence as non-Jews is due to their higher occupational status.[17]

About half of the American Jewish population lives in the urban areas of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut,[18] where one-fifth of non-Jews make their home. Could the higher earnings of Jews be attributable to their disproportionate residence in these high income states? Even when the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire data are limited to urban areas in these three states, Jews have eight per cent higher earnings than other native-born white men.

The 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire data on American Jews can also be used to compare the schooling and earnings of native-born American Jews with native-born members of other racial and ethnic groups (Table 7).[19] Jewish men have higher earnings than the male members of any other group; native-born Chinese

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[15] Second-generation Americans are less likely to be rural and southern than those with native-born parents.

[16] The significant effect of U.S.S.R.-origin parents in Table 6 results from the large proportion of non-identified Jews in this category.

Higher earnings and occupational status have also been reported for Jews in other Western countries. For Canada, see Nigel Tomes, "The Earnings of Jews in Canada: Notes on Earnings Regressions," department of economics, University of Western Ontario, mimeo, 1982. Gur Ofer (department of economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem) reported in a personal conversation that his comparative study of retrospective data on Russian Jewish emigrants in Israel and data from Soviet sources reveal higher earnings for Soviet Jews. See also Daniel J. Elazar with Peter Medding, *Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa* (New York, 1983).

[17] In the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire data, 27 per cent of Jewish men are professionals, compared to 15 per cent of non-Jewish men. Medicine and law alone account for 9.7 per cent of Jews, compared to 2.1 per cent of non-Jews. Jews are also more likely to be nonfarm managers (26.5 per cent compared to 13.4 per cent) and in sales occupations (19.7 per cent compared to 7.0 per cent). The proportion in clerical jobs is similar (about 8 per cent). A smaller proportion of Jews are in the lower skilled areas; 18.3 per cent of Jews and 56.2 per cent of non-Jews are in blue-collar, farm, and service occupations. See Chiswick, "The Earning and Human Capital of American Jews," *op. cit.,* Table 4.

[18] See Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1972," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, pp. 307–309.

[19] These data are limited to persons born in the United States so as to avoid confounding the patterns by the characteristics of immigrants. The sample sizes for individuals of Puerto Rican and Cuban origins are too small for inclusion in the table.

TABLE 5. MEANS OF VARIABLES FOR SECOND-GENERATION ADULT WHITE MEN, BY RELIGION, 1970

Variable	Jewish[a]	Non-Jewish	Total
Earnings ($)	16,176	10,431	10,781
Age (Years)	49.2	47.2	47.3
Schooling (Years)	14.0	11.7	11.8
Residence			
Rural (Per Cent)	2.2	16.7	15.8
Southern (Per Cent)	10.5	9.7	9.7
Population (Per Cent)	6.1	93.9	100.0

[a] Persons who reported Yiddish, Hebrew, or Ladino as their mother tongue.

Source: 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire, one-in-one-hundred sample.

TABLE 6. PARTIAL EFFECT ON EARNINGS OF BEING JEWISH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH FOR NON-JEWS, FOR NATIVE-BORN ADULT MEN WITH FOREIGN-BORN PARENTS, 1970[a]

Origin	Per Cent Difference in Earnings	T-Ratio
British Isles	—	—
Jewish[b]	16.0	12.41
Western Europe	−0.9	−0.95
Southern Europe	−1.0	−1.12
Central Europe	−0.2	−0.16
U.S.S.R.	5.8	4.63
Balkans	2.1	1.34
Canada	−3.9	−3.33
Mexico	−21.5	−14.68
Other Latin America	−0.6	−0.14
Asia/Africa	−0.5	−0.22

[a] British Isles is the benchmark. Controlling for schooling, labor market experience, marital status, and urban/rural, south/non-south residence. Country categories are defined by parent's country of birth for non-Jews: father's country if he was foreign-born, otherwise mother's country.

[b] Persons who reported Yiddish, Hebrew, or Ladino as their mother tongue.

Source: Barry R. Chiswick, "The Earnings and Human Capital of American Jews," *Journal of Human Resources*, Summer 1983, pp. 313–336.

TABLE 7. CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULT NATIVE-BORN MEN, BY RACE AND ETHNIC GROUP, 1970[a]

	Means			Partial Effect of Schooling on Earnings[b]
Race and Ethnic Group	Earnings ($)	Age (Years)	Schooling (Years)	(Per Cent)
White				
All	9,653	42.7	11.9	7.0
Native-Born Parents	9,441	41.7	11.9	6.9
Foreign-Born Parents	10,567	47.1	11.9	7.2
Jewish[c]	16,176	49.2	14.0	8.0
Non-Jewish[c]	10,431	47.2	11.7	6.8
Mexican-Origin[d]				
All	6,330	39.5	9.3	5.2
Native-Born Parents	6,602	38.8	9.7	5.0
Foreign-Born Parents	6,664	40.3	8.9	5.7
Black (Urban)				
All	6,126	42.0	9.9	4.4
Native-Born Parents	6,110	42.0	9.9	4.4
Foreign-Born Parents	7,719	39.0	11.8	6.8
Japanese	10,272	43.4	12.7	6.5
Chinese	10,406	41.4	13.1	6.7
Filipino	7,173	37.3	11.3	4.5
American Indians[e]	5,593	40.0	9.9	5.4

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[a] The data are for men aged 25 to 64 in 1970 who worked and had non-zero earnings in 1969. Earnings are defined as wage, salary, and self-employment income. The Asian data exclude men in the armed forces in 1970; the Jewish/non-Jewish data exclude persons enrolled in school. The sampling fractions are 1/1,000 for white men, 1/100 for Mexican, Jewish/non-Jewish, and Black men, and 2/100 for Asian and American Indian men.

[b] Coefficient of schooling from the linear regression of the natural logarithm of earnings in 1969 on schooling, experience, experience squared, marital status dummy variable, geographic distribution, and, for some regressions, weeks worked. Geographic distribution is urban/rural and South/non-South, except for the Asian analysis, in which it is Hawaii/California/South/other non-South and urban/rural.

[c] The Jewish/non-Jewish data are for native-born men of foreign parentage (one or both parents foreign-born), where Jews are defined as those reporting Yiddish, Hebrew, or Ladino as their mother tongue (language other than or in addition to English spoken in the home when the respondent was a child).

[d] The Mexican analysis is for Spanish-surname men living in the five southwestern states with either an English or Spanish mother tongue and with parents born in the U.S. or Mexico. Although the data are limited to whites, over 95 per cent of the Mexican-origin population was classified as white in the 1970 Census. The schooling coefficient is 4.9 per cent for those with a Spanish mother tongue.

[e] Excludes men living in Alaska.

Source: Barry R. Chiswick, "Differences in Educational Attainment Among Racial and Ethnic Groups: Patterns and Hypotheses Regarding the Quantity and Quality of Children," mimeo, revised, January 1983.

and Japanese men (primarily second-generation Americans) have earnings similar to foreign-parentage white men; and all three have earnings greater than white men with native-born parents (third- and higher-generation Americans). The disadvantaged minorities, as measured by earnings, are Mexican-Americans, Blacks, Filipinos, and American Indians. The ranking by educational attainment is similar to earnings, the main exception being the higher schooling level of Chinese and Japanese men as compared to white men.

It was noted above (Table 4) that in the 1957 Current Population Survey data, the ratio of earnings of Jews to non-Jews increased with level of schooling. The same pattern emerges in the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire data. The partial effect of an extra year of schooling on earnings (from a regression equation) is greater for Jews than for the members of any other group (Table 7). This finding persists even after holding constant occupational attainment or residence in the New York metropolitan area. The larger effect of schooling on earnings implies that Jews receive a higher rate of return on their educational investment than do members of other groups. The greater profitability of schooling for Jews may explain their higher level of investment.

American Jews at the Turn of the Century

The majority of today's adult, native-born, American Jews are descendants of immigrants who came to the United States from Eastern Europe during the period 1880–1914. An examination of the labor market status of turn-of-the-century Jewish immigrants will bring into sharper focus the nature and extent of contemporary Jewish labor market achievements.

The turn-of-the-century data suggest two conclusions: that the skill level of Jewish immigrants enabled them to close the earnings gap with the native-born and immigrants from Northern and Western Europe; that American Jews may have experienced a sharper rate of increase in occupational status and earnings than non-Jews during the twentieth century.

Arcadius Kahan has written: "While the Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe brought along little money or physical assets, their value for the U.S. economy, and the source of their expected incomes, consisted of their skill endowment and their ability to employ their skills gainfully."[20] Data on the occupational distribution of pre-World War I Jewish immigrants prior to their arrival in the United States indicate that nearly two-thirds were in manufacturing (half in clothing manufacturing), about one-quarter in commerce, while relatively few were laborers, agricultural workers, or professionals. In the United States, Kahan argues, Jewish immigrants earned about the same amount as other immigrants in the same industry. Kahan also indicates that each cohort of Jewish immigrants, within 10–15 years of assuming residence in the United States, matched the earnings of native-born American workers of the same age and occupation. These achievements are attributed to the high proportion of skilled Jewish workers, and to their urban residence.[21]

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[20] Arcadius Kahan, "Economic Opportunities and Some Pilgrims' Progress: Jewish Immigrants from Eastern Europe in the U.S., 1890–1914," *Journal of Economic History*, March 1978, p. 237.

The Dillingham Immigration Commission, which was established in 1907 to study the condition of European immigrants in the United States and to propose immigration reform, conducted a survey of about half a million workers in mining and manufacturing in 1909. The commission's report, published in 1911, included detailed cross-tabulations that have recently been put to good use by social scientists. Robert Higgs reports data on weekly earnings, English-speaking ability, literacy, and duration of residence in the United States, for adult men belonging to white, foreign-born groups (including Russian and "other" Jews), as well as the native-born (Table 8).[22] Jewish immigrants, whether of Russian or "other" origin, had

TABLE 8. EARNINGS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULT MALE WORKERS IN MINING AND MANUFACTURING, 1909

Group	Average Weekly Earnings ($)	Per Cent Speaking English	Per Cent Literate[a]	Per Cent Residing in U.S. for Less than Five Years
Foreign-Born				
All[b]	11.81	63.6	85.6	38.1
Jewish[c]	13.16	76.0	93.2	38.4
Russian Jews	12.71	74.7	93.3	42.9
Other Jews	14.37	79.5	92.8	26.2
Native-Born				
White	14.37	(d)	98.2	(d)
Black	10.66	(d)	76.4	(d)

[a] Able to read a language.
[b] Weighted average for 35 foreign-born groups from Europe, Canada, Turkey, and Syria, including the two Jewish categories.
[c] Weighted average. Sample size: 3,177 for Russian Jews and 1,158 for "Other Jews." Jews were 3.2 per cent of the sample.
[d] Not reported.
Source: Robert Higgs, "Race, Skills, and Earnings: American Immigrants in 1909," *Journal of Economic History,* June 1971, pp. 420–428.

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[21] In a study published in 1919, Paul Douglas noted the high skill level of Jews compared to other Eastern and Southern European immigrants. See Paul H. Douglas, "Is the New Immigration More Unskilled than the Old?" *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* June 1919, pp. 393–403. See also Simon Kuznets, "Immigration of Russian Jews to the United States: Background and Structure," *Perspectives in American History,* Vol. 9, 1975, pp. 34–124.

[22] See Robert Higgs, "Race, Skills, and Earnings: American Immigrants in 1909," *Journal of Economic History,* June 1971, pp. 420–428.

higher weekly earnings than foreign-born non-Jews (Table 8). The earnings advantage over the white foreign-born was eight per cent for Russian Jews, 22 per cent for "other" Jews, and 11 per cent for Russian and "other" Jews combined. To some extent the higher earnings of Jews is attributable to the larger proportion who could speak English (76 per cent compared to 64 per cent) and who were literate (93 per cent compared to 86 per cent). Although the proportion of individuals residing in the United States for fewer than five years was the same for Jews and non-Jews (38 per cent), a larger proportion of the Russian Jews and a smaller proportion of "other" Jews were recent immigrants. Controlling for these determinants of earnings, Jews had 3–5 per cent higher earnings than other foreign-born men, a difference which is not statistically significant.[23]

Compared to white, native-born men, turn-of-the-century Jewish immigrants had eight per cent lower earnings (12 per cent lower earnings for Russian Jews and no difference for "other" Jews). If, hypothetically, all Jews had been in the United States for five or more years, even with no change in literacy, there would be no earnings disadvantage for Jews (1 per cent lower earnings for all Jews; 3 per cent lower earnings for Russian Jews; and 5 per cent higher earnings for "other" Jews).

A comparison of the Dillingham Immigration Commission data with the 1957 Current Population Survey and 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire

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[23] With the natural logarithm of average weekly earnings as the dependent variable, the weighted regression equations for adult, white, foreign-born men engaged in mining and manufacturing (1909) are as follows:

	Regression Equations		
Explanatory Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Jewish	0.0516	0.0311	0.0436
	(0.68)	(0.41)	(0.55)
Per Cent Literate	0.0089	0.0083	0.0085
	(5.93)	(4.88)	(4.94)
Per Cent in U.S. Five or More Years[a]	0.0019	—	0.0012
	(2.26)		(0.75)
Per Cent Speaking English[a]	—	0.0019	0.0009
		(2.24)	(0.54)
Constant	1.5729	1.6246	1.6014
N (Groups)	35	35	35
R	0.76	0.75	0.76
R^2 (Adj.)	0.73	0.73	0.72

[a] The variables "per cent in U.S. for five or more years" and "per cent speaking English" are highly correlated with each other.

Notes: t-ratios in parentheses; designates variable not entered. Computed from data reported in Higgs, *op. cit.*

data sets suggests that, both overall and when other variables are held constant, the relative earnings of Jewish men has improved dramatically over the period.

Alternative Explanations

The high level of schooling and earnings of contemporary American Jews appears to be quite unique. What factors account for this impressive performance? Over the years, various explanations have been put forward, pointing to such things as a cultural preference for education, a history of discrimination in access to education and in the labor market, a history of persecution, and greater productivity in acquiring and implementing education. This section considers these explanatory factors, which are by no means mutually exclusive.

CULTURAL PREFERENCE FOR EDUCATION

As a group, Jews manifest a keen interest in learning. In traditional Jewish society, particularly in Eastern Europe, Torah study was an exalted religio-cultural ideal. This love of learning may well have been translated into a thirst for secular education in twentieth-century America. Thus, Alice Kessler-Harris and Virginia Yans-McLaughlin write: "Religious tradition and community approval encouraged the Jew in America to invest in education and correspondingly to increase his upward mobility. No other group had this advantage. . . . " They add: "When choices had to be made, such groups as Italians, Irish, and Poles would sacrifice the educational interests of their young, withdrawing them from school, sending them to work, and absorbing their earnings. Such decisions increased present earnings at the expense of future skills. Jews do not seem to have made similar compromises."[24]

This line of analysis suggests that Jews value education not only for its monetary benefits, but also because it fulfills cultural and peer-group expectations. Consequently, Jews would be expected to continue their schooling for a longer period than would be warranted by strictly pecuniary considerations. This is consistent with the high level of schooling which Jews exhibit, and the high level of schooling would account for high earnings. However, it also implies an overinvestment in schooling, in that Jews continue to acquire education even if it is not financially profitable. Thus —because Jews with lesser ability would be continuing longer with their schooling —this interpretation implies that at each level of schooling Jews would have a lower average level of ability and lower earnings than non-Jews.

Empirically, however, Jews, compared to non-Jews, have higher earnings and a higher rate of return from schooling at each level of education (beyond eight years). This suggests that if Jews do have a cultural drive for education, it is not the cause of their high level of schooling, but is rather a consequence of education itself or whatever it is that generates the large investment in education.

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[24] Alice Kessler-Harris and Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, "European Immigrant Groups," in Thomas Sowell (ed.), *American Ethnic Groups* (Washington, 1978), pp. 114, 120.

DISCRIMINATION

American Jews have experienced discrimination in the labor market, as well as in access to higher education. While overt discrimination has diminished in recent decades, there is no doubt about its presence at the time when the cohorts of adults in the 1957 and 1970 data sets discussed above were of school age and making educational investment decisions.[25] Discrimination could be expected to result in a lower rate of return from schooling, unless the discrimination was specifically directed against individuals with lower levels of education. Indeed, labor market and schooling discrimination are cited as important explanations for the lower levels of schooling and earnings, as well as the smaller rate of return from schooling, of disadvantaged groups. Yet, American Jews apparently have a higher level of schooling and higher rates of return from schooling.

It might be argued that discrimination served as a spur, prompting American Jews to do better. This, however, raises two questions: why did it spur them to do even better than non-Jews; and why did other groups which experienced discrimination not respond in the same manner (except possibly for the Chinese and Japanese)? A more compelling explanation is that Jews were successful despite, rather than because of, discrimination. In other words, the labor market achievements of Jews in the United States would be even more impressive if not for the factor of discrimination.

PERSECUTION

It is useful to distinguish between discrimination and persecution. Discrimination is passive, e.g., a person may be denied access to a job or entry into a particular school. Persecution, on the other hand, is active, i.e., a person fears for his life and property. Persecution, in addition to discrimination, was instrumental in generating the mass emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe to the United States. European Jews were very much aware that, because of antisemitism, no place was secure, no tolerance could be guaranteed to last. An appropriate response to such externally generated insecurity is to avoid investments which are "geographic specific," i.e., investments which are productive in one location but not in another. "Human capital" is embodied in the person and is therefore portable. Hence, European Jews would have an incentive to invest in human capital rather than other assets. Given the intensity of past persecution, it is possible that this attitude has been retained by American Jews. The tendency could only be encouraged by the continued existence of antisemitism. This line of reasoning suggests that Jews would tilt their investments in the direction of schooling.[26]

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[25] See Armen A. Alchian and Reuben A. Kessel, "Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain," in H.G. Lewis (ed.), *Aspects of Labor Economics* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 170–171; Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster, *"Some of My Best Friends . . ."* (New York, 1962); Joe R. Feagin, "Jewish Americans," *Racial and Ethnic Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, 1978), pp. 148–187; A.C. Ivy and Irwin Ross, "Discrimination in College Admissions," in Milton A. Baron (ed.), *American Minorities* (New York, 1958), pp. 133–144; Marcia Graham Synnott, *The Half-Opened Door: Discrimination and Admissions at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1900–1970* (Westport, 1979); and Lois Waldman, "Employment Discrimination Against Jews in the United States—1955," *Jewish Social Studies*, 1956, pp. 208–216.

There are several problems with this argument. Although human capital is embodied in the person, it is not obvious that this form of capital is always more transferable than non-human assets. Properly specified, the hypothesis suggests that persecuted groups will invest in transferable and liquid assets rather than assets that are merely portable. Legal training, for example, is highly portable, but unlike medicine, the skills (for institutional and other reasons) are not transferable across geographic areas. One test of the hypothesis is whether American Jews have a stronger preference for medicine than for law. Relative to other second-generation white American men, Jews do not show such a preference.[27]

The hypothesis also implies a substitution of education for other investments. Yet, it is not obvious that Jews have made smaller investments in other assets, other things being equal.

A final implication of the hypothesis is that by over-investing in education, because of its portability or transferability, Jews receive a lower money rate of return. In fact, however, as indicated above, Jews appear to have a higher rate of return from education than any other group.

Persecution appears to be inadequate as a factor explaining the high levels of education, earnings, and rate of return from schooling among American Jews.

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[26] The line of argument developed here is often referred to as the "Kessel hypothesis." For a recent exchange on the hypothesis and its applicability to Palestinian Arabs as well as Jews, see Reuven Brenner and Nicholas Kiefer, "The Economics of the Diaspora: Discrimination and Occupational Structure," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* April 1981, pp. 517–533; and Eliezer Ayal and Barry R. Chiswick, "The Economics of the Diaspora Revisited," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* July 1983, pp. 861–875.

[27] Using the 1970 census procedures discussed above for identifying Jews, the proportions of adult white men in medicine and law are:

	Medicine[a]	Law[a]	All Professions
Jews	6.10	3.58	27.2
Non-Jews	1.35	0.72	15.3
Ratio (Jews/Non-Jews)	4.50	5.00	2.8

[a] Medicine includes doctors, dentists, and related health professionals with doctoral degrees. Law includes lawyers and judges.

Source: 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire, one-in-a-hundred sample of the population.

HIGH PRODUCTIVITY OF EDUCATION

The apparently higher rate of return from schooling for Jews is consistent with the hypothesis that Jews are more productive in converting schooling into earnings. This may be because Jews acquire a higher quality (or more units) of human capital in a year of schooling or because they are more effective in using their human capital in the labor market.[28] The higher rate of return would encourage greater investment in human capital, and result in a higher schooling level and higher occupational status.[29] The Jewish advantage in this area may be the result of investments made by parents in their children's human capital prior to and concurrent with schooling.[30]

Parents may be viewed as making rational decisions regarding the number and "quality per child" of their children.[31] While number is relatively easy to determine, investments in "child quality," i.e., the value of time and other resources parents devote to their children, are not easily measured. Racial and ethnic groups may vary in the optimal combination of number and quality of children because they are faced with different situations. Fertility levels are higher when contraception is more

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[28] A pre-World War I study of Jews noted: "In the struggle for life, besides intellectual gifts, the industry, versatility, and powers of adaptation of the Jew stand him in good stead. . . . Appreciation of the value of learning and study is a tradition among Jews to an extent unequalled perhaps by any other people." See Arthur Ruppin, *The Jews of To-Day* (New York, 1913), p. 51.

[29] Additional evidence on this point is to be found in the data on Jewish college students and professors. Despite the fact that a larger proportion of Jewish youth go to college, Jewish college students have higher grades, and go to higher quality institutions. Among academics, Jews, on average, are in higher quality institutions, publish more books and articles, and have higher academic ranks and salaries. See Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett C. Ladd, Jr., "Jewish Academics in the United States: Their Achievements, Culture, and Politics," AJYB, Vol. 72, 1971, pp. 98–107; and Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett C. Ladd, Jr., "The Changing Origins of American Academics," in Robert H. Merton, James S. Coleman, and Peter H. Rossi (eds.), *Qualitative and Quantitative Social Research* (New York, 1979), pp. 319–338.

[30] In an essay on Jewish educational attainment, Leonard Dinnerstein writes: "Basically [East European Jews] agreed upon the importance of education in the development of a full human being. From their earliest days children imbibed this attitude, first unconsciously, later with more awareness . . . In the home children learned to venerate books, to remain quiet while father studied, and to treat learned guests with great respect . . . The Jewish immigrants who came to this country in the 1880's and after brought these values and traditions with them." Leonard Dinnerstein, "Education and the Advancement of American Jews," in Bernard J. Weiss (ed.), *American Education and the European Immigrant, 1840–1940* (Urbana, 1982), p. 45.

[31] For a recent development of this approach, see Gary S. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family* (Cambridge, 1981). For its application to racial and ethnic groups, see Barry R. Chiswick, "Differences in Educational Attainment Among Racial and Ethnic Groups: Patterns and Hypotheses Regarding the Quantity and Quality of Children," University of Illinois at Chicago, mimeo, 1983.

"expensive" because of cultural or religious proscriptions; when space is cheaper and children can do productive work at an earlier age; and when women have less schooling and, thus, poorer labor-market opportunities. Higher levels of fertility imply lower investments of parental time and other resources per child, and hence lower child quality.[32]

American Jews are a predominantly urban group, functioning largely without religious constraint on contraception. American Jewish women have a high level of education. Given these factors, it is not surprising that Jewish women exhibit low fertility rates (Table 9).[33] Among urban women aged 15–44 years in March 1957 (standardized for age), for example, there were 1.2 children ever-born per Jewish woman compared to 1.5 overall and 1.5 for Protestants and Catholics. The Jewish/non-Jewish differential is slightly larger in the case of ever-married women in urban areas—1.6 children for Jewish women and 2.0 for all, Protestant, and Catholic women.[34] The data for women under age 45, however, may reflect their own high education and the high level of education and earnings of their husbands. More compelling are the data on the number of children ever-born to women aged 45 and older. These women had completed their fertility; moreover, their fertility decisions were made on the basis of the relative economic opportunities prevailing in earlier decades. Among older, ever-married women, Jews had 2.2 children per woman compared to 2.8 overall and for Protestants, and 3.1 for Catholics (Table 9). Each of the major Protestant denominations, with the exception of the Presbyterians, had a higher fertility rate than the Jews.[35]

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[32] Among racial and ethnic groups in the United States, there appears to be an inverse relation between family size and educational attainment of children. Among the native-born, the Chinese and Japanese, in addition to Jews, have high levels of education and small families. This is in contrast to the large families and low schooling level of United States-born Filipinos, Mexicans, Blacks, and American Indians. A notable exception are the Mormons, who have large families and children with high levels of education. See Chiswick, "Differences in Educational Attainment Among Racial and Ethnic Groups," *op. cit.* and Bernard Berelson, "Ethnicity and Fertility: What and So What," in Himmelfarb and Baras, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–107.

[33] Analyses of data from the 1973 and 1976 National Surveys of Family Growth also show lower fertility for Jews—overall and after controlling for age, education, and area of residence—than for either white Protestants or non-Hispanic white Catholics. The differences are smaller for "wanted pregnancies" than for "total births expected" or "children ever born." See William D. Mosher and Gerry E. Hendershot, "Religion and Fertility Reexamined," National Center for Health Statistics, mimeo, 1983. These findings suggest that Jews are more successful in controlling fertility either because they are more efficient in contraception or because "unplanned" children are perceived as being more costly.

[34] In all age groups between 25 and 64 years of age, Jewish women have a higher proportion never married than white Protestants and a smaller proportion never married than Roman Catholics. U.S. Bureau of the Census, no date, Table 5.

[35] A completed fertility rate of about 2.1 per woman is needed to maintain a stable population. This requires a higher completed fertility rate for ever-married women. The Jewish fertility rate is below these levels.

TABLE 9. MEDIAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN PER 1,000 WOMEN, BY RELIGION, MARCH 1957

Panel A: Women 15 to 44 Years, Standardized by Age[a]

Religion and Race	Women of All Marital Classes		Ever-Married Women	
	U.S.	Urban	U.S.	Urban
Total[b]	1,677	1,504	2,188	2,009
Protestant	1,733	1,541	2,206	1,992
Roman Catholic	1,610	1,493	2,210	2,093
Jewish[c]	1,184	1,184	1,598	1,598
Non-White[d]	1,990	1,642	2,653	2,220

Panel B: Ever-Married Women, Aged 45 and Older

Detailed Religion	Children Ever Born
Total	2,798
Protestant	2,753
Baptist	3,275
Lutheran	2,382
Methodist	2,638
Presbyterian	2,188
Other Protestant	2,702
Roman Catholic	3,056
Jewish	2,218
Other, None and Not Reported	2,674

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[a] Standardized by age of all ever-married women, 1950.

[b] Includes persons of other religion, no religion, and religion not reported.

[c] Although urban data for Jews are not shown separately in the source, 96 per cent of Jews aged 14 and over live in urban areas. The U.S. rate is used in urban areas for Jews for purposes of comparison.

[d] Includes persons of all religions; 90 per cent of non-white wives are Protestant.

Sources: U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," mimeo, no date, Tables 1, 6, and 10; U.S. bureau of the census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1958*, 1958, Table 40, p. 41.

The lower fertility rate among Jews is hardly a novel phenomenon.[36] The limited data available on European Jewish fertility in the nineteenth century suggest that it was lower than the fertility rate of non-Jews. In this country, various sources also suggest lower fertility for Jews at the turn of the century, as well as throughout the twentieth century.

Labor force participation rates of women vary systematically by economic and demographic characteristics. They tend to be higher for women in urban areas, for those with higher levels of education, and for those with fewer children, particularly young children. For these reasons, one would expect Jewish women to have higher labor force participation rates than other women.[37] The data, however, indicate just the opposite. In each broad age group covered in the 1957 Current Population Survey, married Jewish women have lower labor force participation rates than Protestant or Catholic women (Table 10). By implication, Jewish women were more likely to be staying home and providing care to their smaller number of children prior to, and concurrent with, the children's schooling.[38]

Investments in child quality are facilitated by stable family-living arrangements. More parental time and other resources can be invested if both parents are available. Thus, lower rates of out-of-wedlock births, divorce, separation, and desertion would be associated with higher child quality. In addition, a lower frequency of "deviant behavior" on the part of parents would also tend to improve child quality. Nathan Hurvitz, writing in 1961, cites studies showing lower rates of divorce, separation, desertion, juvenile delinquency, adult crime, alcoholism, psychosis, suicide, and death from violent causes among Jews. He concludes: "Jews may have greater family solidarity and stability."[39]

Thus, the high labor market productivity of Jewish men may be a consequence of having fewer siblings with whom to compete for parental time and other resources. This may arise in part because of a lower "cost" of contraception and a

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[36] See Becker, *A Treatise on the Family, op. cit.*, p. 110; Calvin Goldscheider, "Fertility of the Jews," *Demography*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 196–209; Sidney Goldstein, "Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography," AJYB, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 3–59; Jacques Silber, "Some Demographic Characteristics of the Jewish Population in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century," *Jewish Social Studies*, Summer–Fall, 1980, pp. 269–280; and John S. Billings, "Vital Statistics of the Jews in the United States," *Census Bulletin*, No. 19, December 1889, pp. 4–9.

[37] The higher income of their husbands would be an offsetting factor.

[38] Preliminary analyses by the author using the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire data suggest that, other things being equal, the presence of a child in the household has a greater depressing effect on adult, female labor force participation rates of Jews than non-Jews. The greater depressing effect on female labor supply in Jewish families compared to other families is more intense the younger the age of the children. See Barry R. Chiswick, "Labor Supply and Investment in Child Quality: A Study of Jewish and Non-Jewish Women," University of Illinois at Chicago, mimeo, 1984.

[39] Nathan Hurvitz, "Sources of Motivation and Achievement of American Jews," *Jewish Social Studies*, October 1961, p. 234.

TABLE 10. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MARRIED WOMEN, SPOUSE PRESENT, BY RELIGION, MARCH 1957 (PER CENT)

	Total[a]	Protestant			Roman	
		Total	White	Non-White	Catholic	Jewish
Total	29.6	30.7	29.6	40.4	27.3	27.8
Age						
Under 35	27.7	29.2	28.5	34.4	24.6	21.7
35–44	35.7	37.8	36.1	51.1	31.5	24.5
45–64	32.3	32.9	31.6	45.0	30.9	30.6
65 and Over	6.4	6.0	6.2	—	6.7	—
Presence of Children						
No Children Under 18	35.6	35.7	34.1	47.7	36.6	30.0
With Children 6–17, None Under 6	36.7	37.5	36.2	52.6	35.3	28.6
With Children Under 6	17.0	18.9	18.2	23.6	13.2	11.8
Urban Areas–Age						
Total	31.2	33.1	31.5	43.6	28.5	24.8
Under 35 Years	30.2	32.7	31.6	39.2	26.3	21.8
35–64 Years	34.9	36.9	35.1	49.0	32.2	28.2
65 and Over	6.1	5.8	5.7	—	6.2	—

[a] Includes persons with other religion, no religion, and religion not reported.

Source: U.S. bureau of the census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957," no date, Table 13.

higher "cost" of additional children. Moreover, Jewish children may benefit from greater parental inputs of resources (family size held constant), as is suggested by the lower Jewish female labor force participation rate and the greater stability of Jewish families.

Conclusion

This article has considered the patterns and determinants of the labor market status of American Jews. Data from the 1957 Current Population Survey and the 1970 Census of Population, 15 Per Cent Questionnaire indicate that American Jewish men have higher levels of schooling and labor market earnings, as well as a higher rate of return from schooling, than men belonging to other racial and ethnic groups. This does not mean that there is no poverty among Jews, since there is considerable variation in circumstances within any racial or ethnic group. It does mean, however, that Jews, on the whole, are probably America's most successful minority. Comparisons of turn-of-the-century data with contemporary data suggest that American Jews have experienced a sharper rise in occupational attainment and earnings than other white men. This is most impressive, given the recent arrival in the United States of the bulk of the Jewish population, the foreign Jewish "mother tongue," and the discrimination which American Jews encountered in access to education and in the labor market.

The higher rate of return from schooling among Jews may be the cause of the high level of investment in education and, hence, the high earnings. But what explains the high rate of return? American Jews may be more educationally productive than others because of greater parental investments of time and other resources in each child. These large-scale investments are made possible by means of a substitution of higher "child quality" for a greater number of children. The fertility rate of Jewish women is substantially lower than that of other women. Jewish women also have a lower labor force participation rate than other women when they have children, particularly small children, at home. Thus, Jewish mothers are more likely to be providing care to their smaller number of children prior to, and concurrent with, the children's schooling. Greater stability in Jewish marriages and a lower rate of "deviant behavior" contribute to the success of the children.

Alternative explanations which appear in the literature are inconsistent with the data. All of them predict a lower rate of return from schooling for American Jews than for the majority white population, whereas in reality the precise opposite is true. Some point to a Jewish "thirst for education" as a direct causal factor, without explaining why this thirst exists in the first place. Discrimination as a spur to success is sometimes suggested, but this does not explain why Jews have been *so* successful, or why other groups that have experienced discrimination have been much less successful. The insecurity of location-specific assets for a persecuted minority can explain some types of schooling (e.g., medicine) in which Jews have engaged, but not others (e.g., law). Other persecuted groups have not attained a similar level of success as Jews. There is a grain of truth to each alternative hypothesis, but other factors seem more powerful.

The hypothesis regarding the trade-off of quantity and quality of children opens up important possibilities for analyzing group differences in labor market status. Still, it is a hypothesis which requires further investigation. To what extent is there an independent Jewish effect encouraging more of a preference for quality over quantity of children than is found among other groups, all other factors being equal? Did Jewish culture and experience help influence a pattern of behavior which results in the economic betterment of the average member of the group, but at the same time reduces the total size of the group? Will increased acculturation to American patterns alter Jewish behavior and reduce Jewish labor market success?

At a minimum, the analysis suggests that Jewish mothers and fathers have played a key role in the economic success of their children.

BARRY R. CHISWICK

Demographic

Recent Jewish Community Population Studies: A Roundup

IT HAS BEEN WELL over a decade since the 1970 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) was completed. While the NJPS provides baseline data for comparing current population trends and characteristics, no new national data have been collected in the intervening years. Indeed, it is unlikely that a national survey of American Jews will again be undertaken before 1990.

While the NJPS has not been replicated, a large number of local Jewish community population studies have been carried out in recent years. In the absence of a national survey, a comparison of the data contained in the various community studies provides an alternative means of developing a profile of the American Jewish community in 1984. Hence this article, which updates the material appearing in Gary Tobin's and Julie Lipsman's "A Compendium of Jewish Demographic Studies: Data Summary," which is scheduled to appear in *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research,* prepared by the center for modern Jewish studies at Brandeis University. Taken as a whole, the data presented here offer considerable insight into the changes that have taken place in American Jewish life since 1970.

Note: All the data cited in this article are drawn from the following sources: James McCann and Debra Friedman, *A Study of the Jewish Community in the Greater Seattle Area* (Seattle, 1979); Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey Overview for Regional Planning* (Los Angeles, 1980); Allied Jewish Federation of Denver, *The Denver Jewish Population Study* (Denver, 1981); Lois Geer, *1981 Population Study of the St. Paul Jewish Community* (St. Paul, 1981); Lois Geer, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis 1981 Population Study* (Minneapolis, 1981); Population Research Committee, *Survey of Cleveland's Jewish Population, 1981* (Cleveland, 1981); Peter Regenstreif, *The Jewish Population of Rochester, New York* (Rochester, 1981); Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, *The 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1981); Nancy Hendrix, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Nashville and Middle Tennessee* (Nashville, 1982); Policy Research Corporation, *Chicago Jewish Population Study* (Chicago, 1982); Ira M. Sheskin, *Population Study of the Greater Miami Jewish Community* (Miami, 1982); Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic and Attitudinal Study of the Jewish Community of St. Louis* (St. Louis, 1982); Bruce A. Phillips and William S. Aron, *The Greater Phoenix Jewish Population Study* (Phoenix, 1983–1984); Jewish Community Federation of Richmond, *Demographic Survey of the Jewish Community of Richmond* (Richmond, 1984); Bruce A. Phillips, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population Study* (Milwaukee, 1984); and Gary A. Tobin, Joseph Waksberg, and Janet Greenblatt, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Washington* (Washington, D.C., 1984).

Comparing local community studies is no simple matter, since they employ a variety of sampling techniques, interviewing methods, and sets of questions. Moreover, the findings are reported in different formats. It should be understood then, that the tables presented in this article are a distillation and reconstruction of very different originals.

Data are scarce for small communities and communities in the South and Southwest. Phoenix, Nashville, and Miami enter into the picture, for example, but Houston, Dallas, and Palm Beach do not. Still, this article takes account of both large and intermediate-sized communities covering a broad geographic spread.

A major caution is needed in reviewing the data which follow. A national "datum" cannot be constructed by merely adding together the data contained in the individual community studies. These studies, after all, do not represent a sample of the national Jewish population.

While many more surveys were examined than are presented here, they were not included for a variety of reasons: some methodologies were considered inadequate to insure reliable data; some communities did not report most of their data; still other communities presented the data in such a way that they could not be synthesized for comparative purposes. The tables presented in this article represent the best possible compromise between comprehensiveness and accuracy. All the studies chosen were completed between 1979 and 1983, allowing for maximum comparability.

Sampling Methodologies

A wide variety of sampling methodologies have been used in Jewish demographic research: federation lists; list merging; random-digit dialing; etc. It is clear that there is no single best method; it depends on city size, location, and the nature of the Jewish population. What is crucial is that the chosen method be appropriate to the particular community, be employed properly and rigorously, and be reported accurately. A summary of the sampling and research methods used in the various studies included in this article is provided in Tables 1 and 2.

In theory the end result of the differing methodologies should be the same—a sample drawn from a universe of Jewish households providing a profile of the community as a whole. (Excluded from consideration here are differences in the scope and detail of the questions posed.) In practice, however, differences are to be anticipated—even if they cannot be quantified—depending on the study procedure employed.

Virtually all communities seek to include non-affiliated Jewish households in their study samples. The various methodologies, however, differ in their ability to tap these "unknowns." Since available data indicate differences between "list" and "non-list" households—particularly for such characteristics as intermarriage and organizational affiliation—it can be assumed that procedures which differ in their success in bringing "unknowns" into the sample frame also produce results which differ.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF SAMPLING METHODOLOGY, PART ONE

		Random Selection		Random	Distinctive	
City	Year	List Merging	One-Two Lists	Digit Dialing	Jewish Surnames	Other
Chicago	1982			X		
Cleveland	1981	X		X	X	
Denver	1981			X		
Los Angeles	1979			X		
Miami	1982	X			X	
Milwaukee	1983			X	X	
Minneapolis	1981	X				
Nashville	1982		Fed. List		X	
New York	1981			X	X	X
Phoenix	1983			X	X	
Richmond	1983		X		X	
Rochester	1980	X			X	
St. Louis	1982	X			X	
St. Paul	1981		UJFC List			
Seattle	1979		Fed. List		X	X
Washington, D.C.	1983			X	X	

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF SAMPLING METHODOLOGY, PART TWO

		Interview Procedure			Interviewers	
City	Year	Mail Interview	Phone Interview	Personal Interview	Volunteers[a]	Professionals
Chicago	1982		X			X
Cleveland	1981		X		X	
Denver	1981		X		X	
Los Angeles	1979		X			X
Miami	1982	X	X		X	
Milwaukee	1983		X			X
Minneapolis	1981			X	X	
Nashville	1982		X			X
New York	1981	X	X			X
Phoenix	1983		X			X
Richmond	1983		X			X
Rochester	1980			X	X	
St. Louis	1982			X		X
St. Paul	1981			X	X	
Seattle	1979	X	X			X
Washington, D.C.	1983		X			X

[a] May include paid volunteers.

The use of mail questionnaires may produce some differences in response compared to phone surveys. This factor is selective, affecting some questions but not others.

LIST MERGING

In many communities the primary source for drawing a sample is a master list of known Jewish households in the area. This list is usually obtained from the local Jewish federation, and tends to include the names of contributors to Jewish causes, as well as members of synagogues. Using such a list in isolation can introduce a serious bias into the sample frame, since it tends to exclude the young, the old, the formerly affiliated, and many individuals who consider themselves somewhat marginal to the organized Jewish community.

The St. Louis community study used a list-merging process that took nearly a year to complete. Lists were obtained from synagogues, the Jewish newspaper, Jewish organizations, and elderly housing units. In addition, various lists were assembled: people with distinctive Jewish surnames, old lists (marriages, confirmations, ex-members, etc.), and miscellaneous lists (a "snowball" list, JCCA singles, etc.). In all, 148 lists were compiled. Approximately 40,000 names from these lists were keypunched and merged by a computer, bringing the total down to 22,000 by eliminating duplicate entries. From this comprehensive sample frame a sample of 1,500 households was selected, eventually resulting in 922 interviews.

Obviously, the list-merging process that took place in St. Louis was costly, placing it beyond the means of most communities. Still, similar surveys, on a scaled-down level, have been conducted with some success in several communities. A 1980 study of Rochester, New York, for example, employed the following procedure:

> The master list for the study was constructed from the unduplicated mailing list of the Jewish community federation and the membership lists of the congregations and Jewish organizations. However, unlike 1961, we went beyond these groups. Also used was the membership listing of the new large Jewish community center, selected as far as possible for Jewish households. This listing included participants in its extensive senior adult programs and single adults. In addition, the lists of Jewish households in two large senior adult housing projects and the membership lists of two Knights of Pythias groups with primarily Jewish memberships were made available. To be noted, also, is the fact that, again unlike 1961, all the Orthodox congregations now had membership lists and were able to make available lists of non-member, high holy day seat holders.[1]

List merging is only appropriate in moderate-sized, relatively stable communities. It would not be suitable for use in new, growing communities such as Phoenix or Denver.

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[1] Regenstrief, *The Jewish Population of Rochester, New York, op. cit.*, pp. 56–57.

RANDOM-DIGIT DIALING

Random-digit dialing is one of the newer and more popular methods for conducting Jewish demographic research, particularly where budget limitations are involved and telephone interviews will be used in lieu of personal interviews. The Cleveland Jewish community, which utilized this method in 1982, reported the following:

> Random-digit dialing is a painstaking undertaking, which can be used only where there is a significant concentration of target samples. Even in the case of heavily concentrated Jewish areas, we figured a "hit" (Jewish household) took an average of 20 to 30 dialings (because of busy signals, no answers, and phone numbers being unassigned). In the areas outside the Jewish core communities, where scoring a "hit" would have been much more time-consuming, a combination of other methods was used.
>
> The RDD work sheet uses lists of four-digit random numbers attached to phone exchanges of the area to be surveyed. These lists have columns with disposition headings. Every number must be called and the disposition recorded —not a working number, business, disconnected, non-Jewish household, etc. When the random number does lead to a Jewish household (or Jewish member of the household), the interviewer solicits the interview.
>
> We had some apprehension that this extensive dialing might cause animosity in the non-Jewish community toward the Jewish community federation. Happily, this fear proved to be unfounded. The interviewers reported no unpleasant exchanges. In fact, the contrary happened. A number of non-Jews were concerned that the caller might be from a hate organization misrepresenting herself and asked questions to satisfy themselves that it was not so. One even called the federation to make sure.[2]

To better appreciate the enormous volume of calls that are required to construct an adequate sample frame by means of random-digit dialing, reference can be made to the experience in Denver, Colorado:

> The RDD sample was based on some 41,000 phone numbers generated at random by computer so as to include both listed and non-listed phone numbers (in fact, over half of all the respondents had unlisted phone numbers). Of these original 41,000 phone numbers, over 22,000 turned out to be residential phone numbers. Of these residential phone numbers, 932 turned out to be Jewish households. Calls to these 932 households resulted in 802 interviews.[3]

The fact that over half the phone numbers called in Denver via random-digit dialing were unlisted points up an important feature of this procedure. Los Angeles reports a similar experience: "The wisdom of this technique was borne out by the fact that over forty per cent of our respondents have unlisted phone numbers, and thus would not otherwise have been included in the survey."[4]

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[2] Population Research Committee, *Survey of Cleveland's Jewish Population, 1981, op. cit.*, p. 2.

[3] Allied Jewish Federation of Denver, *The Denver Jewish Population Study, op. cit.*, p. vii.

[4] Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey Overview for Regional Planning, op. cit.*, p. 1.

Since random-digit dialing is expensive, methods are often employed to eliminate certain geographical areas. Thus, it is possible that "geographic" bias is introduced into the study. Careful attention must also be paid to call-back techniques, screening mechanisms, and other such things.

DISTINCTIVE JEWISH SURNAMES

At least six of the communities reported on in this article made some use of a list of distinctive Jewish surnames in drawing their sample frames; in most instances, a standard list of 35 names—e.g., Cohen, Levine, Rubin, Shapiro, etc.—was employed. The following example of usage, drawn from the Dallas community study, points up the fact that this method most often serves as a means of checking sample frames derived from other sources:

> For the purposes of this study, the master list was tested for completeness by a process known as the "distinctive Jewish names method" . . . using 35 distinctively Jewish names. A list of each of these Jewish surnames in the telephone directories of every municipality in Dallas County was made and the total number determined. The ratio of these surnames which appear on both the federation master list and the telephone list to the total of the distinctive Jewish names gives an approximation of the completeness of the master list.[5]

Since definitive studies of the validity of the distinctive Jewish surnames procedure are lacking, great care must be shown in using this methodology.

TWO-PHASE STUDIES

The Jewish communities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota conducted demographic surveys of their respective populations in 1981. While the two studies were locally sponsored, they were directed by the same researcher, Lois Geer. Geer used a two-phase methodology as follows:

> In the first phase an attempt was made to reach 25 per cent of the known Jewish households in the area. The intent was to gather as much "non-sensitive" data as possible on the largest number of households. Data to be gathered in this phase included such things as: current and prior residences; length of time at current residence; moving intentions; characteristics of the individuals in the households (age, sex, marital status, education, etc.); household synagogue affiliation; educational intentions for children; community problems and priorities; knowledge of any unaffiliated Jews.
>
> The purpose of the second phase of the population study was two-fold. First, data of a more sensitive nature, such as income, previous marital history, etc., needed to be gathered. The second purpose of this phase was to allow for more in-depth study of specific groups within the Jewish community: the elderly, single persons, dual-working and intermarried households; also, the "unaffiliated" in

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[5] Betty Maynard, *The Dallas Jewish Community Study* (Dallas, 1974), pp. 3–4. The data in Maynard's study are not cited in this article because they are outdated.

Minneapolis. Separate questionnaires were developed, each with questions specific to the group interviewed, as well as questions asked of all phase-two respondents.[6]

The sample for phase one was drawn from a master list of all known Jewish households in the country. In St. Paul, 2,818 households were listed; in Minneapolis, 8,886. The sample for phase two was drawn from those who were interviewed in phase one. In St. Paul, this involved reinterviewing almost all the respondents (95 per cent). In Minneapolis, approximately 45 per cent of the respondents were given a second interview.

Data Analysis

HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Tables 3 and 4 show mean household size and the distribution of households by the number of persons in them. The means range from a low of 2.2 in Los Angeles, Denver, and Miami, to a high of 2.8 in Cleveland. The bulk of the communities have means between 2.4 and 2.6.

TABLE 3. MEAN HOUSEHOLD SIZE

City	Year	Members of Jewish Households
Chicago	1982	2.6
Cleveland	1981	2.8
Denver	1981	2.2
Los Angeles	1979	2.2
Miami	1982	2.2
Milwaukee	1983	2.5
Minneapolis	1981	2.6
Nashville	1982	2.6
New York	1981	2.4
Phoenix	1983	2.4
Richmond	1983	2.4
Rochester	1980	2.5
St. Louis	1982	2.6
St. Paul	1981	2.3
Washington, D.C.	1983	2.3[a]
Washington, D.C.	1983	2.7[b]
NJPS	1970	2.8

[a] Jewish persons only.
[b] All persons.

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[6] Geer, *1981 Population Study of the St. Paul Jewish Community, op. cit.*, p. 1.

TABLE 4. HOUSEHOLD SIZE, BY PER CENT

City	Year	1 Person	2 Persons	3 Persons	4 Persons	5 Persons	6+ Persons
Chicago	1982	21	36	21	12	8	2
Cleveland	1981	19	34	16	17	9	5
Denver	1981	30	37	16	13	3	1
Los Angeles	1979	33	36	12	13	5	1
Milwaukee	1983	30	37	—	—	—	—
Minneapolis	1981	22	37	16	15	8	2
Nashville	1982	24	34	16	16	8	2
Richmond	1983	29	35	12	17	6	1
Rochester	1980	24	37	15	16	7	1
St. Louis	1982	22	37	17	15	7	2
St. Paul	1981	27	39	15	12	5	2
Washington, D.C.	1983	23	31	16	20	7	3
NJPS	1970	18	31	14	21	10	4

With the exception of Cleveland, all the communities report a smaller mean household size than the 2.8 figure recorded by the NJPS in 1970. Certain variations in definition and methodology may account for some of the differences in the community figures. Thus, it would be important to know whether non-Jewish household members or students attending college were included in the computations. Community samples containing large numbers of the non-affiliated would be likely to produce lower figures for household size, since non-affiliated households are generally smaller than affiliated ones.

If it is in fact the case that mean household size has declined significantly since 1970, this could be explained by a variety of factors: a lower birth rate, leading to a smaller number of children per household; a growing proportion of households with children no longer living at home; a growing divorce rate, creating two households; an aging population, with more widows and widowers living singly; and a later marrying age, with more singles living in their own housing units before marriage.

Table 3 shows the distribution of households by the number of individuals comprising them. Without exception, one-person households constitute a larger proportion of the whole in the community studies than in the NJPS; this is also true of two- and three-person households. Correspondingly, larger households, i.e., those with four or more persons, are a smaller proportion of the whole in the community studies than in the NJPS.

The particular factor exerting the greatest influence on household size can vary between communities, e.g., age (the elderly) in Miami, singles in Denver, etc. However, if there has been an across-the-board drop in household size since 1970, it is almost certainly due to a decline in the Jewish birth rate, with a smaller number of children per household in all the communities.

AGE

Age distribution (see Table 5) is one of the most important factors shaping population trends. While the published reports of the community studies show a degree of variation in the age spans covered, certain basic trends can be noted. Virtually all the communities have smaller proportions of the population under 20 years of age than the 32 per cent figure reported by the NJPS. At the other end of the scale, nearly all the communities have significantly larger proportions of people over 60 years of age than the 16 per cent NJPS figure. Quite strikingly, all the communities outside the Sunbelt have larger proportions of people over 70 years of age than the seven per cent figure reported by the NJPS.

Differences between the communities, particularly in patterns of in-out migration, account for some of the variation in the age distribution. In Denver, for example, nearly a third of the Jewish population is in the 30–49 years age category. Only eight per cent of the Washington, D.C. Jewish population is over age 65.

TABLE 5. AGE, BY PER CENT

City	Year	0–9	10–19	20–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–69	70+
Chicago	1982	21		35		30			14
Cleveland	1981	22	11		33		20	14	
Denver[a]	1981	12	9	22	21	11	10	8	7
Los Angeles	1979	16	13	19	13	14	13	8	4
Miami	1982	9	11	8	11	7	10	18	26
Milwaukee	1983	11	16	13	15	12	10	12	11
Minneapolis	1981	12	15	12	15	12	12	11	10
Nashville	1982	21	7	11		41		20	
New York	1981	9	12	16	13	12	14	13	10
Phoenix[a]	1983	13	11	17	19	10	10	12	7
Richmond	1983	15	9	15	22	8	11	13	8
Rochester	1980	12	8	14	17	29		20	
St. Louis[a]	1982	11	14	14	14	12	13	11	11
St. Paul	1981	10	12	11	13	8	16	16	14
Seattle	1979	20	12	23	10		22		13
Washington, D.C.	1983	23		18	20		19		8
NJPS	1970	12	20	14	11	13	13	9	7
U.S. Census[a,b]	1980	14	17	18	14	10	11	5	12

[a] One or more age categories will vary 1–2 years from the designated range.
For Denver and Phoenix, the categories are: 0–9; 10–17; 18–29; 30–39; 40–49; 50–59; 60–69; 70–94.
For St. Louis, the categories are: 0–10; 11–20; 21–30; 31–40; 41–50; 51–60; 61–70; 71+.
For Washington, D.C., the categories are: 0–17; 18–35; 36–45; 46–65; 66+.
For U.S. Census, the categories are: 0–9; 10–19; 20–29; 30–39; 40–49; 50–59; 60–64; 65+.
[b] U.S. bureau of the census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1981,* Washington, D.C., 1981.

SEX

The proportion of females to males in the community studies (see Table 6) is linked to the increased aging of the Jewish population, since Jewish females enjoy greater longevity than Jewish males. While the proportion of females in the NJPS was just above 50 per cent, most communities register larger proportions. Washington, D.C. is the only community with a larger proportion of males than females (52 per cent to 48 per cent).

MARITAL STATUS

Marital status, as reported on in the various community studies (see Table 7), is affected by age distribution, as well as in-migration patterns. Thus Denver, with a relatively large proportion of Jews in the 30–49 years age category, and a relatively small proportion in the 60 and over age category, has a large proportion of singles (23 per cent). Denver also has a relatively large proportion of divorced and separated

TABLE 6. SEX, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Male	Female
Cleveland	1981	47	53
Los Angeles	1979	48	52
Miami	1982	44	56
Milwaukee	1983	49	51
Minneapolis	1981	49	51
Nashville	1982	49	51
Richmond	1983	49	51
Rochester	1980	49	51
St. Louis	1982	47	53
St. Paul	1981	47	53
Washington, D.C.	1983	52	48
NJPS	1970	48	51

TABLE 7. MARITAL STATUS, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Married	Single	Widowed	Divorced/ Separated
Chicago[b]	1982	65	23	6	6
Cleveland	1981	69	11	13	8
Denver[a]	1981	64	23	4	9
Los Angeles[a]	1979	57	17	12	14
Miami	1982	61	7	23	8
Milwaukee	1983	67	14	9	10
Minneapolis	1981	66	22	7	5
Nashville	1982	70	17	8	5
New York	1981	65	15	11	9
Phoenix	1983	63	18	9	10
Richmond[c]	1983	67	14	12	7
Rochester	1980	71	18	8	3
St. Louis	1982	68	9	17	6
St. Paul	1981	66	20	11	3
Washington, D.C.	1983	61	27	4	7
NJPS[d]	1970	78	6	10	5
U.S. Census	1980	67	19	8	6

[a] Tables reconstituted. Figures are approximate. The statistics on marital status were given only as a cross-tabulation with age groups. For Los Angeles, the figures shown were calculated using a weighted average from the sample sizes in each age group. For Denver, the same process was employed, but with percentages used in place of sample sizes (which were unavailable).

[b] Data for marital status of adults, 18 and over.

[c] Heads of household; in the case of married couples, both husband and wife were defined as heads of household.

[d] Heads of household only.

people, and a very low proportion of the widowed. Washington, D.C. has the largest proportion of singles—27 per cent. Despite some differences between the communities, however, the general trend since 1970 appears to be in the direction of a smaller proportion married, a larger proportion single, a larger proportion widowed, and a larger proportion divorced or separated. All of this is consistent with the data on age distribution and household size.

In every community, the majority of households—some two out of three—consist of married couples; the proportions range from a high of 71 per cent in Rochester to a low of 57 per cent in Los Angeles. The overall pattern, however, would appear to have shifted dramatically since 1970, when the NJPS reported that nearly four of five households were married (78 per cent).

The greatest change in the marital status configuration since 1970 would appear to be in the proportion of singles. In most cities—Miami and St. Louis are exceptions—that proportion is at least twice the NJPS figure of 6 per cent: 15 per cent in New York, 18 per cent in Phoenix, 23 per cent in Chicago, and 18 per cent in Rochester.

The data also show (not reported in the table) that many of the married households are without children, either because couples have no children as yet, or because older children have already left home. In most communities, households consisting of adults and children are no longer typical; in many communities, they are a dwindling minority.

GENERAL EDUCATION

Compared to the NJPS, the data in the community studies (see Table 8) reveal smaller proportions of Jews with education at the high school level or below, and larger proportions with a college education or advanced degrees. Even the proportion reporting "some college" is larger than in 1970. Where there are exceptions to this, as in Rochester and Seattle, it would appear that the decrease in "some college" masks an increase at the higher education level.

The data indicate that Jews are remarkably well educated. While the NJPS found that 34 per cent of the Jewish population had at least a college degree, most communities show figures in the 40–50 per cent range; in Washington, D.C. the figure is a remarkable 72 per cent. When the data are separated by age cohort (not shown in the table), it becomes clear that as many as 90 per cent of those in the 25–40 years age category have at least a college degree; in Washington, about 80 per cent have an advanced degree.

Data from the community studies (not shown in the table) make it clear that increased proportions of Jewish females have college and advanced degrees. However, females have yet to attain the same educational level as Jewish males.

OCCUPATION

Occupation, together with secular education, is a prime determinant of socioeconomic status. Virtually all the community studies that inquired about occupation

TABLE 8. GENERAL EDUCATION, BY PER CENT

City	Year	High School or Less	Some College	College Degree[a]	Advanced Degree
Chicago[c]	1982	22	27	25	26
Los Angeles	1979	32	25	26	18
Miami	1982	41	23	24	12
Milwaukee	1983	22	20	32	26
Minneapolis	1981	25	29	28	19
Nashville	1982	← 52 →		28	22
New York	1981	31	18	31	20
Phoenix	1983	24	25	33	17
Rochester	1980	36	15	24	25
St. Louis[b]	1982	33	22	27	18
St. Paul	1981	43	23	20	15
Seattle	1979	29	18	26	27
Washington, D.C.	1983	15	16	24	48
NJPS[d]	1970	46	20	15	19
U.S. Census	1980	67	15	10	8

[a] "College degree" includes completed bachelors degrees and uncompleted advanced degrees.

[b] "Other education" excluded, and percentages recomputed.

[c] Respondent and spouse only.

[d] Based on individual's age, 25 and over.

(see Table 9) found that half or more of employed Jews are in the professional or manager/proprietor categories; in five communities, the proportions approximate two-thirds of the whole. Approximately half the community studies report larger proportions in these categories than the NJPS figure of 62 per cent; the remainder report smaller proportions. The differences between the NJPS and the community studies are to be explained by reference to the sales and clerical categories, since the proportions in the blue-collar category are virtually the same.

Communities as diverse as Chicago (10 per cent), Phoenix (14 per cent), Los Angeles (11 per cent), Cleveland (10 per cent), and Rochester (10 per cent) have significant proportions of blue-collar workers. In most communities about 15 per cent of the work force holds clerical positions—the same proportion as reported by the NJPS. The bulk of the communities have larger proportions of workers in the sales category than the 12 per cent figure reported by the NJPS: 21 per cent in Chicago; 17 per cent in Cleveland; 24 per cent in Phoenix; 20 per cent in Los Angeles; and 33 per cent in St. Louis. In most communities, at least 50 per cent of employed persons are in sales, clerical, or blue-collar positions.

The proportions of managers/proprietors in most communities are smaller than the NJPS figure of 34 per cent: 21 per cent in Chicago; 22 per cent in Cleveland;

TABLE 9. OCCUPATION,[a] BY PER CENT

City	Year	Professional	Managers/ Proprietors	Sales	Clerical	Blue Collar
Chicago[b]	1982	33	21	21	15	10
Cleveland	1981	39	22	17	12	10
Los Angeles	1979	34	16	20	19	11
Miami	1982	31	27	17	17	9
Milwaukee	1983	46	20	17	8	8
Minneapolis	1981	23	42	← 25 →		10
Nashville	1982	43	34	9	10	4
Phoenix	1983	28	23	24	11	14
Richmond[c]	1983	45	23	14	15	3
Rochester	1980	45	19	← 26 →		10
St. Louis	1982	29	20	33	12	6
St. Paul	1981	27	38	← 26 →		9
Seattle	1979	40	29	20	← 11 →	
Washington, D.C.	1983	48	24	← 23 →		4
NJPS[d]	1970	28	34	12	16	10
U.S. Census	1980	17	12	7	19	46

[a] Housewives, students, retired, unemployed, and unknown excluded from figures; percentages recomputed to include only those employed for wages.

[b] Respondent and spouse only.

[c] Males and females combined, all ages.

[d] Based on individual's age, 25 and over.

24 per cent in Washington, D.C.; and 16 per cent in Los Angeles. On the other hand, some communities have significantly larger proportions of professionals than the 28 per cent figure reported by the NJPS, e.g., 45 per cent in Richmond and 46 per cent in Milwaukee.

The data on occupation in the community studies show significant variation by age, sex, and city size. Thus, there are heavy concentrations of young people in the professions, women in clerical positions, and blue-collar workers in larger cities. Taken as a whole, the data reveal significant occupational diversity among American Jews.

INCOME

Information on annual household income in the community studies (see Table 10) cannot be compared with the NJPS because of the inflationary trend since 1970. This factor also hinders comparisons between the community studies themselves. Still another complicating element is the various ways in which "income" is defined in the community studies. Other characteristics shaping differences in income distribution are the proportions of households at the age extremes (65 and over, and under 30), the size of particular communities, and regional differences in the cost of living.

Keeping all of these qualifications in mind, it can yet be said that the data reveal two divergent trends. As might be expected of a group with high educational/occupational status, income is also high for a significant portion of the Jewish population. In all the community studies at least 25 per cent of the households report incomes of more than $40,000. On the other hand, in every community except Washington D.C. at least ten per cent of the population have household incomes under $10,000; many households report incomes under $5,000.

As with occupation, the figures on income in the community studies reveal significant diversity.

NATIVITY

The proportions of the foreign-born in the community studies (see Table 11) range from a low of six per cent in Richmond to a high of 27 per cent in Miami. Most communities show proportions in the area of 11–18 per cent, contrasting sharply with the NJPS figure of 23 per cent.

While an influx of Russian and Israeli immigrants has added to the foreign-born element of American Jewry since 1970, it is clear that the foreign-born component is decreasing over time.

MOVING PLANS

The largest proportions of households in the community studies (see Table 12) indicate that they have no plans to move, ranging from a low of 45 per cent in

TABLE 10. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME[a,b]

City	Year	0–$9,999	$10,000–$19,999	$20,000–$29,999	$30,000–$39,999	$40,000+
Chicago	1982	13	19	25	14	29
Denver	1981	16	21	16	19	28
Los Angeles	1979	21	21	20	12	27
Miami	1982	36	19	15	31	
Milwaukee	1983	12	18	21	← 49 →	
Minneapolis	1981	13	20	23	13	31
Nashville	1982	10	16	20	54	
New York	1981	12	16	21	18	33
Phoenix	1983	10	26	25	(See Below)[c]	(See Below)[c]
Rochester	1980	14	26	22	13	25
St. Louis	1982	13	16	13	15	43
St. Paul	1981	20	18	23	14	25
Washington, D.C.	1983	5	8	← 16 →	59	
NJPS	1970	33	35	← 32 →		

[a] Refusals excluded from figures.

[b] Does not accurately reflect comparisons due to changes in cost of living over four-year period and because of variance in cost of living between metropolitan areas.

[c] For Phoenix, the ranges and percentages are: $30,000–$50,000—25 per cent; $50,000+—12 per cent.

TABLE 11. NATIVITY, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Locally Born	U.S. Born[a]	Foreign Born
Chicago[c]	1982	66	22	12
Cleveland	1981	58	27[b]	15
Denver	1981	22	67	11
Los Angeles	1979	16	60	24
Miami	1982	4	69	27
Milwaukee	1983	← 89 →		11
Minneapolis	1981	47	40	13
New York	1981	← 83 →		17
Richmond[d]	1983	22	72	6
Rochester	1980	← 85 →		15
St. Louis	1982	50	34	16
St. Paul	1981	46	36	18
Seattle	1979	← 77 →		23
Washington, D.C.	1983	36	56	8
NJPS[d]	1970	← 77 →		23

[a] Other than locally born.
[b] U.S. = U.S. and Canada.
[c] Respondent and spouse only.
[d] Heads of household.

TABLE 12. MOVING PLANS, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Moving Within Metro Area	Moving Out of Metro Area	Don't Know	No Plans to Move
Chicago[a]	1982	16	8	16	60
Cleveland	1981	9	7	0	84
Los Angeles	1979	26	12	5	56
Miami	1982	7	5	18	70
Milwaukee	1983	13	10	17	60
Minneapolis	1981	11	5	0	84
Phoenix	1983	26	11	3	60
Richmond	1983	11	7	5	78
Rochester	1980	10	5	15	70
St. Louis	1982	11	5	5	80
St. Paul	1981	7	7	0	86
Washington, D.C.	1983	19	8	27	45
NJPS	1970	5[b]	10	2	83

[a] Moving within next 3 years.
[b] Moving within same city.

Washington, D.C. to a high of 86 per cent in St. Paul. Those in the "don't know" category range from zero per cent in several communities to 27 per cent in Washington, D.C. These figures generally conform to those reported by the NJPS—83 per cent with no plans to move, and two per cent in the "don't know" category.

Among those who are planning to move, it is a local move that is most often contemplated. Los Angeles (26 per cent) and Phoenix (26 per cent) report the largest proportions of planned local moves, while St. Paul (7 per cent) and Miami (7 per cent) report the lowest. Los Angeles (12 per cent), Phoenix (11 per cent), and Milwaukee (12 per cent) have the largest proportions of households planning to leave the community; all other communities range between 5–8 per cent.

Plans to move are cited most often in Sunbelt communities (e.g., Phoenix and Los Angeles), growing communities (e.g., Washington, D.C.), and large communities (e.g., Chicago). The fewest contemplated moves were in Miami, where retirees have gone to settle, and in stable communities, such as Rochester and Cleveland.

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION

Religious identification, as distinct from congregational membership, is reported in 13 of the community studies (see Table 13). Identification with Orthodoxy is consistently low in all these communities, ranging from five per cent in Los Angeles and Minneapolis to 15 per cent in Seattle. Eight communities report proportions of Conservative Jews ranging from 30–39 per cent. The proportions of Reform Jews are more varied: in five communities they constitute 32–39 per cent of the whole; in five communities, over 40 per cent; and in three communities, less than 30 per cent.

TABLE 13. RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	No Preference/ Other
Chicago	1982	6	35	39	20
Cleveland	1981	9	39	47	5
Los Angeles	1979	5	33	35	28
Miami	1982	11	35	24	30
Milwaukee	1983	7	27	52	14
Minneapolis	1981	5	53	32	10
New York	1981	13	36	28	23
Richmond	1983	8	42	36	14
Rochester	1980	12	36	42	10
St. Louis	1982	8	26	52	14
St. Paul	1981	7	55	27	11
Seattle	1979	15	30	46	9
Washington, D.C.	1983	3	35	38	22
NJPS	1970	11	40	30	15

The greatest variations occur in the no preference/other category, ranging from a low of five per cent in Cleveland to a high of 30 per cent in Miami.

New York (13 per cent) and Miami (11 per cent) are centers of Orthodoxy, with Rochester (12 per cent) and Seattle (15 per cent) also showing high proportions. St. Louis (52 per cent), Milwaukee (52 per cent), and Cleveland (47 per cent) have large concentrations of Reform Jews. Minneapolis (53 per cent) and St. Paul (55 per cent) have the largest proportions of Conservative Jews.

In 1970 the NJPS reported the following proportions for household heads: 11 per cent Orthodox; 40 per cent Conservative; 30 per cent Reform; and 15 per cent "other." When these figures are compared with those in the community studies, there appears to be a shift from the Conservative grouping to the Reform and "other" categories. In many communities about one-fourth of the Jewish population identifies as "other" or "just Jewish"; among the younger age cohorts, the proportions are even higher. There are few signs that young people are increasingly identifying as Orthodox.

SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP

The extent of synagogue membership as reported in the community studies (see Table 14) varies widely, ranging from a low of 26 per cent in Los Angeles to a high of 84 per cent in St. Paul. Age and mobility patterns help to account for the differences, but community size also plays a part in that synagogue membership is inversely related to city size. The four communities with the smallest proportions

TABLE 14. SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Yes	No
Chicago	1982	44	56
Cleveland	1981	61	39
Los Angeles	1979	26	74
Miami	1982	38	62
Milwaukee	1983	56	44
Minneapolis	1981	79	21
Nashville	1982	78	22
New York	1981	41	59
Phoenix	1983	33	67
Richmond	1983	67	33
Rochester	1980	68	32
St. Louis	1982	66	34
St. Paul	1981	84	16
Seattle	1979	75	25
Washington, D.C.	1983	39	61
NJPS	1970	47	53

of synagogue members are the largest in population; the four communities with the largest proportions of synagogue members are among the smallest in population. Sunbelt communities have low rates of affiliation—Los Angeles, 26 per cent; Phoenix, 33 per cent; Miami, 38 per cent—because they contain large concentrations of the elderly, who tend to affiliate less. More generally, the data indicate that both the old and the young, as well as lower-income households, have lesser rates of synagogue membership. Overall, the proportion of households in the community studies who are affiliated with synagogues does not exceed the NJPS figure of 47 per cent.

It is important to note that the figures on synagogue membership in the community studies are limited to currently affiliated households; they do not cover former synagogue members or those who might intend to join a synagogue in the future. In addition, data indicate that synagogue attendance occurs independently of membership.

RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE

Information on religious service attendance was elicited in only a small number of the community studies (see Table 15). Because of differences in definition, it is best to employ three broad categories: those who never attend, those who attend often, and the in-between group. Those never attending range from 16–30 per cent, while those attending often range from 9–21 per cent. The in-between group (attending only on the high holy days and "occasionally") ranges from 49–75 per cent.

TABLE 15. RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE,[a] BY PER CENT

City	Year	Never	High Holy Days Only	Occasionally	Often
Miami	1982	24	30	29	17
New York	1981	30	27	22	21
Rochester	1980	29	45	9	17
St. Louis[b]	1982	18	30	38	14
Seattle[c]	1979	20	30	30	20
Washington, D.C.	1983	16	14	61	9
NJPS	1970	27	28	25	18

[a] Categories as designated, except as follows:
For Miami, occasionally = several times per year; often = more than once per month or more.
For New York, often = more than once per month.
For Rochester, occasionally = less than once per month, but more than high holy days; often = more than once per month.
For NJPS, high holy days = 1–4 times per year; occasionally = 5–19 times per year; often = 20+ times per year.

[b] Figures approximate; multiple answers were given to nine different response choices and have been roughly divided into the four categories as shown.

[c] Figures approximate; taken from general statements in text.

Comparable data from the NJPS—limited, however, to household heads—are 27 per cent, 18 per cent, and 53 per cent, respectively.

RITUAL OBSERVANCE

The data on ritual observance, reported in a small number of the community studies (see Table 16), follow the expected pattern. The proportions participating in a Passover seder range from 81–95 per cent, while those lighting Hanukkah candles range from 75–86 per cent. *Kashrut* is observed by much smaller proportions of households; in five communities that inquired about the use of two sets of dishes, the range of positive responses was between nine per cent and 26 per cent. Significant proportions of households do not have a mezuzah: 39 per cent in Chicago, 34 per cent in New York, and 24 per cent in St. Louis.

TABLE 16. RITUAL OBSERVANCE, PER CENT YES

				Kashrut			
City	Year	Sabbath Candles	Passover Seder	Two Sets of Dishes	Kosher Meats	Hanukkah Candles	Mezuzah
Chicago[b]	1982	—	85	11	—	75	61
Miami	1982	51	89	24	45	77	81
New York	1981	39	87	26	36	78	66
Phoenix	1983	33	81	9	—	78	57
Rochester	1980	64	95	34		86	79
St. Louis	1982	47	58/79[a]	17	—	75	76
Seattle	1979	63	90	21		86	—
NJPS[c]	1970	—	—	28		—	—

[a] Seder in home/seder outside home.

[b] Anyone in household.

[c] NJPS report on Jewish identity refers to adults (either 18 and over or 21 and over). Those who observe the Sabbath were 36.7 per cent. This was purely self-defined and referred to any observance which differentiated the Sabbath from the rest of the week. For Passover, 83.4 per cent reported participation; for Hanukkah, 75.2 per cent. *Kashrut* was reported by 25.9 per cent; again, this was self-defined.

Data available from the community studies generally show declining patterns of ritual observance by generation.

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION

Nine communities gathered information on current affiliation with Jewish organizations (see Table 17). The proportions holding some sort of membership vary widely, ranging from 27 per cent in Los Angeles to 82 per cent in Rochester. While definitional issues can account for some of the differences, the impact of community size is clear. The larger communities have smaller proportions of households with organizational affiliations. Sunbelt communities, such as Phoenix (36 per cent), also have small proportions of members of organizations. In contrast, older, more stable communities, such as Cleveland (62 per cent), St. Louis (75 per cent), and Rochester (82 per cent), have high rates of organizational affiliation.

TABLE 17. MEMBERSHIP IN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Yes	No
Chicago[b]	1982	37	63
Cleveland	1981	62	38
Los Angeles	1979	27	73
Miami	1982	61	39
Milwaukee	1983	53	47
Phoenix	1983	36	64
Richmond	1983	44	56
Rochester	1980	82	18
St. Louis[a]	1982	75	25

[a] Includes synagogue membership.
[b] Respondent and spouse only.

Memberships in local Jewish community centers show similar patterns (see Table 18), ranging from 23–31 per cent in five communities; in New York the figure is 12 per cent, reflecting the influence of population size on organizational membership. Richmond, in contrast, has a 47 per cent membership rate in the Jewish community center. The data from St. Louis indicate that large numbers of families either add or drop Jewish community center memberships over a five-year period, depending on service and programmatic needs at particular times.

TABLE 18. MEMBERSHIP IN JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Yes	No
Miami[a]	1982	23	77
Milwaukee	1983	28	72
Minneapolis	1981	23	77
New York	1981	12	88
Phoenix	1983	19	81
Richmond[b]	1983	47	53
Rochester	1980	31	69
St. Louis	1982	30	70

[a] Response based on participation/non-participation, rather than membership/non-membership.
[b] Households.

TRAVEL TO ISRAEL

The NJPS reported that 16 per cent of Jewish households had visited Israel. As against this, the proportions reported in nine community studies (see Table 19) range from a low of 27 per cent in St. Louis to a high of 45 per cent in Miami. There is no discernible pattern for travel to Israel in terms of city size, region, or demographic make-up.

TABLE 19. TRAVEL TO ISRAEL, BY PER CENT

City	Year	Yes
Chicago	1982	30
Cleveland	1981	38
Miami	1982	45
Nashville	1980	41
New York	1981	37
Richmond[a]	1983	33
Rochester	1980	28
St. Louis	1982	27
Washington, D.C.	1983	35
NJPS	1970	16

[a] Anyone in family.

JEWISH CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

Nine community studies (see Table 20) report some form of giving to a Jewish organization or cause by no less than 63 per cent of all households, increasing to

TABLE 20. JEWISH CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS,[a] BY PER CENT

				Dollar Amounts			
City	Year	Yes	No	\$0–\$99	\$100–\$499	\$500–\$1,000	\$1,000+
Chicago[c]	1982	69	31	56	23	8	13
Los Angeles	1979	65	35	—	—	—	—
Miami[b]	1982	63	27	34	30	16	20
Milwaukee	1983	74	26	—	—	—	—
Minneapolis	1981	73	27	49	26	10	15
Phoenix	1983	53	47	—	—	—	—
Rochester	1980	79	21	—	—	—	—
St. Louis	1982	78	22	32	30	17	21
St. Paul	1981	75	25	51	24	8	17
Washington, D.C.	1983	66	34	31	44	10	15

[a] Refusals and "don't knows" excluded from figures.

[b] Dollar amounts refer to all charitable contributions.

[c] Without any corrections after validating JUF givers.

79 per cent in Rochester. Older and more stable communities, such as St. Louis, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Milwaukee have particularly large proportions of contributing households.

Where data regarding the size of gifts are available, it is evident that from one-third to slightly more than one-half of all contributions were under $100. Combining the gift categories, the proportion of households giving under $500 ranged from three-fifths to three-quarters of all contributing households. Households reporting gifts of $1,000 or more ranged from 13 per cent to 21 per cent of contributing households.

Making a contribution to a Jewish organization or cause breaks the pattern of lower affiliation rates, religious observance, etc., that is observable in the larger communities. Thus, about seven out of ten households in Chicago and two-thirds of those in Los Angeles and Washington made some contribution. Even where the dollar amounts are small, they serve to establish some formal attachment to the Jewish community.

A number of points have to be kept in mind when considering the data on Jewish charitable contributors. The extent to which the various community studies reached out to the unaffiliated has special importance here. Moreover, differing proportions of older and younger households, as well as lower-income elements, would clearly affect charitable contributions. Finally, the proportions of reported contributors are probably ceiling figures, masking some respondents who do not give, but claimed that they had.

Conclusion

Judging from the data appearing in the community studies—which in aggregate cover over 50 per cent of the American Jewish population—there have been both sweeping change and significant continuity in American Jewish life since 1970. It is clear that the American Jewish community is far from monolithic in character, composition, or behavior. Indeed, the Jewish "community" is a composite of subgroups differentiated by region, religiosity, generation, and class. There is no "typical" Jewish family, Jewish institution, etc. At the same time, American Jews share a number of characteristics which serve to distinguish them from the general population. As a group they have higher educational, occupational, and income status. They also have a lower birth rate and a higher average age.

There are major differences between communities depending on size and region. Larger communities have greater concentrations of blue-collar workers, lower-income groups, and Jews who are unaffiliated with synagogues. Rapidly growing communities have greater concentrations of singles and Jews who are unaffiliated with organizations.

Families consisting of two parents and children have become a distinct minority, being outnumbered in total by the following: single adult households who have not yet married; divorced or separated households; married households where the children have already left home; widowed households with children; and widowed adults living alone, with a relative, or with other older adults.

Religious life is characterized by great diversity. Sabbath restrictions on work, the maintenance of two sets of dishes, etc. are clearly rituals of the past for the vast majority of American Jews, although they are observed by the Orthodox. On the other hand, the lighting of Hannukah candles and participation in a Passover seder are widely observed. Most American Jews attend synagogue on the high holy days.

GARY A. TOBIN
ALVIN CHENKIN

Jewish Population in the United States, 1984

THE JEWISH POPULATION in the United States in 1984 is estimated to be 5.817 million.

While the 1984 figure is approximately 88,000 more than the estimate given for 1983, this does not reflect the operation of any intrinsic demographic factors leading to population increase. (For data supporting the view that these factors have a negative rather than a positive impact on population growth, see the article by Gary A. Tobin and Alvin Chenkin elsewhere in this volume.) Rather, an explanation is to be found in the procedures of population reporting. There has been a continuing shift of Jewish population to the Sunbelt region, and as part of this process higher numbers have been reported by receiving communities before losses recorded by communities of origin. The preparation of Jewish population estimates in individual communities is a discontinuous process, and this often leads to a situation in which a change in numbers is divorced from a population shift currently taking place. (New York City's estimate, for example, has been changed upward by 7,700, but this is simply a recomputation of figures derived from a 1981 population study.)

In almost every instance local estimates refer to "Jewish households," i.e., households in which one or more Jews reside. As a consequence, non-Jews are included in the count, their percentage of the total being estimated (based on the 1970 National Jewish Population Study and a number of current studies) as between six and seven per cent. Assuming this proportion, the number of individuals in "Jewish households" who identify themselves as Jewish in 1984 would be between 5.410 and 5.468 million.

The state and regional totals shown in Table 1 and Table 2 are derived by summing individual community estimates, shown in Table 3, and then making three adjustments. First, communities of less than 100 are added. Second, duplications within states are eliminated. Third, communities falling within two or more states (e.g., Washington, D.C. and Kansas City, Missouri) are distributed accordingly.

The trend toward geographical redistribution of the Jewish population continues. While the proportions of Jews residing in the Northeast and North Central regions still add up to nearly two-thirds of the national total, there is some decline from the proportions registered in 1983. The South, in contrast, shows a gain of one percentage point.

In 1984 nine states have Jewish proportions exceeding the national average of 2.5 per cent, with three states—Florida, New Jersey, and New York—exceeding five per cent. At the other end of the spectrum, there are 20 states with Jewish proportions of less than one half of one per cent.

ALVIN CHENKIN

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1984

State	*Estimated Jewish Population*	*Total Population**	*Estimated Jewish Per Cent Of Total*
Alabama	9,560	3,959,000	0.2
Alaska	960	479,000	0.2
Arizona	53,285	2,963,000	1.8
Arkansas	3,175	2,328,000	0.1
California	792,515	25,174,000	3.2
Colorado	44,365	3,139,000	1.4
Connecticut	107,575	3,138,000	3.4
Delaware	9,500	606,000	1.6
District of Columbia	24,285	623,000	3.9
Florida	558,820	10,680,000	5.2
Georgia	42,155	5,732,000	0.7
Hawaii	5,550	1,023,000	0.5
Idaho	535	989,000	0.1
Illinois	261,320	11,486,000	2.3
Indiana	21,360	5,479,000	0.4
Iowa	7,760	2,905,000	0.3
Kansas	11,450	2,425,000	0.5
Kentucky	12,910	3,714,000	0.4
Louisiana	17,340	4,438,000	0.4
Maine	9,850	1,146,000	0.9
Maryland	199,415	4,304,000	4.6
Massachusetts	248,395	5,767,000	4.3
Michigan	85,275	9,069,000	0.9
Minnesota	32,040	4,144,000	0.8
Mississippi	3,080	2,587,000	0.1
Missouri	64,770	4,970,000	1.3
Montana	640	817,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,850	1,597,000	0.5
Nevada	18,200	891,000	2.0
New Hampshire	5,980	959,000	0.6
New Jersey	433,475	7,468,000	5.8
New Mexico	5,155	1,399,000	0.4
New York	1,879,955	17,667,000	10.6

State	*Estimated Jewish Population*	*Total Population**	*Estimated Jewish Per Cent Of Total*
North Carolina	14,945	6,082,000	0.3
North Dakota	1,080	680,000	0.2
Ohio	140,435	10,746,000	1.3
Oklahoma	6,960	3,298,000	0.2
Oregon	10,940	2,662,000	0.4
Pennsylvania	412,210	11,895,000	3.5
Rhode Island	22,000	955,000	2.3
South Carolina	8,615	3,264,000	0.3
South Dakota	610	700,000	0.1
Tennessee	18,465	4,685,000	0.4
Texas	78,470	15,724,000	0.5
Utah	2,600	1,619,000	0.2
Vermont	2,465	525,000	0.5
Virginia	60,820	5,550,000	1.1
Washington	22,060	4,300,000	0.5
West Virginia	4,265	1,965,000	0.2
Wisconsin	31,495	4,751,000	0.7
Wyoming	310	514,000	0.1
U.S. TOTAL	**5,817,235	233,981,000	2.5

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

*Resident population, July 1, 1983, provisional. (Source: *Provisional Estimates of the Resident Population of States, by Age: July 1, 1983*, bureau of the census, series P-25, No. 951, May 1984.)

**Exclusive of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which previously reported Jewish populations of 1,800 and 510, respectively.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1984

Region	*Total Population*	*Per Cent Distribution*	*Jewish Population*	*Per Cent Distribution*
Northeast:	49,519,000	21.2	3,121,905	53.7
New England	12,489,000	5.3	396,265	6.8
Middle Atlantic	37,029,000	15.8	2,725,640	46.9
North Central:	58,953,000	25.2	665,440	11.4
East North Central ..	41,531,000	17.8	539,885	9.3
West North Central ..	17,422,000	7.5	125,555	2.2
South:	79,539,000	34.0	1,072,775	18.4
South Atlantic	38,805,000	16.6	922,820	15.9
East South Central...	14,946,000	6.4	44.015	0.8
West South Central ..	25,788,000	11.0	105,940	1.8
West:	45,970,000	19.7	957,120	16.5
Mountain...........	12,331,000	5.3	125,090	2.2
Pacific	33,639,000	14.4	832,030	14.3
TOTALS.............	233,981,000	100.0	5,817,235	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1984 (ESTIMATED)

State and City	*Jewish Population*
ALABAMA	
Anniston	100
**Birmingham	4,500
Dothan	205
Gadsden	180
Huntsville	550
*Mobile	1,250
*Montgomery	1,800
Selma	210
Tri-Cities[a]	150
Tuscaloosa	315
ALASKA	
Anchorage	600
Fairbanks	210
ARIZONA	
**Phoenix	35,000
**Tucson	18,000
ARKANSAS	
Fayetteville	120
Ft. Smith	160
Hot Springs (incl. in Little Rock)	
*Little Rock	1,600
Pine Bluff	175
Southeast Arkansas[b]	140
Wynne-Forest City	110
CALIFORNIA	
**Alameda & Contra Costa Counties	35,000
Antelope Valley	375
Bakersfield (incl. in Kern County)	
El Centro	125
Elsinore	250
Eureka	250
Fontana	165
**Fresno	2,000
Kern County	850
Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
*Long Beach	13,500
*Los Angeles Metropolitan Area	500,870
Merced	100
Modesto	260
Monterey	1,500
Oakland (incl. in Alameda & Contra Costa Counties)	
Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)	
Orange County	60,000
*Palm Springs	4,950
Pasadena (also incl. in Los Angeles Metropolitan Area)	2,000
Petaluma	800
Pomona Valley[c]	3,500
Riverside	1,200
*Sacramento	7,000
Salinas	350
San Bernardino	1,900
*San Diego	34,000
*San Francisco	80,000
**San Jose	18,000
San Luis Obispo	450
San Pedro	300
Santa Barbara	3,800
Santa Cruz	1,000
Santa Maria	200
Santa Monica	8,000
Santa Rosa	750
*Stockton	1,300
Sun City	800
Tulare & Kings County (incl. in Fresno)	
Vallejo	400
Ventura County	6,000
COLORADO	
Colorado Springs	1,000
**Denver	42,600
Pueblo	375
CONNECTICUT	
**Bridgeport	18,000
Bristol	250
Colchester	525
*Danbury (incl. New Milford)	3,500
Greenwich	4,000
*Hartford (incl. New Britain)	26,000
Lebanon	175
Lower Middlesex County (incl. in New London)[d]	
Manchester (incl. in Hartford)	
Meriden	1,400
Middletown	1,300
Milford (incl. in New Haven)	
Moodus	150
*New Haven	22,000
New London	3,500
Newtown (incl. in Danbury)	
*Norwalk	4,000
Norwich	2,500
Putnam	110
Rockville (incl. in Hartford)	
*Stamford	12,000

State and City	*Jewish Population*
Torrington	450
Valley Area[e]	700
Wallingford	440
*Waterbury	2,800
Westport	2,800
Willimantic	400
Winsted	110
DELAWARE	
*Wilmington (incl. rest of state)	9,500
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
**Greater Washington[f]	157,335
FLORIDA	
**Boca Raton-Delray	40,000
Brevard County	2,250
*Daytona Beach	2,000
**Fort Lauderdale	100,000
Fort Pierce	270
Gainesville	1,000
**Hollywood	60,000
**Jacksonville	6,800
Key West	170
Lakeland	800
Lee County (incl. Ft. Meyers)	2,500
Lehigh Acres	125
Miami	253,340
Orlando	15,000
*Palm Beach County (excl. Boca Raton)	45,000
Pensacola	725
Port Charlotte	150
*Sarasota	7,500
St. Augustine	100
**St. Petersburg (incl. Clearwater)	9,500
Tallahassee	1,000
**Tampa	10,500
GEORGIA	
Albany	525
*Athens	250
**Atlanta	33,500
Augusta	1,500
Brunswick	120
*Columbus	1,000
Dalton	235
Fitzgerald-Cordele	125
Macon	900
*Savannah	2,600
Valdosta	145
HAWAII	
Hilo	100
Honolulu	5,000
Kona	150
Kuaii	100
Maui	200
IDAHO	
Boise	120
ILLINOIS	
Aurora	400
Bloomington	125
*Champaign-Urbana	2,000
*Chicago Metropolitan Area	248,000
Danville	240
*Decatur	350
East St. Louis (incl. in So. Ill.)	
Elgin	830
Galesburg (incl. in Peoria)	
Joliet	800
Kankakee	260
Peoria	1,900
*Quad Cities[g]	1,800
Quincy	200
Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
*Rockford	975
**Southern Illinois[h]	1,200
**Springfield	1,100
Sterling-Dixon	110
Waukegan	1,200
INDIANA	
Anderson	105
Bloomington	300
Elkhart (incl. in South Bend)	
Evansville	1,200
*Ft. Wayne	1,200
Gary (incl. in Northwest Indiana-Calumet Region)	
*Indianapolis	10,000
Lafayette	600
Marion	170
Michigan City	425
Muncie	175
*Northwest Indiana-Calumet Region[i]	4,000
Richmond	110
Shelbyville	140
*South Bend	1,900
Terre Haute	450
IOWA	
Cedar Rapids	330
Council Bluffs	245
Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
*Des Moines	3,500
Dubuque	105
Fort Dodge	115
Iowa City	750
Mason City	110

State and City	*Jewish Population*
Muscatine	120
Ottumwa	150
*Sioux City	770
Waterloo	450
KANSAS	
Topeka	500
*Wichita	1,000
KENTUCKY	
Lexington	1,500
*Louisville	9,200
Paducah	175
LOUISIANA	
Alexandria	700
Baton Rouge	1,200
Lafayette	600
Lake Charles	250
**Monroe	510
New Orleans	12,000
**Shreveport	1,250
MAINE	
Augusta	215
**Bangor	1,300
Southern Maine (excl. Portland)	950
Calais	135
**Lewiston-Auburn	1,000
**Portland	5,500
Waterville	300
MARYLAND	
Annapolis	2,000
*Baltimore	92,000
Cumberland	265
Easton Park Area[e]	100
Frederick	400
Hagerstown	275
Hartford County	500
Howard County	4,000
Montgomery and Prince Georges County[f]	99,500
Salisbury	300
MASSACHUSETTS	
Amherst	750
Athol	110
Attleboro	200
Beverly	1,000
*Boston (incl. Brockton)	170,000
Fall River	1,780
Fitchburg	300
*Framingham	10,000
Gardner	100
Gloucester	400
Great Barrington	105
Greenfield	250
Haverhill	1,650
Holyoke	1,100
Hyannis	1,200
Lawrence	2,550
Leominster	750
Lowell	2,000
Lynn (incl. Beverly, Peabody, and Salem)	19,000
Medway (incl. in Framingham)	
Milford (incl. in Framingham)	
Mills (incl. in Framingham)	
**New Bedford	2,700
Newburyport	280
North Berkshire	675
Northampton	700
Peabody	2,600
*Pittsfield (incl. all Berkshire County)	3,500
Plymouth	500
Salem	1,150
Southbridge	105
**Springfield	11,000
Taunton	1,200
Webster	125
Worcester	10,000
MICHIGAN	
Ann Arbor (incl. all Washtenaw County)	3,000
Battle Creek	245
Bay City	650
Benton Harbor	650
*Detroit	70,000
**Flint	2,200
Grand Rapids	1,500
Iron County	160
Iron Mountain	105
Jackson	375
**Kalamazoo	1,000
**Lansing	1,850
Marquette County	175
Mt. Clemens	420
Mt. Pleasant	100
Muskegon	235
Saginaw	450
South Haven	100
MINNESOTA	
Austin	125
**Duluth	1,100
Hibbing	155
*Minneapolis	22,000
Rochester	240
*St. Paul	7,500
Virginia	100
MISSISSIPPI	
Biloxi-Gulfport	100
Clarksdale	160
Cleveland	180
Greenville	500
Greenwood	100

State and City	Jewish Population
Hattiesburg	180
*Jackson	650
Meridian	135
Natchez	140
Vicksburg	260
MISSOURI	
Columbia	350
Joplin	115
*Kansas City	20,000
Kennett	110
Springfield	230
**St. Joseph	343
*St. Louis	53,500
MONTANA	
Billings	160
NEBRASKA	
Lincoln	750
*Omaha	6,500
NEVADA	
*Las Vegas	17,000
Reno	1,200
NEW HAMPSHIRE	
Claremont	130
Concord	350
Dover	425
Keene	105
Laconia	150
*Manchester	3,000
Nashua	450
Portsmouth	1,000
NEW JERSEY	
Atlantic City (incl. Atlantic County)	12,000
**Bayonne	4,500
Bergen County[k]	100,000
Bridgeton	375
*Camden[l]	28,000
Carteret	300
Elizabeth (incl. in Union County)	
Englewood (incl. in Bergen County)	
**Essex County[m]	111,000
Flemington	875
Gloucester County[n]	165
Hoboken	350
Jersey City	3,500
Metuchen (incl. in North Middlesex County)	
Millville	240
Monmouth County	33,600
Morris-Sussex Counties[o] (incl. in Essex County)	
Morristown (incl. in Morris County)	
Mt. Holly	300
Newark (incl. in Essex County)	
New Brunswick (incl. in Raritan Valley)	
North Hudson County[p]	7,000
North Jersey[q]	32,500
Northern Middlesex County[r]	22,000
Ocean County	8,100
**Passaic-Clifton	7,700
Paterson (incl. in North Jersey)	
Perth Amboy (incl. in North Middlesex County)	
Plainfield (incl. in Union County)	
Princeton	2,600
Raritan Valley[s]	22,500
Salem	230
*Somerset County[t]	4,100
Somerville (incl. in Somerset County)	
Toms River (incl. in Ocean County)	
Trenton[u]	8,500
*Union County	32,000
*Vineland[v]	2,750
Wildwood	425
Willingboro (incl. in Camden)	
NEW MEXICO	
*Albuquerque	4,500
Las Cruces	100
Santa Fe	300
NEW YORK	
*Albany	12,000
Amenia	140
Amsterdam	595
Auburn	315
Batavia	165
Beacon	315
*Binghamton (incl. all Broome County)	3,000
Brewster (incl. in Danbury, Ct.)	300
*Buffalo	18,500
Canandaigua	135
Catskill	200
Corning	125
Cortland	440
Dunkirk	150
Ellenville	1,450
*Elmira	1,100
Geneva	300
**Glens Falls	800
Gloversville	535
Herkimer	185
Highland Falls	105
Hudson	470

State and City	*Jewish Population*
Ithaca	1,000
Jamestown	185
Kingston	3,000
Liberty	2,100
Loch Sheldrake-Hurleyville	750
Monroe	400
Monticello	2,400
Mountaindale	150
**New York City Metropolitan Area	1,742,500
New Paltz	150
Newark	220
**Newburgh-Middletown	11,000
**Niagara Falls	650
Norwich	120
Olean	140
Oneonta	175
Oswego	100
Parksville	140
Pawling	105
Plattsburg	275
Port Jervis	560
Potsdam	175
Poughkeepsie	4,900
*Rochester	19,600
Rockland County	25,000
Rome	205
Saratoga Springs	500
Schenectady	5,400
Sharon Springs	165
South Fallsburg	1,100
*Syracuse	9,000
Troy	1,200
**Utica	2,100
Walden (incl. in Newburgh-Middletown)	
Warwick	100
Watertown	250
White Lake	425
Woodbourne	200
Woodridge	300
NORTH CAROLINA	
*Asheville	1,000
Chapel Hill-Durham	1,955
*Charlotte	4,000
Fayetteville (incl. all Cumberland County)	500
Gastonia	220
Goldsboro	120
**Greensboro	3,000
Hendersonville	105
High Point	400
Raleigh	1,375
Rocky Mount	110
Whiteville Zone[w]	160
Wilmington	500
Winston-Salem	440
NORTH DAKOTA	
Fargo	500
Grand Forks	100
OHIO	
*Akron	6,000
*Canton	2,850
*Cincinnati	22,000
*Cleveland	70,000
**Columbus	15,000
*Dayton	6,000
East Liverpool	300
Elyria	275
Hamilton	560
**Lima	168
Lorain	1,000
Mansfield	600
Marion	150
Middletown	140
New Philadelphia	140
Newark	105
Piqua	120
Portsmouth	120
Sandusky	150
Springfield	340
*Steubenville	220
*Toledo	6,300
Warren	500
Wooster	200
Youngstown	5,230
Zanesville	350
OKLAHOMA	
Muskogee	120
**Oklahoma City	2,400
Oklahoma City Zone[x]	190
Tulsa	2,900
OREGON	
Corvallis	140
Eugene	1,500
*Portland	8,845
Salem	200
PENNSYLVANIA	
Aliquippa	400
*Allentown	4,980
*Altoona	580
Ambridge	250
Beaver (incl. in Pittsburgh)	
Beaver Falls	350
Berwick	120
Bethlehem	960
Braddock	250
Bradford	150
Brownville	150
**Butler	300
Carbon County	125
Carnegie	100
Central Bucks County	400
Chambersburg	340

State and City	Jewish Population
Chester	2,100
Coatesville	305
Connellsville	110
**Delaware Valley (Lower Bucks County)[y]	23,000
Donora	100
Easton	1,300
Ellwood City	110
**Erie	880
Farrell	150
Greensburg	300
Harrisburg	6,500
Hazleton	481
Homestead	300
Indiana	135
*Johnstown	550
Kittanning	175
Lancaster	1,800
Lebanon	425
Lock Haven	140
McKeesport	2,000
Monessen	100
Mt. Pleasant	120
New Castle	400
New Kensington	560
**Norristown	1,500
North Penn	200
Oil City	165
Oxford-Kennett Square	180
Philadelphia Metropolitan Area	295,000
Phoenixville	340
**Pittsburgh	50,000
Pottstown	700
Pottsville	500
*Reading	2,800
Sayre	100
**Scranton	3,400
Sharon	330
State College	450
Stroudsburg	410
Sunbury	200
**Uniontown	240
Upper Beaver	500
Washington (incl. in Pittsburgh)	-
Wayne County	210
West Chester	300
*Wilkes-Barre	4,000
Williamsport	415
York	1,600
RHODE ISLAND	
*Providence (incl. rest of state)	22,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	
*Charleston	3,500
**Columbia	2,280
Florence	350
Greenville	600
Orangeburg County	105
Spartanburg	295
Sumter	190
SOUTH DAKOTA	
**Sioux Falls	130
TENNESSEE	
Chattanooga	2,000
Johnson City[z]	210
Knoxville	1,350
*Memphis	9,000
**Nashville	5,080
Oak Ridge	240
TEXAS	
Amarillo	300
**Austin	3,600
Baytown	300
Beaumont	400
Brownsville	160
Corpus Christi	1,200
*Dallas	22,000
De Witt County[aa]	150
*El Paso	4,500
**Ft. Worth	3,600
**Galveston	630
*Houston	28,000
Laredo	420
Longview	185
Lubbock	350
McAllen	295
North Texas Zone[bb]	100
Odessa	150
Port Arthur	260
*San Antonio	9,000
Texarkana	100
Tyler	450
*Waco	600
Wharton	170
Wichita Falls	260
UTAH	
Ogden	100
Salt Lake City	2,500
VERMONT	
Bennington	120
Burlington	1,800
Rutland	350
St. Johnsbury	100
VIRGINIA	
**Alexandria (incl. Falls Church, Arlington County, and urban Fairfax County)	33,550
Arlington (incl. in Alexandria)	
Charlottesville	800
Danville	180
Fredericksburg	140
Hampton (incl. in Newport News)	
Harrisonburg	115
Hopewell	140
Lynchburg	275
Martinsville	135

State and City	*Jewish Population*
*Newport News (incl. Hampton)	2,575
*Norfolk (incl. Virginia Beach)	11,000
Petersburg	600
*Portsmouth (incl. Suffolk)	1,100
**Richmond	8,000
Roanoke	1,200
Williamsburg	120
Winchester	110
WASHINGTON	
Bellingham	120
Bremerton (incl. in Seattle)	
*Seattle	19,500
**Spokane	1,000
Tacoma	750
WEST VIRGINIA	
Bluefield-Princeton	250
**Charleston	1,075
Clarksburg	205
Huntington	450
Morgantown	200
Parkersburg	155
Weirton	150
Wheeling	650
WISCONSIN	
Appleton	250
Beloit	120
Eau Clair	120
Fond du Lac	100
Green Bay	280
Kenosha	250
*Madison	4,500
Manitowoc	115
*Milwaukee	23,900
Oshkosh	150
Racine	405
Sheboygan	250
Superior	165
Waukesha (incl. in Milwaukee)	
Wausau	155
WYOMING	
Cheyenne	255

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*Denotes estimates submitted in current year.

**Estimates submitted in current year; represents change from previous estimate.

[a] Florence, Sheffield, Tuscumbia.

[b] Towns in Chicot, Desha, Drew Counties.

[c] Includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, Upland.

[d] Centerbrook, Chester, Clinton, Deep River, Essex, Killingworth, Old Lyme, Old Saybrook, Seabrook, Westbrook.

[e] Ansonia, Derby-Shelton, Oxford, Seymour.

[f] Greater Washington includes urbanized portions of Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, in Maryland; Arlington County, Fairfax County (organized portion), Falls Church, Alexandria, in Virginia.

[g] Rock Island, Moline (Illinois); Davenport, Bettendorf (Iowa).

[h] Towns in Alexander, Bond, Clay, Clinton, Crawford, Edwards, Effingham, Fayette, Franklin, Gallatin, Hamilton, Hardin, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Johnson, Lawrence, Macoupin, Madison, Marion, Massac, Montgomery, Perry, Pope, Pulaski, Randolph, Richland, St. Clair, Saline, Union, Wabash, Washington, Wayne, White, Williamson Counties.

[i] Includes Crown Point, East Chicago, Gary, Hammond, Munster, Valparaiso, Whiting, and the Greater Calumet region.

[j] Towns in Caroline, Kent, Queen Annes, Talbot Counties.

[k] Allendale, Elmwood Park, Fair Lawn, Franklin Lakes, Oakland, Midland Park, Rochelle Park, Saddle Brook, Wykoff also included in North Jersey estimate.

[l] Includes Camden and Burlington Counties.

[m] Includes contiguous areas in Hudson, Morris, Somerset, and Union Counties.

[n] Includes Clayton, Paulsboro, Woodbury. Excludes Newfield; see Vineland.

[o] See footnote (m).

[p] Includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, Woodcliff.

[q] Includes Paterson, Wayne, Hawthorne in Passaic County, and nine towns in Bergen County. See footnote (k).

[r] Includes Perth Amboy, Metuchen, Edison Township (part), Woodbridge.

[s] Includes in Middlesex County, Cranbury, Dunellen, East Brunswick, Edison Township (part), Jamesburg, Matawan, Middlesex, Monmouth Junction, Old Bridge, Parlin, Piscataway, South River, Spottswood; in Somerset County, Kendall Park, Somerset; in Mercer County, Hightstown.

[t] Excludes Kendall Park and Somerset, which are included in Raritan Valley.

[u] Includes Mercer County in New Jersey; and Lower Makefield, Morrisville, Newtown, and Yardley in Pennsylvania.

[v] Includes in Cumberland County, Norma, Rosenheim, Vineland; in Salem County, Elmer; in Gloucester County, Clayton, Newfield; in Cape May County, Woodbine.

[w] Elizabethtown, Fairmont, Jacksonville, Lumberton, Tabor City, Wallace, Warsaw, and Loris, S.C.

[x] Towns in Alfalfa, Beckham, Cadelo, Canadian, Cleveland, Custer, Jackson, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Lincoln, Logan, Oklahoma, Payne, Roger Mills, Tillman, Washita Counties.

[y] Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Penndel, Warington, Yardley. Also includes communities listed in footnote (u).

[z] Includes Kingsport and Bristol (including the portion of Bristol in Virginia).

[aa] Includes communities also in Colorado, Fayette, Gonzales, and La Vaca Counties.

[bb] Denison, Gainesville, Greenville, Paris, Sherman, and Durant (Oklahoma).

Canada

Canadian Jewry: Some Recent Census Findings

THE STUDY OF WORLD Jewry today is being increasingly enriched by the use of concrete, quantitative information, which is available in abundance for Israel and in more limited amounts for several Diaspora communities. One of the best sources of "hard data" on contemporary Jews is the decennial Canadian census. This article highlights the 1981 census findings as they pertain to the geographic distribution, marital status, fertility rates, and age structure of Canadian Jews. Comparisons are made with data drawn from the 1971 and earlier censuses.

No discussion of specific data can ignore the prior issue of definition. Ivor Millman has admirably summed up the situation as it applies to Canadian Jews:

> Outside of Israel and Eastern Europe, official statistics in Canada are probably unique in the Western world, in that they recognize the concept of Jewish ethnic origin/nationality. . . . Canadian statistics have a place for Jewish identity on a religious basis too. Partly as a result of this, and partly because of the detailed way in which the census results are analysed for the larger ethnic and religious groups, the statistical data on Canadian Jewry are, by any standard, extremely comprehensive and informative . . .
>
> The census question on religion is a straightforward one—allowing the option of 'none.'
>
> The census question on ethnic origin tends to comprise elements of both nationality and ethnicity . . .[1]

While the Canadian census employs both ethnic and religious criteria for counting Jews, and the totals are not identical, the religious denomination measure is more comparable over long periods of time. Accordingly, the present article will make exclusive use of religious denomination data in referring to the Jewish population. In most census years, the Jews-by-religion count has been higher than the Jews-by-ethnicity count. In 1981 there were 296,425 Canadian Jews by religious affiliation and 264,020 by ethnic origin.

Note: The author acknowledges the helpful financial support of the Ethnic Studies Program, Multiculturalism Canada.

[1] Ivor Millman, "Data on Diaspora Jewish Populations from Official Censuses," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S.J. Gould (eds.), *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1972–1980* (Jerusalem and London, 1983), p. 46.

While the overall Canadian population, now numbering more than 25 million, grew by almost 13 per cent between 1971 and 1981, the Jewish population increased by only 7.4 per cent, up from 276,000 to 296,000. Jews are steadily becoming a smaller proportion of the total Canadian population (1.22 per cent in 1981 as against 1.28 per cent in 1971).

Pattern of Jewish Settlement

Rapid increases in the size of the Canadian Jewish population occurred after 1881, fueled by pogroms and other difficulties experienced by Jews in Czarist Russia. By 1891 the Jewish population of Canada had reached 6,586, double the figure of the previous decade. While the largest number of Jews were found in Quebec province, there was some Jewish representation in every area of Canada, including the North West Territories and the Yukon. This trend continued during the ensuing decades, bringing the Jewish population of Canada to 75,838 by 1911 and 126,201 by 1921. The most important immigrant-receiving community at the time was Montreal. However, the Jews of Ontario province, concentrated mainly in Toronto, were not far behind; and indeed, by 1931 they had become more numerous than the Jews of Quebec province—a situation that continues to the present.

In 1931 Canadian Jewry numbered around 156,000. The Jewish population of the Maritime Provinces—Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland-Labrador (which joined Canada in 1949)—was about 3,300, just over two per cent of the Canadian Jewish total. Manitoba had more than 19,000 Jewish residents, some 12 per cent of Canadian Jewry. The remainder of the Canadian West held fewer than 12,000 Jews. The great bulk of Canadian Jews at the time were living either in Ontario province (62,400 people, 40 per cent of the total) or Quebec province (60,000 people, 39 per cent of the total). Montreal was a larger and more vibrant Jewish center than Toronto, but the Ontario diaspora—including Ottawa and Hamilton in southern Ontario—made the provincial total larger than the total for Quebec province.

The distribution of the Jewish population has remained more or less constant since 1931. In 1971 Canadian Jewry numbered around 276,000, with approximately 45 per cent (125,300 people) residing in Ontario and just over 40 per cent (110,900 people) living in Quebec. The Jewish population of the Maritime Provinces had dwindled to a little over one per cent of the total, with the very same absolute numbers in 1971 as in 1931. Manitoba and the remainder of the Canadian West had shrunk somewhat in their percentages of all Canadian Jewry, but a growth in absolute numbers in Alberta and British Columbia brought their combined total close to 18,000, a figure quite similar to that of Manitoba.

The most significant development since 1971 has been the relative decline of Montreal, due to anxiety surrounding the Francization issue in Quebec, which has resulted in Toronto becoming the leading Jewish center in Canada. At the same time, there has been steady growth of some of the Jewish communities in the West, reflecting economic developments in petroleum-rich Alberta. These communities are now capable of conducting a broad range of Jewish activities on their own.

Table 1 indicates the distribution of Canadian Jews among the major urban centers, as revealed in the 1981 census.

Whereas Montreal was once the largest Jewish community in Canada, the honor now clearly belongs to Toronto. The approximately 124,000 Jews in metropolitan Toronto in 1981 constituted about 42 per cent of the Canadian Jewish total, this in contrast to Montreal's 34 per cent (101,400 people). Winnipeg was a very distant third with a Jewish population above 15,000. The next most important Jewish communities, in order of size, were Vancouver (12,865 people), Ottawa (8,470 people), and Calgary (5,575 people). There were also sizable Jewish communities in Edmonton and Hamilton.

It is reasonable to predict further declines in both Montreal and Winnipeg due to the age structures of the Jewish populations in these two cities. In 1981 both Jewish communities were heavily weighted with senior citizens, while showing a shortage of young families with children. The presence of large numbers of Jewish children in Toronto and the major centers in the West suggests that the Jewish communities in Central and Western Canada are reasonably secure in terms of demographic composition.

East European Jews, who dominated the Jewish immigration scene in Canada from the 1880's to the 1950's, have been joined in recent decades by about 10,000 Jews from Morocco/North Africa, as well as a substantial number of Jews from the U.S.S.R. and Israel. These new sources of immigration have given Canadian Jewry a somewhat more heterogeneous cast than in the past.

While Sephardic immigrants from France, Iran, and Iraq have gravitated to Montreal, other recent Jewish immigrant groups have shied away from the city. Thus, more than 66 per cent of Canada's South African-born Jews were living in greater Toronto in 1981, in contrast to less than one per cent in Montreal. Toronto also attracted substantial numbers of foreign-born Jews from Russia and Hungary.

With regard to Jews born in Israel, the Canadian total in 1981 was around 7,000. Of these, some 42 per cent were living in Toronto, while 38 per cent resided in Montreal.

Over one third of Canada's Jews were foreign-born in 1981.

Marriage and Divorce

In reviewing the 1971 Canadian census data on marital status and nuptiality, K.G. Basavarajappa was led to observe:

> Canadian-born Jewish males and females . . . showed some of the highest proportions of single and lowest proportions of married.
>
> Among Canadian and foreign-born males, the highest mean ages [at first marriage] were shown by Jewish groups. The highest ages observed were mainly due to the lowest proportions marrying under 20 years of age, generally lower proportions at 20–29 years, and the highest proportions marrying over 30 years of age.[2]

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[2] K.G. Basavarajappa, *Marital Status and Nuptiality in Canada, 1971*, Statistics Canada, 1978, pp. 70–71.

TABLE 1. MAJOR JEWISH CENTERS* IN CANADA, 1981: POPULATION OF JEWISH RELIGION, BY SELECTED AGE GROUPS (ROUNDED)

	Total Jews	Child Population (Aged 0–14 Yrs.)		Senior Population (Aged 65 & Over)		Child/Senior Ratio**
		Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
All Canada	296,425	53,100	17.9	48,700	16.4	1.1
Toronto	123,725	23,000	18.6	18,200	14.7	1.3
Montreal	101,365	17,100	16.8	19,400	19.1	0.9
Winnipeg	15,350	2,200	14.2	3,800	24.6	0.6
Vancouver	12,865	2,250	17.5	1,600	12.6	1.4
Ottawa	8,470	1,800	21.4	1,200	14.2	1.5
Calgary	5,575	1,100	19.3	600	11.1	1.8

N.B. Montreal and Winnipeg are shown, by these data, to be "old" communities in 1981—with more elderly Jews than Jewish children, and aged per cents well above the national Jewish average of 16.4 per cent. The proportion of children is lower than in the other major Jewish centers.

* Containing at least 5,000 individuals of Jewish religion in 1981 (metropolitan area totals). Hamilton and Edmonton are a little below this threshold, with about 4,300 Jews each; other communities, e.g., Halifax, London, and Windsor, are much smaller still.

**Number of children per over-65 Jews.

Sources: Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Population, Report No. 93-929 (Quebec); No. 93-930 (Ontario); No. 93-931 (Manitoba); No. 93-933 (Alberta); No. 93-934 (British Columbia); Table 6 in each of these has religion showing age groups.

Basavarajappa attributed this pattern of late marriage to the urban residence and high socio-economic status of Canada's Jews.

The 1971 census found that a higher proportion of Jews were divorced than were Canadians in general. However, it is possible that this is merely indicative of less remarriage after divorce among the Jewish population. The uncertainty arises because individuals who were divorced earlier, but had remarried before the new census was taken, were listed as "married"; the "divorced" category was reserved for people who remained in that state when the new census took place.

As the 1981 data in Table 2 indicate, the picture with regard to marriage and divorce has remained very much the same since 1971, suggesting a somewhat risky future for Canadian Jewish families.

Table 2 shows that older Jews were more likely than other older Canadians to be married, but that the situation was quite different with regard to younger age groupings. Fewer Jews in the all-ages and the over-35 years groups were "single, never-married," while Jews aged 20–34 had much higher percentages of singles than the same all-Canada population. Less than 20 per cent of Jews aged 20–24 were married in 1981, compared with a national average very close to 40 per cent.

Table 2 also shows a clear difference with regard to divorce (again, without remarriage prior to the census). By any age-group comparison—save for the insignificant 20–24 years cohort (not many people that young are divorced, and the category contains less than 100 divorced Jews)—there were proportionately more divorced Jews than other divorced Canadians. For all ages over 15 years, 3.3 per cent of Jews reported divorce, in contrast to less than 2.7 per cent of Canadians in general. The highly significant 35–44 years age group showed 5.8 per cent divorced Jews, as against a national average of 4.7 per cent. Even Jewish senior citizens reported more divorce than other Canadians in the same age group (2.1 per cent compared to 1.6 per cent).

The number of Jewish single-parent families (mostly headed by females) in Canada increased by 31 per cent between 1971 and 1981, going from 5,550 to 7,270. However, the national figure increased by 52 per cent during the same period, reducing the Jewish percentage in the single-parent family category from 1.1 per cent to 1.0 per cent.

Fertility and Its Consequences

Millman has summarized the 1971 Canadian census data on Jewish fertility and household size as follows:

> Canadian Jewry has a rate of natural growth lower than the overall Canadian average. . . . It is interesting to note the particular popularity among Jews of 2 and 3 children families . . .
>
> The data . . . also suggest that, on average, Jewish women start families at a later age than do Canadian women generally . . .

TABLE 2. SELECTED MARITAL STATUS DATA, CANADA AND JEWS OF CANADA, 1981 (ADULT POPULATION ONLY), BY PER CENT

All Canadians		Jews (Religion)
18,862,080	Total Population Aged 15 Years and Up	243,330
27.9	Single (Never Married)	24.4
63.35	Married	64.9
2.65	Divorced	3.3
2,343,810	Population Aged 20–24 Years	22,190
61.6	Single	80.0
37.9	Married	19.5
0.5	Divorced	0.4
4,216,190	Population Aged 25–34 Years	52,910
19.6	Single	26.9
77.2	Married	69.3
3.0	Divorced	3.7
2,968,155	Population Aged 35–44 Years	34,085
7.7	Single	7.4
86.6	Married	86.0
4.7	Divorced	5.8
2,360,980	Population Aged 65 Years and Over	48,710
9.1	Single	5.1
55.2	Married	63.5
1.6	Divorced	2.1
34.1	Widowed	29.2

Sources: Statistics Canada, 1981 Census, Report No. 92-901 (Tables 4–5); for Jews, custom tabulations by Statistics Canada, 1983.

> Jewish households tend to be smaller than average Canadian ones. This reflects, possibly . . . lower birth rates and higher proportions of elderly persons who live alone or in couples.[3]

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[3] Millman, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–53.

The average number of births experienced per 1,000 Canadian women (all ages, all religions) declined from 2,775 in 1971 to 2,493 in 1981, a 10.2 per cent drop. Looking at births among women aged 15–44 only, the 1971–1981 decline was 22.8 per cent, from 2,307 to 1,781. For Jewish women, the all-ages drop during the same period was 6.9 per cent (2,117 in 1971 as against 1,970 in 1981), while the decline in the 15–44 years category was 14.2 per cent (1,860 in 1971 as against 1,596 in 1981). Thus, the decline in Jewish fertility between 1971 and 1981 was considerably less steep than for Canadians in general.

Tables 3 and 4 present a variety of data from the 1981 census comparing Jewish and general Canadian fertility.

TABLE 3. CANADIAN AND CANADIAN-JEWISH WIVES,* BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN AND AGE GROUPS, 1981, BY PER CENT

	All Canadian Married Women		Jewish Married Women	
Ages 15–44	3,803,165	100	40,725	100
No Births	864,745	22.7	10,285	25.3
1	750,865	19.7	7,860	19.3
2	1,204,915	31.7	13,875	34.1
3–4	830,810	21.8	8,130	20.0
5 Or More	151,830	4.0	580	1.4
Ages 45 And Over	3,335,055	100	57,360	100
No Births	363,805	10.9	5,495	9.6
1	394,635	11.8	9,260	16.1
2	714,580	21.4	21,285	37.1
3–4	1,067,685	32.0	18,775	32.7
5 Or More	794,345	23.8	2,540	4.4
Ages 25–29	872,460	100	9,080	100
None	261,835	30.0	4,220	46.5
1	235,775	27.0	2,515	27.7
2	270,260	31.0	1,750	19.3
3 Or More	104,595	12.0	595	6.5
Ages 30–34	912,695	100	12,265	100
None	129,955	14.2	2,290	18.7
1	174,195	19.1	2,830	23.1
2	378,000	41.4	5,060	41.3
3 Or More	230,540	25.3	2,090	17.0

*"Ever-married," including widowed and divorced.

Source: 1981 Census of Canada, Report No. 92-906, Table 11.

TABLE 4. CANADIAN AND CANADIAN-JEWISH WIVES,* BY AVERAGE BIRTHS PER WOMAN, SELECTED AGE GROUPS, 1981

	Avg. Births Per Woman, Canada	5 or More Children	Avg. Births Per Woman, Jews	5 or More Children	Jewish Avg. Per All-Cdn. Avg.
Age Groups					
20–24 Years	.69	--	.41	—	.59
25–29 Years	1.29	0.6 Per Cent	0.90	0.8 Per Cent	.70
30–34 Years	1.88	2.0 Per Cent	1.63	1.4 Per Cent	.87
35–39 Years	2.33	5.8 Per Cent	2.06	1.4 Per Cent	.89
40–44 Years	2.84	13.5 Per Cent	2.38	3.0 Per Cent	.84
45–49 Years	3.26	21.5 Per Cent	2.49	4.4 Per Cent	.76
All, 45 Years And Over	3.30	23.8 Per Cent	2.24	4.4 Per Cent	.68

*"Ever-married," including widowed and divorced.

Source: 1981 Census of Canada, Report No. 92-906, Table 11.

Taken as a whole, the tables reveal two important facts: Jewish families tended to be smaller than other Canadian families, and Jewish women commenced having children at later ages than other Canadian women.

Table 3 shows few differences between Jewish and non-Jewish women in the one- or two-child range. However, with regard to married women who had no births at all, there were substantially more in the under-45 years Jewish population. Among women 45 years and older—i.e., those who had completed their families—23.8 per cent of all-Canada women in this age bracket had five or more children, while only 4.4 per cent of the Jewish women had that many. (However, Jewish women aged 45 and older were a little less likely to be childless.) In the 25–29 and 30–34 age categories, families with three or more children were far less common among Jews than among Canadians in general. Table 4 shows that average births-per-woman for any age group was lower for Jews than for other Canadian women.

All in all, it is clear that contemporary Canadian Jewish families manifest highly rational and highly consistent family planning. While few Jewish women leave the child-bearing years with no children, Jewish families are concentrated around the "ideal" size of two children. Total Jewish fertility, to judge by the 1981 census data, remains below zero population growth—the approximate level of general Canadian births at present.[4]

If birth rates remain depressed over a long period of time, while longevity is good, the percentage of older people in the population will rise. Table 5 indicates a shrinkage of the Jewish child population (0–14 years) between 1961 and 1981, with a corresponding strong increase of Jews aged 65 and older. In 1961 the child population was between three and four times as large as the population of senior citizens (27.6 per cent compared to 8.2 per cent). The situation had greatly altered by 1971, when the child population was a little less than twice the size of the population of senior citizens (20.6 per cent compared to 11.6 per cent). In 1981 Jewish children and Jewish senior citizens showed a near equality, both in absolute terms and as percentages of the total Jewish population; the child population was just under 18 per cent, while senior citizens accounted for over 16 per cent. By now, Jewish senior citizens no doubt outnumber Jewish children.

Conclusion

There is no gainsaying the fact that the "climate" for fertility in Canada—both general and Jewish—is now decidedly negative. (Orthodox Jews, however, are an exception.[5]) The North American "baby bust" of recent decades has created an atmosphere in which people who might otherwise be inclined to have a large family hesitate to do so, because having more than two or three children has

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[4] See Jean Veevers (ed.), *Demographic Aspects of Vital Statistics: Fertility,* Statistics Canada, 1983; and Margrit Eichler, *Families in Canada Today* (Toronto, 1983).

[5] See Leo Davids, "Yiddish in Canada," *Canadian Ethnic Studies,* No. 2, 1984.

TABLE 5. POPULATION OF CHILDREN AND SENIOR CITIZENS IN CANADIAN JEWRY, 1961–1985 (ROUNDED TO NEAREST 50 PEOPLE)

	1961	1971	1981	1985 Estimates*
Total Canadian Population	18,238,250	21,568,300	24,343,200	25,430,000
Total Jewish Population	254,350	276,000	296,400	304,000
As Part Of All Canada	1.39 Per Cent	1.28 Per Cent	1.22 Per Cent	1.20 Per Cent
All Canada Child Population				
Aged 0–14	6,191,900	6,378,800	5,477,200	5,117,000
As Part Of Canadian Population	34.0 Per Cent	29.6 Per Cent	22.5 Per Cent	20.1 Per Cent
Jewish Child Population				
Aged 0–14	70,300	56,800	53,100	52,000
As Part Of All Jews	27.6 Per Cent	20.6 Per Cent	17.9 Per Cent	17.1 Per Cent
Jewish Senior Population				
Aged 65 And Over	20,850	32,500	48,700	56,000
As Part Of All Jews	8.2 Per Cent	11.8 Per Cent	16.4 Per Cent	18.4 Per Cent

*By extrapolation of the annual change for each category experienced between 1971 and 1981, to the four years 1981–1985.

Sources: 1971 Census of Canada, Report No. 92-732 (Bulletin 1.4-4), inside cover; 1981 Census of Canada, Report No. 92-912, Table 3.

become deviant. Given this situation, there is no reason to expect any reversal of the established Canadian Jewish fertility pattern of today, at least in the near future.[6]

LEO DAVIDS

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[6] See Leo Davids, "Jewish Demography: A Brief Overview of the Current World Situation," paper presented at the plenary assembly of the Canadian Jewish Congress, May 14, 1983; and Veevers (ed.), *op. cit.*, chapter 3.

World Jewish Population, 1982

THE 1984 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK (AJYB) contained new estimates of the Jewish population in the various countries of the world at the end of 1982, as well as background information and analysis. The statistical tables are reprinted here, without the accompanying text. Changes have been made in one respect only. While the estimates for the Jews in the 1984 AJYB related to the end of 1982, the data for the general population of the respective countries reproduced the United Nations estimates as of mid-year 1981. This time the updated United Nations estimates as of mid-year 1982 have been used for the total population,[1] and the proportion of Jews per 1,000 of the respective country's total population has been recomputed accordingly.

The 1986 AJYB will present updated and, where necessary, revised Jewish population estimates for the countries of the world at the end of 1984.

The three main elements which affect the accuracy of each estimate are the nature of the base data, the recency of the base data, and the method of updating. A simple code, combining these elements, is used to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of the Jewish population figures reported in the detailed tables below. The code indicates different ranges of possible error in the reported estimates: (A) base figure derived from countrywide census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the intervening period; (B) base figure derived from somewhat less accurate countrywide Jewish population investigation; partial information on population movements in the intervening period; (C) base figure derived from less recent sources and/or partial coverage of Jewish population in the country; updating according to demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends; and (D) base figure essentially conjectural; no reliable updating procedure. In categories (A), (B), and (C) the year for which the principal base figure was obtained is also reported.

U.O. SCHMELZ
SERGIO DELLAPERGOLA

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[1] United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *Population and Vital Statistics Report: Data Available as of January 1, 1984* (ST/ESA/STAT/SER. A/147).

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, BY CONTINENTS AND MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS, 1980 AND 1982

	1980			1982		
		Revised				% Change
Region	Original	Abs. Nos.	Per Cent	Abs. Nos.	Per Cent	1980–82
Diaspora	9,745,200	9,700,200	74.7	9,614,300	74.0	−0.9
Israel	3,282,700	3,282,700	25.3	3,374,300	26.0	+2.8
World	13,027,900	12,982,900	100.0	12,988,600	100.0	+0.0
America, Total	6,491,950	6,473,600	49.9	6,477,700	49.9	+0.1
North[a]	5,998,000	5,998,000	46.2	6,013,000	46.3	+0.2
Central	44,750	47,700	0.4	46,800	0.4	−1.9
South	449,200	427,900	3.3	417,900	3.2	−2.3
Europe, Total	2,969,500	2,928,800	22.6	2,842,700	21.9	−2.9
West	1,121,000	1,080,300	8.3	1,070,900	8.3	−0.9
East & Balkans[b]	1,848,500	1,848,500	14.2	1,771,800	13.6	−4.2
Asia, Total	3,327,900	3,327,900	25.6	3,417,200	26.3	+2.7
Israel	3,282,700	3,282,700	25.3	3,374,300	26.0	+2.8
Rest[c]	45,200	45,200	0.4	42,900	0.3	−5.1
Africa, Total	164,550	173,600	1.3	172,000	1.3	−0.9
North	21,050	22,550	0.2	21,250	0.2	−5.8
South	109,550	120,550	0.9	120,250	0.9	−0.2
Rest[c]	33,950	30,500	0.2	30,500	0.2	—
Oceania	74,000	79,000	0.6	79,000	0.6	—

[a] U.S.A. and Canada.

[b] The Asian territories of USSR and Turkey are included in "East Europe and Balkans."

[c] Including Ethiopia.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE AMERICAS, 1982

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Canada	24,634,000	308,000	12.5	A 1981
U.S.A.	232,057,000	5,705,000	24.6	B 1971
Total Northern America		6,013,000		
Bahamas	218,000	500	2.3	B 1970
Costa Rica	2,324,000	2,200	1.0	C 1980
Cuba	9,782,000	700	0.1	D
Dominican Republic	5,744,000	100	0.0	D
Guatemala	7,699,000	900	0.1	D
Haiti	5,201,000	100	0.0	D
Jamaica	2,227,000	300	0.1	B 1982
Mexico	73,011,000	35,000	0.5	C 1970
Netherlands Antilles	253,000	700	2.8	D
Panama	2,089,000	3,500	1.7	C 1982
Puerto Rico	3,297,000	2,500	0.8	D
Other		300		D
Total Central America		46,800		
Argentina	29,158,000	233,000	8.0	C 1960
Bolivia	5,916,000	1,000	0.2	C 1982
Brazil	126,807,000	100,000	0.8	B 1980
Chile	11,487,000	20,000	1.7	C 1970
Colombia	28,776,000	7,000	0.2	B 1977
Ecuador	8,945,000	1,000	0.1	C 1982
Paraguay	3,370,000	700	0.2	C 1982
Peru	18,223,000	5,000	0.3	C 1982
Surinam	350,000	200	0.6	D
Uruguay	2,947,000	30,000	10.2	D
Venezuela	14,714,000	20,000	1.4	D
Total Southern America		417,900		
Total		6,477,700		

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE, 1982

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Austria	7,571,000	7,500	1.0	B 1971
Belgium	9,855,000	32,500	3.3	D
Bulgaria	9,101,000	3,400	0.4	C 1965
Czechoslovakia	15,369,000	8,700	0.6	D
Denmark	5,118,000	6,900	1.3	C 1968
Finland	4,824,000	1,000	0.2	B 1982
France	54,219,000	530,000	9.8	B 1972–8
Germany, East	16,697,000	900	0.1	D
Germany, West	61,638,000	33,500	0.5	B 1982
Gibraltar	30,000	600	20.0	A 1981
Great Britain	56,341,000	350,000	6.2	B 1977
Greece	9,793,000	5,000	0.5	B 1978
Hungary	10,702,000	63,000	5.9	D
Ireland	3,483,000	2,000	0.6	B 1982
Italy	56,748,000	32,000	0.6	B 1982
Luxemburg	364,000	700	1.9	B 1970
Netherlands	14,310,000	26,500	1.9	B 1966
Norway	4,115,000	950	0.2	A 1982
Poland	36,227,000	4,800	0.1	D
Portugal	10,033,000	600	0.1	D
Rumania	22,558,000	30,000	1.3	B 1979
Spain	37,935,000	12,000	0.3	D
Sweden	8,325,000	15,000	1.8	C 1982
Switzerland	6,344,000	19,000	3.0	A 1980
Turkey[a]	46,312,000	21,000	0.5	C 1982
USSR[a]	269,994,000	1,630,000	6.0	B 1979
Yugoslavia	22,646,000	5,000	0.2	B 1980
Other		150		D
Total		2,842,700		

[a] Including Asian regions.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ASIA, 1982

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Hong Kong	5,233,000	1,000	0.2	C 1980
India	717,762,000	4,300	0.0	B 1971
Iran	40,240,000	30,000	0.8	D
Iraq	14,161,000	200	0.0	D
Israel	4,063,700[a]	3,374,300	830.4	A 1982
Japan	118,449,000	800	0.0	D
Lebanon	2,637,000	250	0.1	D
Philippines	50,740,000	150	0.0	C 1982
Singapore	2,472,000	400	0.2	C 1982
Syria	9,660,000	4,000	0.4	D
Thailand	48,490,000	300	0.0	C 1980
Yemen	6,085,000	1,200	0.2	D
Other		300		D
Total		3,417,200		

[a] End 1982.

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA, 1982

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Algeria	19,911,000	300	0.0	D
Egypt	44,673,000	250	0.0	D
Ethiopia	32,775,000	27,000	0.8	C 1976
Morocco	21,392,000	17,000	0.8	C 1971
South Africa	30,044,000	119,000	4.0	B 1980
Tunisia	6,726,000	3,700	0.6	C 1982
Zaire	30,250,000	200	0.0	D
Zambia	6,029,000	300	0.1	D
Zimbabwe	7,600,000	1,250	0.2	C 1980
Other		3,000		D
Total		172,000		

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN OCEANIA, 1982

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Australia	15,178,000	75,000	4.9	B 1981
New Zealand	3,125,000	4,000	1.3	B 1981
Total		79,000		

TABLE 7. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION (100,000 JEWS AND ABOVE), 1982.

Rank	Country	Jewish Population	% of Total Jewish Population In the Diaspora	% of Total Jewish Population In the World
1	United States	5,705,000	59.3	43.9
2	Israel	3,374,300	—	26.0
3	Soviet Union	1,630,000	17.0	12.5
4	France	530,000	5.5	4.1
5	Great Britain	350,000	3.6	2.7
6	Canada	308,000	3.2	2.4
7	Argentina	233,000	2.4	1.8
8	South Africa	119,000	1.2	0.9
9	Brazil	100,000	1.1	0.8
Total 8 Largest Diaspora Communities		8,975,000	93.3	69.1
Total 9 Largest World Communities		12,349,300	—	95.1